1. LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: I will ask Mr Justice Silber to give the first judgment in this case.

2. MR JUSTICE SILBER: Her Majesty's Attorney General applies to this court for an all proceedings order to be made against the defendant, Allen Gordon Barrett, pursuant to section 41 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (as amended). The provisions of that section which are material to this application provide that:

3. Those terms are then defined in subsection (1A) which says:

4. The application is, as I have said, for an “all proceedings order” and that is defined as being “an order which has the combined effect of the two other orders.” Those two other orders are a “civil proceedings order” and a “criminal proceedings order”.

5. The basis of this application is that the defendant has pursued three different types of litigation. The first arises out of the sale of his matrimonial home pursuant to an order in the Nuneaton County Court, while the second relates to the proceedings against the solicitor of his former wife. More recently he has commenced a third type of litigation which consists of proceedings against various judges who have been concerned with his earlier litigation. He has attempted to issue criminal proceedings against those judges and to make consequential applications for judicial review when he was unsuccessful.

6. I ought to record that he has told us, and we accept, that he was successful in an action against a garage in 1978 and in a claim against the Department of Transport in 1986. In respect of those three classes of litigation to which I have referred he has not enjoyed any success and, as I will explain, his claims have been characterised as being misconceived in one way or another by various judges who have had to consider them. On four occasions different senior judges have stated that copies of their judgments, relating to the claims made by him, should be sent to the Attorney General for the purpose of making an application for a section 42 order. In the light of the recent attempts by the defendant to issue criminal summonses the Attorney General submits that this is an appropriate case for an “all proceedings order”.

7. This litigation arises out of the apparent inability of the defendant to accept orders of the court in 1977 for the sale of his former home at 32 Derwent Road, Bedworth, Warwickshire (“the Bedworth property”). The defendant was involved in divorce proceedings with his former wife, who subsequently became Mrs Hemming, and who on 21^st September 1977 obtained a charging order on that property. That order made in the Nuneaton County Court stated that the sum of £1,972.92 was still due under the charging order and it was ordered that the defendant deliver possession of the Bedworth property by 18^th October 1977. It was further ordered that Mrs Hemming's solicitors should arrange the sale of that property on conditions to be approved by the registrar. There was, in addition, a direction at the end of the order that it should cease to have effect if the judgment debt and the costs referred to in the order were paid.

8. At that time, those sums were not paid and on 11^th April 1978 the defendant was ordered to vacate the Bedworth property. On 21^st June 1978 the registrar ordered that the Bedworth property should be sold at a price of £11,250, or such sum as a particular firm of estate agent should deem a fair figure in the circumstances, but not for a price less than £10,000. The registrar also ordered that the contract of the sale of that property and the transfer be signed by Mr Registrar Kendrick on behalf of the defendant. An application for leave to appeal from this order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

9. As monies under the Charging Order remained outstanding, a contract was duly entered into by the registrar on 19^th July 1978 for the sale of the Bedworth property to a Mr Charles, an innocent purchaser, for the sum of £11,250. The contract was in the ordinary form specified in the West Midlands Association of Law Society Contracts For Sale, 1973 edition. Special Condition 2 stated that the date of completion was on or before 1st September 1978.

10. On that date, the defendant paid into court the amounts outstanding under the charging order and he personally resumed possession of the Bedworth property, notwithstanding the order of the court that he should deliver up possession.

11. Committal proceedings were then brought against the defendant who was sentenced to three months' imprisonment for contempt of court for reentering the Bedworth property. Mr Charles was obviously not prepared to complete the purchase on 1^st September and he did not actually complete the purchase by payment of the purchase price until 8^th September 1978. The defendant had also purported to sell the Bedworth property to his brother.

12. At that stage, as the land was registered, the transfer to Mr Charles still had to be registered, but to stop this happening the defendant made a successful ex parte application to restrain the registration of the Bedworth property to Mr Charles. Slade J granted the injunction over a few days in the usual way in order that the matter could be looked at in greater detail at an inter partes hearing which took place on 9^th February 1979. On that occasion, Whitford J refused to continue the injunction. An appeal to the Court of Appeal against Whitford J's decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 20^th June 1979.

