


How Long Can The CPS Ignore The Criminality Of Hope Not Hate?


restorationist.org.uk/how-long-can-the-cps-ignore-hope-not-hates-criminality

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As evidence mounts of ongoing criminal conduct and state involvement, it appears Hope Not Hate is proudly continuing the legacy of its disgraced predecessor, Searchlight. Legal and factual scrutiny of this organisation reveals a cynical exploitation of English law and well-designed tactics.



In *"The Tailor of Panama"* (2001), a fraudster tailor, Harry Pendel (Geoffrey Rush), fabricates tales of a secretive underground revolutionary movement, the "Silent Resistance," to cynical MI6 officer Andy Osnard (Pierce Brosnan) as a way of paying off his debts. Osnard is well aware Pendel's fantastical creation is absurd, but transmits ever-worsening reports to keep his own nest feathered. It eventually provokes a full US invasion. Despite being caught in their own escalating web of exaggerated fiction, the pair justify their actions citing the corrupt behaviour of the country's villains.

The philosophical principle certain actions remain inherently wrong regardless of their beneficial consequences traces from ancient Stoic concepts of virtue ethics across medieval natural law theory to Enlightenment deontology. While earlier thinkers like Aquinas established intrinsically evil acts couldn't be justified by good intentions, Immanuel Kant crystallised this into systematic moral philosophy through his categorical imperative, arguing moral duties are absolute and treating people merely as means to ends violates human dignity.

This Kantian framework directly influenced modern rights-based theories and continues to anchor contemporary debates against consequentialist approaches which would permit harmful acts if they produce greater overall good, reflecting an enduring tension between duty-based and outcome-based moral reasoning which has persisted from ancient philosophy through current ethical discussion.

This is the perverse pseudo-logic of an increasing stack of appalling legislation, notably Boris Johnson's Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021, which allows intelligence officers and their informants to murder, torture, bug, propagandise, and engage in injustice, if it's all in the interests of justice and the greater good.

It's unlikely any of this penetrates the grey offices of Hope Not Hate (real name: Searchlight Information Services). It won't be lost on critics of Britain's Attorney General, Richard Hermer (KC), the man assigned to investigating abuse of NGO status and criminal activity: a former volunteer and patron of Searchlight described as an "active and dedicated antifascist." The term "antifascist" has been used by communist groups synonymously to describe themselves for nearly a century.

As perversion of the Charities Act 2011 proliferates, it is clear a network of "human rights" organisations in the UK are abusing the law under a false belief evil is justified in the pursuit of good, and criminality is justified in the service of justice.

Executive Summary

This article presents a detailed case against the organisation *Hope Not Hate*, arguing despite years of documented misconduct, including harassment, unlawful data gathering, and potentially criminal political activity, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has failed to act. The article questions whether the CPS's inaction is due to oversight, political alignment, or something more troubling: a structural reluctance to investigate organisations that present themselves as "anti-extremist" while operating outside the rule of law.

Founded with the stated aim of opposing political extremism, *Hope Not Hate* has, we argue, evolved into a partisan pressure group. It uses its charitable status and media influence to silence political opponents, disrupt civic organisations, and intimidate private individuals. This activity, it is claimed, often occurs beneath the threshold of law enforcement attention, despite numerous complaints, allegations, and publicly available evidence.

Key concerns raised in the article include:

- Persistent allegations of criminal conduct, including doxxing, targeted harassment, and unlawful surveillance;
- A pattern of strategic litigation and vexatious complaints intended to chill lawful political expression -Misuse of charitable status and judicial mechanisms to evade accountability and suppress scrutiny;
- Continuity with the tactics of the now-discredited 'Searchlight' network, including the recycling of personnel and methods;
- CPS inertia in the face of material evidence submitted over many years, including whistleblower accounts, investigative reporting, and documented complaints.

Our article argues that this is more than a case of regulatory failure. It raises fundamental questions about the political neutrality of public prosecutors and the future of the rule of law in Britain. If activist groups can act with apparent impunity while their critics face legal or professional ruin, then the principle of equal justice is no longer credible.

The piece concludes with a call for a full and independent inquiry into the conduct of *Hope Not Hate* and the inaction of the CPS. Without intervention, public confidence in legal impartiality will continue to deteriorate, and the boundaries of lawful dissent will be further constricted.

A History Of Unlawful Behaviour

Gerry Gable was a radical young communist who volunteered for *Daily Worker* newspaper (now *Morning Star*) and later as a trade union "community organiser," but became disillusioned as a political candidate for the Communist Party of Great Britain when it appeared to turn against his own ethnic interests. He became the "intelligence officer" for a group of vigilante thugs in London, led by a gay nightclub owner, who were denounced by their own communities for wanting to "take revenge on the Nazis." The history of the period has been extensively documented.

In 1964, he and two accomplices were convicted of "entry by artifice" for burglarising the flat of historian David Irving. posing as GPO (*General Post Office*) telephone engineers to steal documents to give to *Special Branch*. The same year, he and a group of radical Labour MPs founded Searchlight, with himself as "research director" and sports journalist Maurice Ludmer as editor. One of its "journalists" (a thug enforcer) was convicted of arson, and its most virulent opponents were other left-wing groups.

By the 1970s, Gable was working for *London Weekend Television* (LWT) as a researcher releasing memos boasting of his links to the intelligence services, and Searchlight was publishing claims key establishment figures were part of a secret paramilitary neo-nazi group called "Column 88." The information purportedly came from a former communist party activist (Dave Roberts) who had infiltrated the National Front and was later arrested for assault on a restaurant waiter and arson on Communist Party premises. Left-wing publications were deeply suspicious the group was fabricated or exaggerated, and twenty years later, Searchlight published in their "community handbook" it was, in fact, a state "honey trap" related to identifying unionist militants attracted to the violence in Northern Ireland.

A few years later, Gable had wracked up the BBC several hundred thousand pounds in libel fees while working for *Panorama*, claiming in their episode "Maggie's Militant Tendency" key members of the Tory party were secret nazis. Then, Private Eye magazine were forced to pay out for libel when they falsely published a member of the military police had tried to murder him.

During the 1990s, Gable revealed the existence of a secret neo-nazi paramilitary group for ITV's *World In Action*, named "Combat 18." This time the information came from a BNP infiltrator (Tim Hepple), and another National Front extremist (Matthew Collins). Hepple boasted of intelligence links and appeared to be stirring both sides. Right-wing groups claimed the group was massively exaggerated; left-wing groups derided it as another intelligence-linked scheme. Stories published by the series became more and more fanciful.

After they subsequently libelled three libertarian writers, Searchlight were collectively sued and almost bankrupted, taking small bookshops with them in the process. In 2003, the Charity Commission upheld complaints from the British National Party they were abusing corporate structuring and it was forced to divide into three separate organisations. Then they were sued unsuccessfully for libel again by two BNP members.

Pulling Down The Corporate Veil

Nick Lowles (aka "Peter Brighton," aka "Laurence King,"), a "freelance journalist" at *World in Action* and *Panorama*, became co-editor of Searchlight in 1999 with Steve Silver, quickly orientating the organisation network to dismantle Britain's largest political party, the British National Party, and making enemies of the radical left. Accusations again began to circle. More right-wing organisations threatened to sue over claims of links to Northern Ireland intelligence operations.

In 2002, *Searchlight* began masquerading under "Stop the BNP," adopting "Hope Not Hate" in 2004. It started the process of splintering the organisation from its dubious past. Their former "communications advisor," firebrand journalist and former GMB union official, Dan Hodges (son of Labour MP Glenda Jackson), claimed they used "every dirty, underhand, low down, unscrupulous trick in the book."

