IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE No LTA 98/6404/4

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London WC2

Monday, 19th October 1998

B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE KENNEDY

LORD JUSTICE ALDOUS

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HER MAJESTY'S ATTORNEY-GENERAL

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ROACH

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(Computer Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of

Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 180 Fleet Street,

London EC4A 2HD

Tel: 0171 421 4040

Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

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The Applicant appeared in person

MR M BISHOP (Instructed by Treasury solicitor) appeared on behalf of the Respondent

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J U D G M E N T

(As Approved by the Court)

(Crown Copyright)

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LORD JUSTICE KENNEDY: This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of the Divisional Court, consisting of Pill LJ and Gage J, the judgment having been given by Gage J on 2nd March 1998. In those proceedings the Attorney-General sought a civil proceedings order under Section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 against Mr Roach. The reason for seeking that order was that over

a prolonged period, extending from 1988 to 1998, Mr Roach had

brought a whole series of actions. That is not in dispute, and something he readily accepts, but it was contended on behalf of the Attorney-General before the Divisional Court that those actions had been brought without any sensible reason for them and with the results set out by the Divisional Court in the judgment of Gage J. The issues, as he defined them, were these:

(1) Is the court satisfied that the respondent has habitually and persistently and without reasonable ground instituted vexatious civil proceedings?

(2) If so, should the court exercise its discretion to make a civil proceedings order?

Having defined those issues and pointed out that the burden was upon the Attorney-General to satisfy the court that the order should be made, the court then reviewed the actions which had been placed before it and reviewed them separately one by one. It is quite unnecessary, for the purposes of today's proceedings, to rehearse that review. It was obviously carefully carried out. What we now have to consider is whether there is anything wrong with the conclusion at which the Divisional Court arrived, namely that such an order should be made. Before us this morning Mr Roach has said that he is the victim of the State, that the order which has been made makes him a prisoner of the State and means that he has no right to pursue those who have destroyed his life. He submits that he has very good grounds for the various actions that he brought. He reminds us that, unfortunately, he is blind in one eye and reminds us that it is his position that his father and mother were negligently advised. He says that no arguable defence has ever been put forward by those whom he has accused. He accepts that in making these submissions he is not laying before us

anything new which he did not lay before the Divisional Court, but he asks us to lift the order made by the Divisional Court so that he can pursue those who, he contends, ought to be pursued. He says that his submission to us is made on the basis of the law of torts.

I, for my part, have read carefully through the judgment of the Divisional Court and the skeleton argument prepared by Mr Roach as well as that submitted to us this morning on behalf of the Attorney-General. I have come to the conclusion, having read his skeleton argument and listened to what he said, that there is no arguable ground for attacking the decision of the Divisional Court. Accordingly, I, for my part, would refuse leave to appeal.

LORD JUSTICE ALDOUS: I agree.

LORD JUSTICE KENNEDY: I should say that there was an application to adduce further evidence. (To the applicant) It follows that, there having been an application to adduce further evidence and you not having obtained leave, you cannot adduce further evidence either. That falls by the wayside. We dealt with this matter, I should also say, on the basis that it was not out of time; technically it was. That is not a point worthy of trouble at this stage. We wanted to deal with the matter on its merits.

Order: Application refused