13. The defendant subsequently made an application in that action (“the second application”) against his former wife and Mr Charles to have the registration set aside and the contract and transfer rescinded. On 29^th April 1983, Vinelott J refused to make that order and the defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeal who dismissed the appeal. Dillon LJ (with whom Eveleigh LJ and Kerr LJ agreed) explained that “everything was done normally in this case and Mr Barrett has no ground of complaint”. Mr Barrett then made an unsuccessful application to the House of Lords. It is worth referring to two comments that were made during the course of the proceedings concerning the second application. First, Mr Vinelott concluded that:

14. Second, Dillon J in the Court of Appeal explained that the action was “concerned with the inability of Mr Barrett to accept the sale of his former home”. As I will explain, sadly, that inability to accept the sale of the home continues.

15. On 22^nd February 1980, the defendant commenced proceedings against the solicitors of his former wife alleging inducement of breach of contract of marriage and breach of their duty of care to his daughter, the second plaintiff in that action. The judgment of Arnold J striking out that action on 6^th July 1978 indicates the cause of action of the defendant was that the solicitors for his wife had persuaded the defendant's former wife not to abandon divorce proceedings against him and that they had advised her to cease communication with the defendant that might led to a reconciliation. An appeal against Arnold J's order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 28^th July 1978 and that court also refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

16. This failure did not deter the defendant because on 22^nd February 1980 he issued a further writ, with his daughter again as co-plaintiff, against the same solicitors with allegations similar to those which had been struck out by Arnold J. That writ was set aside in so far as it purported to claim relief on behalf of his daughter by the district judge. Successive appeals against that order were dismissed by Stephen Brown J on 16^th October 1981 and by the Court of Appeal on 30^th November, with a subsequent application for permission for leave to appeal to the House of Lords also being refused.

17. On 27^th July 1982 the statement of claim, relating to the claim of the defendant, was struck out by Hodgson J on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action or was otherwise frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the court. It is noteworthy that Hodgson J concluded his judgment by saying:

18. On 2^nd December 1982 an application for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal was dismissed.

19. On 16^th February 1994 the defendant issued a writ against Sir Edward Eveleigh, Sir Michael Kerr and Sir Brian Dillon who were the three Lord Justices who had dismissed his appeal from the order of Vinelott J in the second application to which I have already referred. His cause of action was based on allegations of fraud, a criminal conspiracy to defraud and denial of equal protection of the law. It was for aggravated damages, mental damages and exemplary damages.

20. On 29^th March 1994 Master Murray dismissed the action as being “doomed to failure”. Mr Robert Englehardt QC sitting as a deputy High Court judge in the Queen's Bench Division dismissed the appeal from Master Murray's order and refused permission to appeal. In reaching his decision Mr Englehardt relied on the well-known principles of judicial immunity, but noted that the defendant “feels a strong sense of grievance”. The attitude of the defendant in that action showed a total inability on his part to accept that he had no longer any claims relating to the sale of the Bedworth property and, more importantly, it indicated a determination to litigate issues even after he had already exhausted all his remedies in relation to them.

21. On 1^st June 1988, the defendant applied for leave to judicially review a decision of a stipendiary magistrate, Mr Nicholas Evans, who refused to issue summonses against six people who had been involved in this litigation relating to his divorce and the sale of the Bedworth property. Those included the three Lord Justices who dismissed his appeal against Vinelott J's judgment in the second application, namely Sir Edward Eveleigh, Sir Michael Kerr and Sir Brian Dillon. The defendant had also sought to issue a summons against Mr Englehardt who, as I explained, had dismissed the appeal against the order striking out the defendant's claim against the three Lord Justices. Another defendant was Sir John Vinelott who had made the order in the second application against which the Court of Appeal judges had dismissed his appeal.

