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KEYVAN NOURHAGHIGHI
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
CAMPBELL J.
[1] On June18, 1998, the applicant commenced this application, effectively for a finding that
the respondent is a vexatious litigant, and, accordingly, for relief pursuant to s. 40(1) of the Federal Court Act which reads as follows:
40. (1) Where the Court is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or has conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner, the Court may order that no further proceedings be instituted by the person in the Court or that a proceeding previously instituted by the person in the Court not be continued, except by leave of the Court. | 40. (1) La Cour peut, si elle est convaincue par suite d'une requête qu'une personne a de façon persistante introduit des instances vexatoires devant elle ou y a agi de façon vexatoire au cours d'une instance, lui interdire d'engager d'autres instances devant elle ou de continuer devant elle une instance déjà engagée, sauf avec son autorisation.
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[2] The primary source of evidence tendered in support of the application is nine (9) actions filed between May 20th, 1995 and August 6th, 1997. Using the normal procedural processes available in the Federal Court Rules, each of the statements of claim in these actions have been struck by Justices of the Trial Division. Two (2) appeals remain before the Appeal Court.
[3] The primary purpose in bringing the present application, as stated by counsel for the applicant, is to free the applicant of the legal responsibility and practical burden of having to apply to strike out any further actions which might be filed. Indeed, a further action was filed on May 28, 1999 (T-942-99) which was referred to by counsel for the applicant as proof that the s. 40(1) order is necessary.
[4] I find that the discretion which I have to grant an application under s. 40(1) should be exercised contextually, and, therefore, with regard to the respondent's objective in bringing Court action, as well as the form and substance of the actions themselves. During the course of the three hour hearing held on the present application, I had a good opportunity to assess these factors, and, as a result, can make the following observations:
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1. The respondent is an intelligent and articulate individual who honestly believes that he has been wronged in a number of ways, including by agents of the Government and the Courts;
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honestly believes that a conspiracy exists between the Government and the Courts to inhibit his ability to seek and obtain justice;
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3. The respondent is very frustrated at not having yet gaining an opportunity to have his grievances fully heard, and to have a decision rendered on their merits;
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4. The respondent does respond to reasonable procedural requests when treated in a respectful manner.1
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[1] Regardless of whether the respondent can be said to have instituted vexatious proceedings or conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner in the actions filed up to August 1997, I do not believe it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to transfer the legal responsibility and practical burden to him to obtain leave of the Court for any subsequent actions, including T-942-99, for the following reasons:
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1. No actions have been commenced during the period August 1997 to April 1999. There is, therefore, no immediate need for an order under s. 40(1) to protect from an abuse of the process of the Court.
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2. Because of the respondent's belief in a conspiracy, an order under s. 40(1) on the application of the applicant will only act to confirm this belief in the respondent's mind. In my opinion, the reputation of the delivery of justice will suffer thereby.
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3. The normal process for dealing with the form and substance of the past actions commenced by the respondent was used by both parties and was found to be workable. There is no reason to believe that it will not be so in the future.
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4. The applicant is well able to efficiently and effectively identify whether a cause of action is disclosed in the statement of claim in T-942-99, and in any subsequent statement of claim that might be filed, and to expeditiously bring a motion to strike any claims considered to be deficient. I find this to be preferable to attempting to create an administrative "leave" process which requires definition and maintenance. That is, at this point in time, all factors being taken in consideration, the process used in the past is the most reliable and the least troubled.
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[2] Accordingly, this application is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.
"Douglas R. Campbell"
J.F.C.C.
Toronto, Ontario
June 2, 1999
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
COURT NO: T-1237-98
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STYLE OF CAUSE: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
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Applicant
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Respondent
DATE OF HEARING: TUESDAY, JUNE 1, 1999
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER BY: CAMPBELL J.
DATED: WEDNESDAY,
JUNE 2, 1999
APPEARANCES: Mr. Sean O'Donnell
For the Applicant
Mr. Keyvan Nourhaghighi
In Person
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General
of Canada
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
Date: 19990602
Docket: T-1237-98
Between:
Applicant
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Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
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