1. LORD JUSTICE LAWS: This applicant was made the subject of a civil proceedings order under Section 42 of Supreme Court Act 1981 on 27th February 1996. In making the order Lord Justice Beldam remarked that it was difficult to imagine a case in which the conduct of the litigant could be more vexatious. The order was made in the applicant's absence. The court took the view that he had enjoyed ample opportunity to appear.

2. On 11th July 1997 the applicant's application for leave to appeal against the order was refused by Lord Justice Kennedy and Lord Justice Millett. The applicant did not appear on that occasion. Later he applied for his application to be reinstated. That was heard on 12th June 2000 by Lord Justice Schiemann and Lord Justice Mummery, again in the applicant's absence. The court dismissed the application stating in terms that there was no arguable point. On 11th July 2000 the applicant again applied for his application for permission to appeal to be reinstated. On this occasion the Civil Appeals Office replied to him stating, seemingly pursuant to what was an indication given by Lord Justice Schiemann, that the applicant required the leave of a High Court judge under Section 42 of the Supreme Court Act before his application could be made.

3. On 22nd May 2001 he wrote to this court's office stating that the Department of Social Security had refused to set aside a decision to refuse him leave to appeal seemingly against a decision of the Office of the Social Security and Child Support Commissioners. He stated that he intended to appeal that decision. On 24th May 2001 the office wrote indicating Master Venne's view that the applicant again required leave of the High Court under Section 42.

4. The applicant now seeks to say that he needs no Section 42 leave either in relation to the Social Security matter or in relation to the reinstatement of his application for permission to appeal against the original civil proceedings order. In my judgment this argument is misconceived. This court is clearly a court for the purposes of Section 42 whether or not a Social Security Tribunal commissioner is also at court. The applicant's application in relation to the Social Security Commissioners constitutes, in my judgment, the institution of proceedings for the purpose of Section 42 (see Johnson v Valks 2000 1 All ER 450). The application to reinstate the application for permission to appeal the original order likewise requires Section 42 leave. It is clearly an application within Section 42 (1) (a) and so it is covered by the requirement of leave of the High Court.

5. I have heard the applicant over the last half-an-hour or so making certain submissions concerning the case of Kebilene and concerning Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Kebilene, in my judgment, is in truth nothing to the point. In the passage relied on by the applicant Lord Steyn, in their Lordships' House, was considering a point relating to Section 22 (4) of the Human Rights Act which does not touch the issue before me. As regards the European Convention on Human Rights, it was held by the Commission in Strasbourg in "H" v United Kingdom [1985] 45 DR 281 ECHR that an order requiring a vexatious litigant to seek the permission of a judge before bringing further proceedings was not in breach of Article 6. There is no escape, as I see the matter, from the requirement of Section 42 leave if the applicant is to pursue either of the applications before me.

6. I have not forgotten his submission that the original civil proceedings order was made without jurisdiction. That cannot be gone into here if, as I have held, he needs the leave of the High Court to bring this application. The same applies in relation to his very numerous complaints of alleged technical and procedural errors or failures in the court below and his wide-ranging accusations of fraud and conspiracy by the attorney general, by solicitors, by counsel and by the court staff. None of this can be gone into without Section 42 leave. Indeed, his presentation of those matters was so extreme as, if anything, to confirm the conclusion reached by Lord Justice Beldam in 1996.

7. These applications are refused.

Order: Applications refused