What happened in the following decade appears to be a bitter power struggle involving Lowles' operations to wrestle control of Searchlight for himself. *Searchlight Information Services* (SIS) became "Hope Not Hate" (a limited company to do campaigning), and Searchlight Educational Trust (SET), the funding charity, was renamed to "Hope not Hate Charitable Trust." Searchlight's "State of the British Right" publication became the "State of Hate" report. The conflict culminated in a 2013 lawsuit where *Hope Not Hate* successfully sued Searchlight for naming rights while creating a frivolous entity Hope Not Hate (Services).

Freedom of Information Act requests have revealed they were paid by the Home Office for rather questionable invoice items, paid by the London Assembly, as well as employed by the Department for Communities and Local Government. Their former director, Ruth Smeeth MP, is on record as secretly briefing a foreign government about her own PM's intentions

The Economist accused them of massively exaggerating the celebration of an MP's murder by their political enemies. *The Spectator* called their gangster tactics a form of racketeering and coercion. *The Critic* called them the left's sponsored "attack dog." Left-wing *Novara Media* accused them of cherry-picking their opponents. Influential Whitehall blogger *Guido Fawkes* published recordings which appear to implicate the group in partisan violation of electoral law.

In 2018 they were successfully sued for libelling a bookshop owner. In 2021, they were accused of libelling their own award winner. In 2023, the *Shawcross Review* of the Home Office's Prevent program accused them of falsely conflating legitimate disagreement with

extremism. In 2024, Lowles was forced to publicly apologise for circulating a hoax list of protesters and falsely claiming extremists were engaging in acid attacks. In 2025, he was accused again of circulating false claims of immediate infanticide in Gaza.

Lowles, presumably quoting his extensive study of Aquinas and Kant, publicly claimed the dishonesty was justified because it served their interests:

Yes, the list was a hoax, but just look at the front pages of today's papers. An anti-racist message is being transmitted to millions of homes this morning.

A Bankrupt Doctrine From The Radical 60s

Searchlight and Hope Not Hate's activities are nothing original. They are American racketeering tactics copied from the self-appointed likes of Media Matters, the ADL, the SPLC, and GLAAD. All of these unelected "watchdogs" find their philosophical roots in the bizarre and twisted doctrine of a German radical who fled Weimar Berlin to live out his years in California.

Herbert Marcuse was a communist extremist and pillar of the Institute for Socialism (original name) at Frankfurt which grew into a different branch of Marxism. After fleeing to the US while working for the CIA's predecessor, he became a rock star of the anti-Vietnam movement and published numerous intellectual justifications radicals still fall back on today: the fusion of Freud's ideas with Marx to unleash "sexual energy" for revolutionary communist zeal; and the disparagement of comfortable life in the capitalist world. He was expelled from USC San Diego by Ronald Reagan's influence. Quietly in the literature are the countless affairs he allegedly had with suspiciously young female students.

Most notoriously, Marcuse wrote extensively on Karl Popper's "paradox of tolerance" in liberal society: if one tolerates the intolerant, the loudest intolerant voices drown out the tolerant ones, corrupting tolerance itself. His argument was immersed under unreadable pseudo-academic jargon, but it boiled down to: fascism is all around us, and for tolerance to survive, we must oppress the intolerant.

In his infamous 1969 essay, "Repressive Tolerance," he outlines the justification for prosecuting thoughtcrime and implementing pre-censorship, because left-wing types are peaceful angels with benign intentions and murderous dictatorship only ever emerges from the right:

Liberating tolerance, then, would mean intolerance against movements from the Right and toleration of movements from the Left. As to the scope of this tolerance and intolerance: ... it would extend to the stage of action as well as of discussion and propaganda, of deed as well as of word. The traditional criterion of clear and present danger seems no longer adequate to a stage where the whole society is in the situation of the theater audience when somebody cries: 'fire'. It is a situation in which the total catastrophe could be triggered off any moment, not only by a technical error, but also by a rational miscalculation of risks, or by a rash speech of one of the leaders.

He goes on to explain the emergency fascists are everywhere, and, paraphrasing, implies free speech will always end in the chambers of Auschwitz if we don't stop discussion and communication:

The whole post-fascist period is one of clear and present danger. Consequently, true pacification requires the withdrawal of tolerance before the deed, at the stage of communication in word, print, and picture. Such extreme suspension of the right of free speech and free assembly is indeed justified only if the whole of society is in extreme danger. I maintain that our society is in such an emergency situation, and that it has become the normal state of affairs.

This is obviously a dogma totalitarian enough to rival the Nazis themselves, and was written before sheer scale of communist horror was discovered. As sordid, partisan, and fallacious as it was, Marcuse's ramblings had enormous influence in the decades following the Holocaust. Many groups like Gerry Gable's sprung up.

Not only does it open the door to censorship and suppression of legitimate dissent, Marcuse's "solution" creates a paradox where tolerance becomes intolerant, undermining its own foundation. It assumes an objective standard of "true" vs "false" consciousness which is impossible to establish (yet only left wing progressives can discern), and conflicts with liberal democratic principles of equal participation. All on top of wildly overestimating the manipulative power of mass media while underestimating individual agency, and undermining the possibility of genuine consensus through open dialogue. The total lack of a limiting criteria virtually ensures scope creep. And that's only the beginning.

The extension of tolerance in 1920s' Berlin led to rampant child prostitution, horrific Frankenstein-style medical experiments, disgust-fueled book burning, and a culture which made visiting British soldiers physically vomit.

Organisations such as Searchlight and Hope Not Hate do not have a complex rationale. Their vigilantism has a righteous cause derived from a magical thinking religious worldview of bogeymen and angels with its toe in a bygone era. All countries are, apparently, drowning under the constant threat of reactionary proto-Nazis around every corner, aiming to use their "free speech" to build gas chambers, and the only way to

prevent the light of Weimar Berlin's progressive utopia succumbing to the inevitable re-emergence of Hitler 2.0 is justified "fair game" tactics of suppression. If it sounds barking mad, it's because it is.

Adopting the American SuperPAC Model

Searchlight has a long and close association with the Labour party: its members were the first directors. Questions about the organisation, and its successor, have a twisted precedent in Parliament.

Challenged on 24 October 2024 by Nick Timothy MP (UIN 11083), Stephanie Peacock MP gave what appears to be a blatantly coached answer on the subject:

HOPE not Hate Limited is not a charity; it is therefore not subject to the restrictions on political activity that apply to charities and does not come under the Charity Commission's jurisdiction. HOPE not Hate Charitable Trust is a charity and therefore does come under the Charity Commission's jurisdiction and cannot engage in partisan political activity. The Charity Commission does not have an open regulatory case on HOPE Not Hate Charitable Trust.

This is a well-known tactic and in many cases unlawful or a sham arrangement. A charity cannot lawfully avoid its political restrictions by simply outsourcing the prohibited activity to a company it's linked to — especially if it funds that company (e.g. providing "grants") or controls it directly or indirectly. Peacock was clearly in error, and it demonstrates the effective smokescreen this organisation has been legally hiding behind.

If Peacock or other MPs – or indeed Hope Not Hate themselves – can be shown to have provided false evidence to a Parliamentary committee, it would constitute contempt of Parliament. Sanctions range from censure to imprisonment. If given under oath, it may also theoretically constitute perjury. Parliamentary privilege applies to neither.

According to the charity's latest accounts, it receives its restricted funding from a range of established UK charitable foundations and a few notable corporate donors. Among the most consistent backers is the Barrow Cadbury Trust, which contributed again in 2023 following a similar donation the year before. The Paul Hamlyn Foundation remains another major source of support, with over £38,000 received in 2023 alone. New funding also came from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and the Esmée Fairbairn Foundation, while other foundations such as the Aziz Charitable Foundation made smaller contributions or transfers.