22. Finally, the defendant also sought leave to judicially review the decision of the Chief Land Registrar. The allegations giving rise to the application for judicial review refer to “the crimes committed by the stipendiary magistrate, Mr N Evans” and those included:

23. On 23^rd July 1998 Tucker J sitting as a Crown Office judge refused to grant leave to judicially review the decision of the stipendiary magistrate. He ordered that a copy of his judgment should be sent to the Attorney General so that he could consider whether proceedings should be commenced under section 42 of the 1981 Act. Tucker J said in the course of his judgment that:

24. The learned judge referred to the allegation made by the defendant and said of them:

25. Tucker J had no hesitation in dismissing the application.

26. Notwithstanding the strength of those comments, the defendant renewed his application for permission to the Divisional Court. In his judgment Collins J (with whom Lord Bingham LCJ agreed) said:

27. The Divisional Court endorsed the decision of Tucker J that the matter should be considered by the Attorney General and it ordered that a copy of its judgments should be sent to the Attorney General for him to consider whether proceedings should be commenced against the defendant under section 42 of the 1981 Act.

28. The defendant then sought to issue summonses for sedition against those who had been involved in the decisions made against him in previous court applications. The defendants were the stipendiary magistrate, Mr Nicholas Evans, Tucker J, Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ and Collins J. He also asked that a summons of sedition should be issued against the Chief Land Registrar. The Clerk to the Justices refused to issue the summonses and the defendant sought permission to judicially review this application.

29. On 2^nd December 1999 Elias J refused to give permission characterising the application of the defendant as “totally and entirely hopeless”. He said that it was akin to the application dismissed by Tucker J, to which I have already referred. Elias J explained that:

30. He therefore dismissed the application and ordered that a copy of his judgment be sent to the Attorney General.

31. The defendant renewed his application for permission to the Divisional Court and on 23^rd February 2000 it was dismissed. Alliott J giving the judgment of this court endorsed every word of Elias J's judgment and, in particular, that the application was “totally and entirely useless”. Rose LJ, Vice President of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal agreed. The Divisional Court also ordered that the papers should be sent to the Attorney General to determine whether an application should be made under section 42. Against that background the present application is made.

32. The starting point for the Attorney General's submission is that the defendant has had no success with any of his litigation in respect of the three matters which I have outlined. It is also said by Mr Hoskins that the defendant has sought to pursue many of the grievances relating to the sale of his former home by commencing proceedings against parties not connected with that order, such as members of the Court of Appeal who initially dismissed his claims. The Attorney General points out, rightly in my view, that many of the defendant's claims have been criticised in trenchant terms by different judges as having no basis and that those comments are entirely justified. In the light of the defendant's recent attempts to issue criminal summonses, the Attorney General submits that this is an appropriate case for an “all proceedings order”.

33. The defendant has appeared in person and he has put in an affidavit, as well as a helpful written skeleton. He has made oral submissions which he has presented with commendable courtesy. The recurring theme of his argument is that he is right and that the decisions of the court, especially those relating to the sale of the Bedworth property, are all incorrect.

34. It is appropriate at this stage to deal with two submissions that have been made. First, the defendant has submitted that this court has no jurisdiction because of the terms of section 2(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998. Which provides that:

35. I do not think that there is anything in that point whatsoever. The claim is in no way concerned with those matters and I conclude that his contention is misconceived on this point.

36. The second matter of law is a submission made on behalf of the Attorney General that in section 42 proceedings this court should not go behind the decisions which prompted the application. The basis of that submission are the comments made by Sir John Donaldson MR in Attorney General V Jones [1990] 1 WLR 859. The Master of the Rolls (with which Staughton and Stuart Smith LJJ agreed) said:

37. Those comments mean that on an application such as this, the court is obliged to regard the judgments relied on by the Attorney General as being correct and they are not open to review by this court at the defendant's request. The defendant, nevertheless, criticises many of the decisions in derogatory and unequivocal language and in his written skeleton argument he repeatedly accused judges and court officials of fraud. It is noteworthy that he refers to about 16 such instances of fraud apart from making other hostile comments. As Sir John Donaldson indicated the appropriate remedy of the defendant in respect of each of the decisions with which he was dissatisfied was either to seek to have the judgment set aside or to appeal against them. What is important is that on this present application this court cannot review or reopen those decisions and must regard them as correct.

