IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) C/2000/2162

The Royal Courts of Justice

The Strand

London WC2A

Monday 31 July 2000

Before:

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Between:

Respondent

and:

Applicant

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Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of

Smith Bernal Reporting Limited

190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2HD

Tel: 020 7421 4040

Official Shorthandwriters to the Court

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The Applicant appeared on her own behalf

The Respondent did not appear and was not represented

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(As approved by the Court)

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Crown Copyright

Monday 31 July 2000

JUDGMENT

1. LORD JUSTICE RIX: This is an application by Miss Ruth Mottershead for permission to appeal from a judgment of the Divisional Court given on 29 March 2000, by which an order was made against her pursuant to section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 to the effect that she became a vexatious litigant and could not initiate or pursue proceedings without the consent of the Attorney General.

2. The main ground upon which Miss Mottershead seeks permission to appeal from that judgment is that she was not given notice of the hearing of 29 March. That hearing was due to come on on 9 or 10 February 2000 but, due to congestion in the court timetable, that hearing could not be maintained, and therefore had to be adjourned and a new fixture made. The new fixture was made for 29 March, and on 11 February 2000 the Treasury Solicitor wrote to Miss Mottershead at two addresses at which it was believed that notice would come to her attention. I take those addresses from the Treasury Solicitor’s subsequent letter to Miss Mottershead of 29 March 2000: namely, Flat 16, 54 Regent Street and 74 Kelverlow Street, the first address being in Lancaster and the second in Oldham.

3. Miss Mottershead, who has long felt aggrieved, to an extent which the court has described as obsessive, about the repossession of her home at 5 Leaphill Road, Kings Park, Bournemouth in Dorset, has insisted upon giving that address of her former home, now owned by other persons, for some years as her formal address for service. Her complaint was that the letter of 11 February, written to her by the Treasury Solicitor and informing her of the new fixture on 29 March, was not sent to her at that Kings Park address. It was, of course, not sent to her there, although given as her address of service, because Miss Mottershead does not live there. It was therefore sent to the two addresses which I have mentioned, which are addresses at which it was likely that Miss Mottershead would get notice of the hearing.

4. The position that she takes on that, for instance in her affidavit of 5 April 2000, which I have read and considered, is not that she did not receive the letter of 11 February, but that it was not sent to her at what she says is her Kings Park, Bournemouth address. The fact is, however, that she kept in touch herself or was written to, so that she knew that the hearing of 9 and 10 February had gone. As she told me in court today, she did not go to that adjourned hearing. When I asked her why that was so, she told me that it was because she kept in touch with the court office and because she had received a letter from the Treasury Solicitor. She may be confused about that last matter, but the fact is that she was well able to keep in touch with the court office and to know that the fixture of 9 and 10 February had been adjourned, and she knew well enough that she was not due to attend a hearing on that day.

5. I could not accept that she did not receive the Treasury Solicitor’s letter of 11 February which was sent to those addresses I have mentioned in Lancaster and Oldham. Although on her insistence the subsequent letter of 29 March 2000 was also sent to her address for service at Kings Park, Bournemouth and she says that is the reason why she received the letter, it was again sent to the Lancaster and Oldham addresses and that in my judgment is the reason why she received that letter.

6. Like the Divisional Court, and despite the further evidence and submissions of Miss Mottershead, I am quite satisfied that she did receive notice of the hearing of 29 March.

7. Amongst many other points which Miss Mottershead has raised and to which I have listened, which were mainly concerned with the underlying merits of the repossession of her former Bournemouth home, she also takes a point about non-receipt, in advance of a hearing in December 1999, of the witness statement and bundles of files and material prepared by the Treasury Solicitor for the December 1999 hearing. That was a hearing at which, in advance of the final hearing of the application under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the Attorney General sought a pre-trial injunction pending that final hearing. There is a judgment concerning that dated 16 December 1999 given in the Divisional Court by Smith J. Miss Mottershead complains, as I say, that she did not receive service of the witness statement and accompanying documents relating to that hearing, but the two letters of 2 December 1999 from the Treasury Solicitor to Miss Mottershead makes it plain that she was served with these documents and that that was accepted by her in a previous affidavit. In any event, any mishap over timely service of those documents in relation to that December hearing can have no relevance to the subsequent final hearing of this matter in March 1999.

8. In my judgment the Divisional Court was entirely right to proceed on 29 March, albeit in Miss Mottershead’s absence. In my judgment there is no realistic prospect of success in any appeal upon the basis put to me in her written material and in her oral submissions today by Miss Mottershead. Despite, if I may say so, her very courteous and indeed charming submissions, I am afraid that I must reject this application.

ORDER: Application refused

Attorney General v Mottershead (1) (Queens Bench)
Attorney General v Mottershead (2) (Queens Bench)
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