Corporate donors have also played a role. Google provided a significant donation in 2022, which appears to have been fully spent by the end of 2023, and Toms Trust made a modest contribution. The Sam and Bella Charitable Trust and the foundation known as This Day (formerly the Jubilee Foundation) were large donors in 2022, but did not contribute again in 2023. Other sources like Stonewall and an anonymous family trust appear in earlier years but not in the most recent accounts.

Overall, the charity raised just under £164,000 in restricted funds during 2023, but expended over £321,000—indicating it drew on reserves accumulated in previous years, or something odd may be happening. Its financial position deteriorated significantly in 2023. While the charity held over £418,000 in net assets at the end of 2022, this figure fell to just over £42,000 by the end of 2023. Most of this loss came from a collapse in unrestricted funds, which dropped from £215,481 to £4,598 over the course of the year, suggesting high dependency on legacy reserves and perhaps a failure to secure ongoing unrestricted donations.

A £650,000 grant was made to Hope Not Hate Limited, an "operational partner," and at year-end the charity was still owed over £43,000 by the company. Operating lease commitments fell sharply, from £17,600 to £5,351, possibly reflecting reduced premises usage or renegotiated agreements.

In terms of operational flow, the charity posted a deficit of £376,341 for the year and absorbed £90,561 in cash from operations—an order of magnitude larger than the prior year's minimal drawdown. This cash drain was partly offset by an increase in deferred income of £290,500, pointing to advance receipts to fund future obligations.

Income for the year totalled just over £417,000, down considerably from £715,000 the previous year. Restricted income came largely from institutional grants, while unrestricted donations and Gift Aid made up the remainder. The organisation ran no significant fundraising events in 2023, compared to the prior year's £66,000 from an annual dinner. Likewise, revenue from charitable trading activity—training and literature sales—ceased entirely.

Charitable expenditure increased to nearly £785,000 in 2023, with the majority spent on grant funding (£650,000 to Hope Not Hate Limited). Direct activity spending was relatively low, and staff costs dropped to zero as no staff were formally employed during the year, unlike 2022 when seven staff members were paid. This reflects a shift towards a model where charitable delivery is outsourced entirely to the associated company, rather than being conducted by directly employed staff within the charity itself.

Rumours circulating the trust was "propped up" by USAID do not appear to be well-founded, although the ultimate source of donor funds may well invite further examination.

The last financial statements for *Hope Not Hate Limited* paint a picture of a delivery organisation funded almost entirely by the charitable arm, *Hope Not Hate Charitable Trust*. In 2023, the limited company received £650,000 in grants from the charity, up from £625,000 the previous year. This suggests an increasingly central role for the company in executing the trust's activities, but also confirms a highly dependent financial structure.

By year-end, *Hope Not Hate Limited* held £136,556 in net current assets, a decline from £208,986 in 2022. Although cash at bank increased to over £500,000, its creditor obligations also rose substantially—more than doubling from £134,202 to £370,744. Most of this increase stems from "other creditors," suggesting a build-up of unpaid operational costs or deferrals not itemised in detail.

The company did not require or undergo an audit and claimed small-company exemptions under the *Companies Act 2006*. It maintained a consistent workforce of 17 employees, who presumably carry out the bulk of the group's campaigning. While the accounts note the use of estimation (particularly for recognising deferred income) the operational model appears stable in headcount but increasingly strained in liquidity.

Notably, the limited company also recharged minor operational expenses back to the charitable trust (under £2,000), reflecting a resource-sharing agreement for office space and shared personnel. As of year-end, the company owed the charity over £43,000—an unresolved balance which, combined with their grant dependency, underscores how entangled the two entities are in practical and financial terms.

The financial disclosures of *Hope Not Hate* expose a carefully structured arrangement in which a registered charity funds and facilitates the operations of a politically active company through mechanisms which appear to comply with charity law on paper but undermine its spirit in practice. *Hope Not Hate Limited*, the political arm, received £650,000 in grants from the *Hope Not Hate Charitable Trust* in 2023, with no discernible independent revenue stream. Its operations, staff, and premises are shared with the charity, and its survival is wholly dependent on charitable funding. There is no meaningful separation in substance, only in form.

This structure functions as a form of regulatory arbitrage (exploiting loopholes in regulatory systems to circumvent unfavourable regulations). The charity, bound by legal restrictions against partisan political activity, does not campaign directly but routes funds and personnel into a sister entity that does. In doing so, it exploits the jurisdictional boundary between the *Charity Commission*, which regulates only the trust, and the political freedoms afforded to limited companies. The political work is carried out beyond the reach of charity law, but financed entirely through tax-advantaged donations raised under the pretext of charitable purpose.

Such an arrangement is not a loophole discovered by accident—it is designed. The regulatory firewall between the two entities is superficial, and the practical outcome is the public donates to a charity while its resources fund a political NGO. This use of charitable infrastructure to subsidise political activism erodes trust, distorts the intent of charity law, and undermines the legitimacy of both regulatory frameworks. The evidence presented in the financial documents points to deliberate structuring for legal arbitrage of a kind which is often found by anti-money laundering (AML) investigations: a model that mimics compliance while subverting the principles that justify the charity's privileged status.

Researcher Charlotte Gill has produced analysis on the dual entity's background over the last few years. She notes overall grant receipts amounting to £2.34 million over 31 grants since 2012, and the charitable arm received £141,380 in government grants during the 2019–2020 fiscal year, with some of that funding reportedly coming directly from the Home Office. These are taxpayer-funded grants provided to the charity's educational wing, raising questions about whether public money is being used to support activities that might be considered political.

According to her data, the largest private donors are major philanthropic trusts, including two "unnamed family trusts": the Sigrid Rausing Trust (over £1.365 million across multiple grants and £450k specifically since 2018); the Paul Hamlyn Foundation (as noted), which provided approximately £445–£585k through its Migration Fund in multiple donations since 2020; the Sam and Bella Sebba Charitable Trust (£80k, as noted); the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust (£385k, as noted); and The Big Give (~£55k) . Additional trust-based donors include the AB Charitable Trust, Trust for London, Indigo Trust, and historically notable ones like the Oak Foundation, Comic Relief, and the Migration Foundation. Facebook UK is noted as a corporate sponsor, and high-profile backers include Alan Sugar, Eddie Izzard, Paloma Faith, Amir Khan, Beverley Knight, and others credited as supporters—though precise donation sums are not disclosed.

The *Charity Commission for England and Wales, Campaigning and Political Activity Guidance for Charities (CC9)*, updated 7 November 2022 guidance is clear on "charity by proxy" or "circumvention of charitable restrictions."

From section 3.3 and section 3.6:

"A charity cannot have a political purpose."

"Political activity cannot be the continuing and sole activity of the charity."

"An organisation with a political purpose, such as promoting a change in the law, legally cannot be a charity. This applies even if the organisation has other purposes which are charitable."

"Some charities choose to work alongside an associated non-charitable campaigning organisation, and this is also a legitimate option."

And crucially in section 6.6:

"A charity working with other organisations must guard against the possible 'leakage' of its charitable funds – meaning that the money it has contributed to a coalition or alliance must not be spent for purposes other than those of the charity."

Under the *Charities Act 2011*, the Commission has wide-ranging powers to address misconduct. These include the authority to open statutory inquiries, issue official warnings, suspend or remove trustees, and disqualify individuals whose conduct damages public confidence in the charitable sector.

