IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE LTA 96/7717/D

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London WC2

Thursday 3rd July, 1997

B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE STAUGHTON

LORD JUSTICE MUMMERY

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HER MAJESTY'S ATTORNEY GENERAL

Respondent

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MENZIES

Ex Parte Applicant

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(Computer Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of

Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 180 Fleet Street,

London EC4A 2HD

Tel: 0171 831 3183

Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

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THE APPLICANT APPEARED ON HIS OWN BEHALF

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J U D G M E N T

(As approved by the Court)

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Thursday 3rd July, 1997

JUDGMENT

LORD JUSTICE STAUGHTON: Mr Menzies comes to this court in rather strange circumstances. There was an application that he should be declared a vexatious litigant, and that a civil proceedings order be made against him. This came before the Divisional Court, and a decision was reached upon it on 2nd August last year. The Divisional Court comprised Schiemann LJ and Smedley J. They concluded that Mr Menzies was a vexatious litigant and they made the civil proceedings order. Reasons were given in the following October.

At the same time Mr Menzies applied to the Divisional Court, he tells us, for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Attorney-General. That application was refused by the Divisional Court. The Divisional Court also refused leave to appeal from their decision on the vexatious litigant order.

Since then two significant orders have been made. First, in February of this year Mr Menzies applied to Smedley J for leave to make a renewed application for leave to apply for judicial review. He needed leave to make the application for leave because the section 42 Order was outstanding. Smedley J took the view, apparently, that it should first be decided whether the application for leave to appeal against the section 42 Order would succeed. That was apparently pending in this court. So, by his order of 14th February 1997 he ordered that the application to him in respect of leave to apply for leave to apply for judicial review should be adjourned, pending the determination of the application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeal in respect of the section 42 Order.

Then, it seems, on 4th June this year the application for leave to appeal against the section 42 Order came before this court comprising Auld and Pill LJJ. They were evidently persuaded by Mr Menzies that his judicial review proceedings should be determined first. So they ordered that the application for leave to appeal against the section 42 Order should be adjourned without a date being specified (sine die). The effect of that was that both proceedings are both indefinitely adjourned pending the resolution of the other. As somebody once said, "something must be done".

I take the view that Smedley J ought to vary his order by removing the indefinite adjournment and hear the application for leave to apply for leave to apply for judicial review. There is no appeal against that order before us, and all we can do is express the hope that Smedley J will take that course. If, despite our hopes he declines to do so, there will be a further problem. One way or another this impasse must be sorted out sooner or later. We make no order on today's application and merely express the view that that would be the most suitable course. Mr Menzies says that if he succeeds in judicial review against the Attorney-General that will advance his cause for saying that he is not a vexatious litigant. That is as it may be, and I express no opinion at all on that point.

Mr Menzies also tells us that there is a problem about documents. He says he only has one set of documents and cannot afford another. He has difficulty in getting access to the documents where they are needed. As I understood him the documents are with Smedley J's clerk. If that is the situation, that is where in my view they ought to be. If instead of that they are now in the Civil Appeals Office, I would recommend that they be made available for the renewed application before Smedley J by being sent directly to the judge's clerk or any other how. So I would make no order for the time being on today's application.

LORD JUSTICE MUMMERY: I agree with the judgment of Lord Justice Staughton.

ORDER: No order.