If *Hope Not Hate* is shown to have used charitable funds to support partisan campaigns (like its parent, Searchlight), or if there is evidence it engaged in activities such as harassment or coercion under the guise of charity, this would constitute mismanagement and could trigger formal action. Precedents like the Commission's handling of the Captain Tom Foundation and the IEA show where serious governance failures or breaches of charitable purpose occur, the Commission has not hesitated to act. They could face regulatory inquiry, removal of trustees, and potential disqualification from future charitable involvement.

In the least, their structuring necessitates the issuance of a formal warning under s.75A of the Charities Act 2011. An organisational network set up to with the explicit purpose of intentionally circumventing the law is not lawful: it violates the common law doctrine of *sham or pretence* (Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832), is an abuse of *legal personality* (Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34), and constitutes *improper purpose* (Padfield v Minister of Agriculture [1968] AC 997). Corporate veil-piercing law may apply if the Trust is a facade, though no precedent exists.

Trustees who misuse charitable funds may be liable for breach of trust, and if dishonest, may face prosecution under the Fraud Act 2006, section 4 (abuse of position). Although "embezzlement" is a term more familiar in Scottish law, the English equivalents include false accounting and theft. Knowledge, dishonesty, and intent are key.

Which would be worrying for "Red Army" pole-to-pole extremist, Matthew Collins, as membership of a proscribed group like Combat 18 is criminal under section 11 of the Terrorism Act 2000. It disqualifies someone from charity trusteeship under the Charities Act 2016.

Funds may undergo forced disclosure through the use of Norwich Pharmacal orders. Trustee cost orders are lawful under Auden McKenzie (Pharma Division) Ltd v Patel [2019] EWCA Civ 2291.

Libel As A Business

At the heart of English law is the idea of reasonableness; there is an ordinary everyman on the Clapham omnibus hiding a centrist dad opinion. The behaviour of *Searchlight* and *Hope Not Hate* strikes us as *foreign*. We do not need vigilante partisans and their mad ideas to discern extremism; it is an intrinsically foul smell to the Englishman's nose *prima facie*.

The modus operandis really is a childishly simple game any five year-old in the playground would recognise as the game of "it." In the US, it would be called "cooties." Unemployable radicals and former extremists devise lists of people they don't like, – three men in a pub, political parties with 4M votes, anticommunist PhDs, Facebook grumblers, anonymised YouTubers, GB News presenters, Reform councillors, or anyone else unable or unwilling to fight back – and begin to trawl two decades of social media posts for anything which can be misconstrued. This begins a serial, collectivised process of escalating unlawful stalking one would normally associate with domestic violence perpetrators: sockpuppeting into private *Telegram* channels, registering for private events under fake names, visiting housing estates to offer bribes, and secret photography.

Eventually, the material is laundered into a dossier of "case files" which are aimed to cause maximal reputational damage, with alarmist libel villifying the targets as sinister figures with nefarious intentions so they end up stigmatised out of political life. These elaborately-designed PDFs are distributed to gullible Labour MPs, and radical fellow travellers working at publications such as the Byline Times and The National. But the real

goal of the laundering operation are gullible supine reporters at major outlets such as the [BBC](#), [Channel 4](#), and [The Guardian](#) (the easily-frightened, mask-wearing, climate weather map types). This industrialised libel machine carries on under the Gablean auspices of being a valuable source of "intelligence" to Britain's security apparatus "monitoring" the Panamanian "Silent Resistance" of the "far right," with the organisation described in mainstream media in flattering terms, e.g. "antifascist charity."

Business is good. And when it's not good, the *Tailor of Panama* has a plan. Show me the man and I'll show you the crime.

To "defame" is from Latin *diffamare*, or "to spread abroad by ill report, spread news, divulge." Some have it from the French derivation (*defamacioun*), meaning to forcibly "defaminate" or to disconnect someone from the love and protection of their family (i.e. "disown", "estrangle", or "repudiate"). However, the "fam-" is generally accepted to be from *fama* (reputation, fame), not *familia* (family). [Ecclesiastical courts](#) in England from around the 12th century treated it as a moral sin. By the 16th century, it became a [tort](#).

Libel is from *libellus*, diminutive of *liber* (book), from the French *libelle* ("written accusation"). In [De Libellis Famosis](#) (1606), the [Star Chamber](#) declared criminal libel an offence even if the libelous statement was true, because true libel could still provoke breaches of the peace. The [Defamation Act 1952](#) and [Defamation Act 1996](#) formed the main basis of remedial legislation, but were superseded by the [Defamation Act 2013](#) to deal with [libel tourism](#).

In other words, the English have a long history of dealing with libel. To prove it, the claimant must show:

- The statement has a defamatory meaning: i.e., it tends to lower the person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society ([Lachaux v Independent \(2019\)](#)).
- The statement refers to the claimant.
- The statement was published to a third party.
- **Serious harm:** under [Section 1](#) of the *Defamation Act 2013*, individuals must show serious harm to reputation; businesses must show serious financial loss.

No complete defence applies: this includes truth, honest opinion, or public interest. No valid defence must apply, such as truth ([s.2](#)), honest opinion ([s.3](#)), or public interest ([s.4](#)). The "honest opinion" defence fails if the statement is presented as fact, lacks a factual basis, or cannot be held by an honest person, as in [Koutsogiannis v Random House \[2019\]](#).

Knowingly or recklessly publishing damaging allegations may defeat any public interest defence. [Weasel words](#) and [thought-terminating clichés](#) like "far-right" or "misogynist" carry [defamatory sting](#). Labels like these must be backed by verifiable facts, or they may lead to liability and aggravated damages.

In Vince v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2024] EWHC 1806 (KB), the court allowed the claim to proceed over being labelled an “extremist.” In a second case (Vince v Staines & Tice [2025] EWHC 412 (KB)), damages were awarded when similar allegations were not defended. These establish that allegations of extremism can be defamatory.

If *Hope Not Hate* presents opinion as fact, or a company asserts “opinions” without a factual basis, this defence is weakened. The repetition of hearsay is also actionable. A company can express opinions, but cannot escape liability by labelling defamatory assertions as views, and republishing defamatory hearsay without verification remains actionable, as confirmed in McManus v Beckham [2002] EWCA Civ 939. Therefore, if an organisation like *Hope Not Hate* presents allegations as fact, asserts corporate opinions without evidential grounding, or repeats defamatory content under the guise of reporting, it risks exposure to libel where serious reputational or financial harm results.

A tort for malicious falsehood (also known as injurious falsehood or trade libel, Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524) is a separate claim from defamation. A course of action may be brought against a defendant who maliciously publishes a false statement which identifies the claimant, their business, property or other economic interests, and can be shown to have caused the claimant pecuniary loss or to fall within one of the exceptions in section 3(1) of the 1952 Defamation Act. In the case of Lowles’ 2024 tweet about an unverified acid attack in Middlesbrough, he apologised; no litigation followed.

Academics will recognise the means of these tactics to achieve the ends of “stochastic terrorism.” Although not a legal concept, it was popularised in 2011, with its definition given as:

the use of mass communications to stir up random lone wolves to carry out violent or terrorist acts that are statistically predictable but individually unpredictable.

However, in the process of dodging these obstacles, they've learnt a trick or two.

In 2017, Farage sued *Hope Not Hate*, but subsequently withdrew. They were represented by Bindmans LLP and Mark Lewis (solicitor-advocate), and later William Bennett KC. All have high-profile track records in defamation litigation.

Aside from the publicised litigation against Farage, no known cases have resulted in reported judgments against them on the UK books. Some unreported defamation or employment claims may exist as sealed records.

The limitation period for libel is one year (Section 4A, Limitation Act 1980). The “single-publication rule” (Section 8, Defamation Act 2013) prevents re-litigating based on subsequent web access. Some claimants argue re-publication resets the clock, but this remains grey. *Hope Not Hate*'s publication timing appears to spread out their libellous “reports” against potential claimants in such a way that no two such claimants can come at them at once. This would suggest foreknowledge and premeditation: if your business is libel, and you know it, you act to reduce your legal exposure.

For those republishing libel, under section 319 of the Communications Act 2003, broadcasters must ensure "due accuracy and impartiality" in news. Failure may lead to fines or revocation of Ofcom licenses. *Hope Not Hate's* "reporting" is in such violation of the *Independent Press Standards Organisation's* Editor's Code of Practice, it's difficult to know where to start.

Exploiting Grey Areas Of Organisation Law

The foggy structuring of a political limited company operating in parallel with a fundraising "charity" as its sole beneficiary is clearly suspect. *Hope Not Hate* publicly claim to act as a "research" organisation which collects libraries of information on private individuals which is analogous to a credit reporting bureau.

Credit reference agencies like Experian are regulated separately under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and fall under the jurisdiction of the Financial Conduct Authority. Additionally, they are subject to UK GDPR rules as credit reference agencies, which gives individuals access and correction rights.

The Private Security Industry Act 2001 creates a licensing regime for "private investigations," but the relevant sections have not been commenced, meaning anyone can legally operate as a private investigator in England & Wales. The Security Industry Authority (SIA) cannot regulate this conduct unless someone misuses a protected title (like "close-protection operative").

Hope Not Hate's activities remain lawful unless they breach other laws, such as harassment, fraud, or data protection law.

It is a criminal offence to impersonate a constable under Section 90 of the Police Act 1996, and it is also an offence at common law to impersonate a public official in a way which causes another to act (or not act) in a way they otherwise would not (R v Barnard (1837) 7 C & P 784). While there is no specific crime of "impersonating law enforcement," misrepresenting oneself to obtain a benefit or deceive another may trigger criminal liability under the Fraud Act 2006, especially section 2 (false representation).

Essential OSINT software systems used by organisations of this nature, such as Maltego and SpiderFoot, often prohibit unlawful use in their licence terms. Using such tools to compile political dossiers may breach Section 170 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (unlawful obtaining of personal data), and provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act or Investigatory Powers Act if live data interception occurs.

Compiling lists or profiles of individuals is personal data processing under UK GDPR. Unless *Hope Nor Hate* can rely on a journalistic or legitimate-interest exemption, they must comply with notice and data minimisation principles.

Under Schedule 2, Part 5 of the Data Protection Act 2018, if the processing is for journalism, and the purpose is in the public interest, some GDPR rules (like the right to be informed or data access) don't apply. The organisation has to genuinely be acting as a

journalist and show it is balancing the public interest against privacy rights. [Article 6\(1\)\(f\) of UK GDPR](#) requires a genuine purpose which is not outweighed by harm to the individual's rights; a balancing test (showing your interests don't override the data subject's rights); and transparency, i.e. telling the individuals you've collected their data.

Organisations must tell people when they collect their personal data, even if from public sources ([Article 13/14](#)). This includes telling them who's collecting it, why, how it's used, and their rights. They may only collect what is adequate, relevant, and limited to what's necessary for the purpose ([Article 5\(1\)\(c\)](#)). No storing irrelevant or excessive information "just in case."

The aforementioned [Section 170 of the Data Protection Act 2018](#) makes it a criminal offence to knowingly or recklessly obtain, disclose, or retain personal data without the consent of the "data controller" ([Article 4\(Z\)](#)). This includes accessing data without permission, passing it to others, or keeping it once aware it was unlawfully obtained. The offence carries penalties of up to 12 months' imprisonment or a fine on summary conviction, and up to 2 years' imprisonment or an unlimited fine on indictment. Defences exist where the action was necessary to prevent crime, legally authorised, in the public interest, or based on a reasonable belief of consent. The offence is distinct from civil breaches of UK GDPR and is enforceable by the [Information Commissioner's Office](#).

Clear Acts Of Electoral Interference

One of *Hope Not Hate*'s most vociferous opponents is the Westminster blogger "Guido Fawkes," who has [extensively documented](#) alleged breaches of electoral safeguards and the [entryism](#) of its charitable trustees into Parliament as MPs (e.g. [Anna Turley](#), [Sarah Owen](#), [Antonia Bance](#), [Gurinder Singh Josan](#)). In a notable incident following disclosure of their activity to [prevent Susan Hall](#) from becoming Mayor of London, he [alleged in June 2024](#) its operatives were violating electoral finance law, [which they denied](#).

Under the [Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000](#) (PPERA), as amended by the [Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014](#), any organisation — including *Hope Not Hate* — spending more than £10,000 in England during a regulated election period on activities intended to influence voters must register as a recognised third-party campaigner with the Electoral Commission, pursuant to [section 89\(1\)](#) and [section 94\(3\)](#) of PERA. Additionally, under section 94B (inserted by section 42 of the 2014 Act), such campaigners must not spend more than £9,750 in any single parliamentary constituency. Exceeding these thresholds without registration or proper declaration constitutes a criminal offence under section 94(6), and failure to report relevant spending locations and amounts may breach section 94F. These provisions are enforced by the [Electoral Commission](#) and apply during regulated periods defined under [section 85](#), with breaches subject to investigation, fines, or criminal prosecution under [section 110](#).

Political parties and third-party campaigners are banned from accepting overseas money under section 54 of PPERA. Charities can receive overseas funds, but political campaigning funded by them risks legal action or investigation.

Government departments are bound by the Civil Service Code, issued under Section 5 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which requires civil servants to act with integrity, honesty, objectivity, and impartiality. These duties prohibit the misuse of public resources for partisan purposes.

Additionally, the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, made under Section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 (now governed exclusively by the Procurement Act 2023 and its supporting regulations, e.g., Procurement Regulations 2024), imposed legally binding duties on contracting authorities, including the obligation under *Regulation 18* to treat all economic operators equally and without discrimination, and to act in a transparent and proportionate manner. Funding or favouring politically active groups without a lawful, neutral, and transparent process may breach these obligations. Such conduct is open to *Judicial Review* for illegality or procedural unfairness, and may be subject to audit challenge under the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 or National Audit Office scrutiny, potentially exposing the department to findings of irregularity, improper purpose, or failure to secure value for money.

A former director, Ruth Smeeth, is on record as secretly briefing a foreign government about her own PM's intentions. Lobbying foreign governments on their behalf requires registration under the new Foreign Influence Registration Scheme in the National Security Act 2023. The scheme (not yet commenced) makes non-registration a criminal offence.

Operating as a “movement” or front group while engaging in electoral activity without registering as a third-party campaigner may breach several areas of UK law. Under PPERA, any individual or organisation that incurs more than £10,000 in regulated expenditure intended to influence voters during a regulated period must register with the Electoral Commission (sections 89 and 94), and failure to do so constitutes a criminal offence under section 94(6). Presenting such activity as non-political while soliciting or using funds for electoral purposes may also constitute fraud by false representation under section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006, particularly where donors are misled about the true nature or purpose of the organisation. Additionally, if the entity is registered as a charity, engaging in partisan or electoral campaigning outside its stated charitable objects may breach the Charities Act 2011 and contravene Charity Commission guidance, risking regulatory enforcement or loss of charitable status.

Most of which is ironic, considering *Hope Not Hate* have repetitively libelled officially democratic parties such as UKIP and the Homeland Party (registered with the EU). The *Electoral Commission* registers parties based on formal compliance. It does not police ideology. Labelling a group as “fascist” is a statement of opinion; in this case defamatory and false, it may be actionable.

Carefully Skirting The Criminal Line

Where things become murkier is the uninvestigated behaviour carefully omitted in published "reports," but alleged by victims. The list is long, and harrowing. What is more alarming is the indifference shown by the police and CPS towards what now amounts to a compelling portfolio of activity which can be shown to be in criminal in nature.

Particularly mind-bending are the confusing accounts of *Hope Not Hate* operatives allegedly engaged in blackmail and homosexual liaisons with filmmakers employed by their arch political enemy, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, as told in lurid detail by provocateur Milo Yiannopoulos. Although these testimonies seem unreliable, they involve extremely serious accusations of sexual assault which *Hope Not Hate* felt they needed to explicitly deny.

The most direct legal exposure for *Hope Not Hate*, where it targets individuals through repeated contact or profiling, arises under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which makes it unlawful to pursue a "course of conduct" amounting to harassment or stalking. Under section 1(1), a person must not pursue a course of conduct that amounts to harassment of another and that they know or ought to know would cause alarm or distress.

Crucially, section 1(1A) extends this duty to organisations acting through their employees or agents, meaning that entities like *Hope Not Hate* can be held liable for institutional patterns of harassment.

A "course of conduct" is defined in section 7(3) as conduct involving at least two occasions, and it need not involve threats—persistent contact, monitoring, or targeting can suffice. Unlike some other offences, the Act provides no general "public interest" defence, and the statutory defences under section 1(3)—such as preventing or detecting crime or complying with legal obligations—are narrowly drawn. Breach of the Act may give rise to civil injunctions under section 3, damages, or criminal liability under section 2 (harassment) or section 4 (putting someone in fear of violence), with maximum penalties of up to five years' imprisonment for aggravated forms. Courts have confirmed that campaigns of publication, online abuse, or unwanted surveillance may constitute harassment under this Act, and the threshold is context-sensitive but not especially high where individuals suffer anxiety, reputational damage, or distress from repeated unwanted attention.

This will painfully familiar to employees, who publicised in 2024 they had ironically been victims of sustained harassment.

In terms of "infiltrating" private events on private property, the line is less blurred. Aggravated trespass under section 68 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 applies when entry is made with the intent to disrupt. Entry gained under false pretences may also trigger liability under section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006.

In 2024, a *Hope Not Hate* report claims to be in receipt of confidential criminal records. It is not clear how they obtained this information, or if it actually exists, but publishing details of spent convictions without lawful basis breaches the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, section 8. Accessing DBS-type information without authority may be misconduct in public office or a breach of the Police Act 1997.

In a particularly damning incident related to events depicted in a *Channel 4* documentary, an employee (Harry Shukman) was caught using what appears to be a genuine UK passport with a false name ("Christopher Charles Morton"). Possessing or using a false passport is a criminal offence under section 4 of the Identity Documents Act 2010 (10 years maximum imprisonment). If authorised under a *Criminal Conduct Authorisation* (RIPA 2000, s.29B), the action may be exempted from prosecution.

A simple check of the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) of this *International Civil Aviation Organization 9303 document* would clarify if it would pass the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), and a search of *Interpol's SLTD blacklist database* would reveal it has been altered after theft. E-passports have a digital signature (PKI) from the issuing country. If the passport number was forged or altered, the check digit won't match; if the passport number is fake or doesn't match the signed chip data, the signature check fails. Alongside a UV test for watermarks, the results would confirm the level of sophistication involved in its manufacture. If the MRZ is properly constructed, it would strongly indicate it was an elaborate forgery (a crime), was issued by HM Passport Office (state involvement). To which, the denial of a Freedom of Information Request on security grounds requesting a simple Y/N as whether it is a known valid HMPO document number would be sufficient to conjecture its origin. Alternatively, a lawfully responsible technical consultant from a manufacturer or verification provider might assist.

Statements inciting violence or panic – such as Lowles' apology for violating the Peace with false reports of acid attacks – may breach sections 4A or 18–23 of the Public Order Act 1986, especially where recklessness to racial or religious hatred is shown. False claims about acid attacks could meet the threshold for criminal liability depending on the context and intention.

In a recent story, YouTuber "Morgoth" alleges employees repetitively harassed neighbours and offered to bribe them for information. If staff did indeed harass or offered inducement for personal information, this may constitute harassment and stalking under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, bribery under the sections 1–2 of the Bribery Act 2010, and/or witness intimidation under section 51 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001.

(Note: we have been privately shown photographic evidence of these handwritten inducements dated May 16, which include Shukman's offers of "compensation," his signature, and what appears to be a personal UK mobile phone number ending in the digits 984. Morgoth's description is perhaps more harsh than how they superficially present. The tone is exceptionally friendly and personable; however it is entirely likely it was written deceptively in bad faith to avoid the possible types of charges given above.)

Previously to this, Cambridge historian "Raw Egg Nationalist" went into great detail about his experience being stalked at a local farm shop by a suspiciously-spyish US journalist from *Business Insider* who claimed to have determined its location from a social media photograph. REN contends, adamantly, this premise was false. He argues it was to disguise the true origin (a "parallel construction") after he was the victim of an "eggspose" on the Hope Not Hate website. It is an utterly bizarre article which makes an exceptionally weak attempt to present REN as a new Alex Jones. It's also not clear why Hope Not Hate would employ or partner with someone so obscure when they could have simply used a friendly local newspaper with a more believable story.

What is notable in both the Morgoth and REN cases is the clumsy "template" style of communication. Each correspondence begins like a phishing email, using an overly-warm tone to solicit help:

| *My name is [Katherine/Harry]. I'm a journalist.*

While it might seem innocuous, the pattern is a giveaway. Any intelligence officer will recognise the clumsy misuse of such a crude legend during the final "approach" phase of recruitment, which is taught as basic tradecraft at Fort Monckton in Gosport. Others include diplomat, medic, aid worker, filmmaker, researcher, consultant, and so on.

There's no statutory definition of "journalist" in UK law. In cases involving leaks of public-servant documents, UK courts (including the CPS guidance) have interpreted "journalist" broadly when deciding whether source protection applies. In the 2024 *Investigatory Powers Tribunal* decision regarding unlawful state surveillance of Barry McCaffrey and Trevor Birney, researching and producing a documentary was sufficient. In Shadrake v. Attorney-General (a Singaporean case often cited in UK context), the defendant was held responsible for contempt based on statements made as an investigative journalist.

Due to its nature requesting otherwise inaccessible personal information, and incompatibility with IPSO standards, it appears this bad faith conduct is in fact analogous to phone hacking, and cross the threshold for *false representation* (with the intention of making a gain, or causing loss or risk of loss to another person) under section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006.

Dr Jake Scott, a political theorist and friend of the *Restorationist*, received particularly harsh treatment for spurious tongue-in-cheek comments after *Hope Not Hate* published unverified, unlawfully intercepted messages from a supposed "2021 leak of *The Mallard's* editorial staff chat." Aside from the harmless dry humour of their content, It is not clear how they came to be in possession of such messages, whether they are genuine or unaltered, or whether they reported their receipt of them to the police. This behaviour arguably exposes the organisation to liability the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, section 3; the Computer Misuse Act 1990, section 1; and civil claims regarding the misuse of private Information (Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22).

(Note: we have been privately shown the evidence, and the identity of the individual believed to be responsible for "leaking" private messages from *The Mallard* ('Mario'). From a surface reading of the evidence, and if substantiated during investigation, it would appear to be criminal conduct under the CMA 1990, without any reasonable 'public interest' defence applicable.)

Another friend of the *Restorationist*, Tom Rowsell, an academic documentarian who holds a masters from UCL in his field, is maligned in a desperate guilt-by-association "case file" seemingly based on eccentric Nordic interests shared by the likes of J.R. Tolkien.

Public interest does not justify deceptive or malicious publication. Naming individuals without consent, especially with political motives may constitute harassment. Any public interest defence (not available under the PFA 1997) requires a "reasonable belief" in the need to publish. Violence risk undermines such a claim.

Which is where things take a much darker turn.

Coercive Control & Protection Rackets

English law does not recognise "racketeering" as a statutory offence, but the conduct commonly associated with it, coordinated threats, coercion, blackmail, surveillance, and harassment carried out by an organised group falls squarely within the scope of multiple serious criminal offences. The *Crown Prosecution Service* prosecutes this behaviour using existing laws on blackmail, conspiracy, participation in organised crime, harassment, and data misuse.

In the US, the term "protection racket" is well recognised as demanding payment in exchange for not inflicting harm. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, the *Hobbs Act*, extortion from protection rackets is defined as:

The obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.

To prove a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. § 1962) it must be shown that a person: (a) invested in or derived income from a pattern (at least two acts within 10 years) of racketeering activity; (b) acquired or maintained interest in an enterprise through racketeering; (c) conducted the affairs of an enterprise through racketeering; or (d) conspired to do any such thing.

In March 2024, conservative author Douglas Murray detailed in the Spectator, a month after a previous criticism by the same magazine, how he had been the victim of "gangster" behaviour he described as "sinister":

Some years ago HNH published a list of 'Islamophobes'. One – a scholar I know – subsequently had an Islamist come to his front door and try to shoot him in the head. I wrote about this at the time. A while later, HNH wrote a similar report and threatened to put me in it. When I lawyered up, HNH explained that if I removed the piece criticising it, it might consider removing my name from its latest hit-list. In other words, the group is not just silly but sinister. It wishes to change the political weather in our country, and it operates like a gangster.

Hope Not Hate repudiated the first allegation furiously, but apparently did not deny the second. This behaviour has been repeated again recently in correspondence sent to Ben Habib's GB PAC.

Blackmail is defined under section 21 of the Theft Act 1968. It occurs when a person makes an unwarranted demand with menaces, intending to cause loss to another or gain for themselves. A threat to publish damaging material about someone unless they comply whether by retracting a statement, providing private information, or ceasing political activity is sufficient. The law does *not* require the threat be illegal in itself. If the demand is unjustified and accompanied by any form of menace, and if the intent is coercive, the offence is complete.

Where such conduct is organised and coordinated by multiple individuals, liability may also arise for conspiracy to blackmail or conspiracy to defraud. These are common law offences which capture joint criminal purpose, even where not every individual commits the act itself. Further, under section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, it is an offence to participate in the activities of an organised crime group knowing or suspecting that one's conduct will support or benefit the group's criminal purpose. This offence is designed to target systemic criminal coordination, whether the underlying activity is financial fraud, violent coercion, or reputational blackmail.

Where persons within the organisation work together to identify, monitor, and target individuals for the purpose of coercion or reputational destruction, each may be criminally liable. This includes not only those who issue the threats or carry out the contact, but also those who coordinate or enable the process (from research and communications to fundraising and publication).

As previously mentioned, under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, it is also an offence to pursue a course of conduct which causes another person alarm or distress. Sections 2A and 4 criminalise stalking. This includes repeated attempts to contact or monitor a person, gathering private information without consent, and using deception or inducement to obtain personal details. The Act applies to organisations as well as individuals.

Other individuals, such as Tom Dupre, are reported to have been threatened with reputational harm, job loss, and social ostracisation. In these cases, information was allegedly gathered first through surveillance, online tracking, or infiltration and then used

as leverage. This pattern, in which data is unlawfully obtained and then weaponised, may also engage offences under the [Data Protection Act 2018](#), the [Bribery Act 2010](#), and the [Proceeds of Crime Act 2002](#) – the latter would concern their funds.

On the basis of the above, and if the factual allegations can be proven, *Hope Not Hate* may be properly characterised as a group criminal venture. It operates through coordinated surveillance, reputational coercion, and intimidation. It gathers personal information on individuals without consent or legal authority—and uses that information as leverage to achieve ideological and political outcomes. It targets individuals for reputational destruction, often threatening employment and social standing. It does so through a shared organisational structure and with apparent knowledge of the consequences.

Where this conduct meets the definitions of blackmail, harassment, bribery, and unlawful data use, the organisation as a whole may fall within the scope of [section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015](#). Each person knowingly contributing to the criminal activities of the group is criminally liable.

(6) “Organised crime group” means a group that— (a) has as its purpose, or as one of its purposes, the carrying on of criminal activities, and (b) consists of three or more persons who act, or agree to act, together to further that purpose. (7) For a person to be guilty of an offence under this section it is not necessary— (a) for the person to know any of the persons who are members of the organised crime group, (b) for all of the acts or omissions comprising participation in the group's criminal activities to take place in England and Wales (so long as at least one of them does), or (c) for the gain or benefit referred to in subsection (3) to be financial in nature. (8) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person's participation was necessary for a purpose related to the prevention or detection of crime.

The fact that the group presents itself as a charity does not alter the legal position. If the underlying conduct is criminal, then donations solicited and applied in furtherance of that conduct may constitute the proceeds of crime under the [Proceeds of Crime Act 2002](#). In that case, *Hope Not Hate* may be operating not just as a political organisation, but as a criminal enterprise *funded by charitable donations*.

The Cowardice Of Choosing Easy Targets

Far and away the most insightful and revealing thing about *Hope Not Hate* is the groups of people they *don't* go after. Britain does have an extremism problem worth of their attention and action.

Radical Islam.

The *Security Service* [makes it clear](#) Islam is by far the most significant extremist threat to the UK as 75% of their caseload. It claims to have 43,000 people (domestic and foreign) – more than 50% of the size of the British Army – [on its watchlist](#). The victims of

organised rape gangs are estimated to number in the hundreds of thousands.

There is little to no mention of the serious and rampant antisemitism, hatred of women, and physical paramilitary violence in every major city in the UK. They murder little girls in horrific ways, behead British soldiers in public, stab dissenters for blasphemy, and openly call for the death of Jews.

The question has to be asked: why haven't Hope Not Hate "infiltrated" any of the extremist mosques in the UK? Or tackled real hate? Real bravery means real risk. It's far easier to browse Twitter for upsetting comments made by popular YouTubers.

The only response this champion team of Scooby Doo vigilantes appear to have given is the coward's line of motivated reasoning. Their public statements are dogmatically centred around the denunciation of so-called "islamophobia" while the English live with the consequences of violence every day in the midst of being labelled by equally-extreme "watchdog" groups.

It's easy to be the amateur wannabe hero behind a keyboard chasing ghosts of the *Hitler Youth*. If you try to "infiltrate" Islamic groups, you might actually *die*. If you publish "case files" on these extremists, they may just show up to your office with firearms and kill all your staff.

Identifying Key Defendants

Given how open employees and associates are with their public profiles and activities, it is barely conceivable the *Crown Prosecution Service* and *Charity Commission* would incur too much of a time or effort penalty in ascertaining the names of individuals involved in potentially criminal behaviour to begin an investigation.

The UK does recognise forms of collective legal action, though they are more limited and procedurally distinct from the American class action model. The most common mechanism is the Group Litigation Order (GLO), which allows individuals with similar claims to opt into a coordinated process overseen by the High Court. While cases are grouped for efficiency, each claimant retains their individual right to damages, and court permission is required to initiate the process.

Another mechanism, the representative action under Civil Procedure Rule 19.6, allows one person to sue on behalf of others with the "same interest," but this is rarely used due to strict legal requirements for uniformity in interest and remedy.

A libel claim in England and Wales begins with the claimant issuing a formal Letter of Claim to the publisher, outlining the defamatory statement and the harm caused, and requesting correction or compensation. The defendant may respond with a denial or offer settlement, potentially relying on defences under the Defamation Act 2013 such as truth, honest opinion, or public interest. If unresolved, the claimant must issue proceedings in the High Court within one year of publication. The defendant then files a Defence, possibly followed by a Reply from the claimant. Both parties exchange evidence during

disclosure, and the case proceeds to trial—usually before a judge alone—where the court determines liability and any applicable defences. If the claimant prevails, remedies may include damages, injunctions, and publication of a correction or apology, with the possibility of appeal.

A claimant can compel disclosure once proceedings have begun under Part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). Standard disclosure requires parties to disclose documents that support or undermine either side's case, and if documents are suspected to be withheld, a claimant can apply for specific disclosure under *CPR 31.12*.

Additionally, even before proceedings, a claimant can seek a Norwich Pharmacal order (a common law remedy derived from Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133) which compels a third party (usually an intermediary such as an ISP, publisher, or bank) to disclose information needed to identify a wrongdoer or support a potential claim. The court grants such orders where the respondent is involved, however innocently, in the wrongdoing, and where disclosure is necessary to bring legal action. These mechanisms, alongside the Overriding Objective in CPR 1.1, ensure fair access to justice and relevant evidence.

The full facts of the organisation's founding are on record via a Nominet dispute resolution (Hope Not Hate (1986) Limited (formerly Searchlight Information Services Ltd) vs Mr Gerry Gable, D00011785). The list of directors from Searchlight has interesting crossover.

The active trustees of the charity are given as LOWLES, Nick; ADAMS, Peter; ASIM, Qari Muhammad, Imam; JOSAN, Gurinder Singh; TUTTLE, Simon Anthony; WYNNE-JONES, Rosalind Kate.

Former trustees are given as GABLE, Sonia Kathleen Emma (wife of Gerry Gable); LEVENE, Jemma Abigail (Center for Countering Digital Hate); SMEETH, Ruth; ALABI, Caroline; BELOVSKI, Harvey, Rabbi Dr; BUTLER, Paul David, Revd Fr; CAYTON, Christopher; CHAMBERS, Alex; COHEN, Barbara Mariel; COULSON, Peter Michael; DHILLON, Perminder; FIELD, Margaret; HERMAN, David; HOGARTH, Jane Claire; HOLLINGSWORTH, Cormac Kevin; KAZI, Tehmina; KUSHNER, Anthony, Dr; LEECH, Kenneth; LENNON, Jenny; LERNER, David Russel; MIDDLEBURGH, David Maxwell; MOSS, Baron; PAINTER, Anthony James; PURKISS, Robert Ivan; SANDHU, Sarabjit Singh; SUPPLE, Carrie; THIRANAGAMA, Narmada; TURLEY, Anna Catherine; WILLIAMS, Bill.

The active directors of the limited company as given as LOWLES, Nick; AMOLE, Anupreet Singh; CRUDDAS, Jon; GALLANT, Simon Lewis; JACOBS, Peter Jonathan; PAINTER, Anthony James; PHILLIPS, Alison; TUTTLE, Simon Anthony; WYNNE-JONES, Ros.

Former directors are given as LEVENE, Jemma Abigail; SMEETH, Ruth; BATTY, Joseph James; HOGARTH, Jane Claire; HOLLINGSWORTH, Cormac Kevin; JOSAN, Gurinder Singh; MCGREGOR, Matthew; TAYLOR, Byron; TURLEY, Anna Catherine.

Most extraordinary is the list of individuals who have switched between governance of both the charity and the company, which makes the claim of separation utterly absurd under the doctrine of nemo iudex in causa sua. Lowles, Wynne-Jones, and Tuttle are currently directors and trustees of them both, deciding which "grants" the supposedly "independent" sole beneficiary of the charity should receive.

Staff and employees who may have taken part in unlawful activities publish their details publicly on multiple forums available to anyone to view (their sockpuppet social media accounts are equally easy to identify). At the time of writing, they include the following authors, organisational officers, and public employees (past and present):

AHMAD, Mustafa; ATKINSON, Graeme; CARTER, Rosie; CARTWRIGHT, Ellie; COLESHAW, Christian; COLLINS, Matthew; DAVIS, Gregory; DEO, Anki; DUFFILL, Kelly-Anne; FILER, Rebecca; HERMANSSON, Patrik; JONES, Owen; KHAN-RUF, Safya; LAWRENCE, David; LAMING, Georgina; MITCHELL, Lisa; MALIK, Misbah; MESZAROS, Paul; MULHALL, Joe; MURDOCH, Simon; NORTH, Marcus; OSOWSKI, Molly; PRENTICE, Charlie; RAUHANEN, Anna; ROBERTSON, Jallen; RORDORF, Juliana; RYAN, Melissa; RYAN, Nick; SETHI, Pallavi; SHUKMAN, Harry; STEVENS, Nick; STONER, Erin; WEAVER, Naomi; WILSON, Claire (unverifiable).

It's unclear how many of these individuals are permanent employees, have links to extremist groups, or retain individual counsel. Some have held positions in the House of Commons or local councils, and many appear to be freelance writers.

Freedom To Campaign, Not License To Libel

Searchlight and *Hope Not Hate*, like everyone else, have a natural negative right to speech and free association which precedes government. They can, and should, speak and publish as they wish. The state should not interfere with their liberty to criticise, scrutinise, complain, analyse, or advocate for what they believe in, even if others find it disagreeable. Nor should they endure criminal harassment by lunatics for their enjoyment of such negative liberty the Englishman cherishes for all. Perhaps some good may eventually come of their activities.

The ability of those we hate to speak and offend us – the worst of them – is our health indicator of our own liberty. Freedom of speech means freedom to burn the Quran and deny the Holocaust, as ugly as it might be. Yes, it means you have the right to be upsetting, racist, and every other "ist" from the jargon of pathology adopted by our equally-appalling partisan flanks without being the subject of a "case file." Democracy is a risky business: if sixty per cent of a population vote for communism or fascism, that's the built-in price. You must persuade on the merits of your arguments, not languish in bizarre sixties sociology advocating for pre-censorship and partisan vilification of adversaries you libel as cartoon villains.

Libel is not protected speech. Protection rackets are not charity. Regulatory arbitrage and abuse of charity law is not good faith. It is not acceptable to engage in criminal conduct for the supposed pursuit of good. There is no reasonable excuse. There is no reason why *Hope Not Hate* cannot reform as a Community Interest Company and revise their behaviour patterns to lawful advocacy in the volatile market of ideas.

You are not free to adopt manipulative labels like "antifascist" to bamboozle gullible BBC writers you are benevolent. As an front group birthed by radical communists, employing radical communists, violating electoral law on behalf of Labour's extreme left, and carrying out all your "work" to defeat the modern-day perceived enemies of communism, it's simple fraud. Fraud which has characterised and distinguished communists for a century.

At the end of the conversation, the Englishman is *reasonable*. England is a country of eccentric, often puritanical, inventive villagers with controversial opinions, mediated by quiet manners. The activities of Lowles & co are invasive, alien, and foreign to us. We do not recognise it as English. We have no need of unelected, unwelcome, undemocratic "watchdogs" or partisan usurpers interfering in our messy decision making. We receive this foul smell poorly, and rightly so. We like our extreme opinions, but we *don't vote for them*.



If you have evidence of criminal behaviour committed by this organisation, we urge you to act responsibly by contacting your local police force and/or making a protected disclosure to your local MP.