38. Having heard the defendant make his submissions it seems quite clear that he still remains hopefully obsessed with his complaints surrounding the sale of his former matrimonial home and the way in which his applications have been dealt with by the courts. I can readily understand how initially he felt he had been unjustly treated by the sale of the Bedworth property, but the legality of that sale was decided many years ago and it has been so decided on more than one occasion. The repeated attempts of the defendant to open up this issue all over again constitute, to my mind, a serious case of vexatious litigation, especially in the light of his sustained attempt to reopen it by seeking redress against some of the judges who have dealt with it. It is striking that in his application today the defendant referred to some of the activities of the judges as being “organised crime”.

39. The defendant suffers from what could only be described as an obsession which has had the effect, as judges in the past have indicated, of detaching him from reality. He appears unable to accept the hopelessness of the claims that he has brought. Indeed he still believes vehemently that he is a party that is wronged and that he is entitled to redress. So, regrettably, he would be unable to appreciate that any future claims raising questions concerning the sale of his former home or the way that it has been dealt with by the courts are doomed to failure.

40. There are two aggravating features of the defendant's conduct. First, he is not merely entirely deluded about the weakness of his cases, but he is also acting, to my mind, maliciously, and with worrying disingenuity in his attempt to bring claims against the judges who give judgments with which he disagrees. Secondly, his claim spanned a very long period of more than 20 years starting in 1978, and it seems that his grievance has not reduced over the years and quite possibly has increased. It is true that during the 1980s there was a lull in the litigation, but in the 1990s he started litigating again.

41. Of course any order which limits the freedom of citizens to bring and pursue civil and criminal proceedings is draconian in nature. Thus any court considering imposing such an order should consider the evidence with particular scrutiny. In appraising the effects and nature of the defendant's previous proceedings that I have described I take into account not merely the oppressive consequences for his unfortunate adversary, but also the wider public interest. Scarce and valuable judicial resources have been used on an unacceptable scale as a result of his misconceived and repetitive litigation which is likely to continue unless restrained by this court. Thus I come to the clear conclusion that this court should exceed to the Attorney General's application and make an order to prevent the defendant continuing to make applications to the court.

42. An additional reason for reaching that conclusion is that the overriding objectives of the CPR include “enabling the courts to deal with cases justly”, (sub rule 1) and this includes so far as practicable:

43. (Sub rule 2 (E)). Although these objectives are concerned with the interpretation of the CPR, they are of importance in encouraging us to impose a civil proceedings order.

44. In the words of the section it seems clear to me that the defendant has habitually and without reasonable regard instituted vexatious civil proceedings. I am also satisfied that similar comments apply to his attempts to use the criminal courts in his campaign to seek redress, so that the order sought should cover all proceedings.

45. A more difficult question is its length. Section 42(2) of the 1981 Act (as amended) permits an “all proceedings” order to be made for a limited time. It must not be forgotten that the existence of a section 42 order constitutes a serious impediment to commencing proceedings although it would still remain possible to litigate as the judge whose permission must be necessary would merely have to be satisfied under section 42(3) of the 1981 Act that the proposed proceedings:

46. This is not a high threshold and this factor must be borne in mind in determining the length of the section 42 order.

47. To calculate the appropriate period of such an order it is necessary to strike a balance between the need to bring to an end the vexatious use of the courts and the desirability of removing the restriction when it would no longer be likely to serve a useful purpose. The difficult task for any court is to assess the latter date as that entails considering when a litigant will cease to misuse the right to commence proceedings.

48. A useful starting point is to examine the previous conduct of a defendant to see what inferences can be drawn. Until now the defendant has shown an unabated desire to continue to pursue hopeless claims over a period of more than 20 years as I have explained. We still today have to deal with a renewed application for permission for judicial review and that was issued in November 2000.

49. Although this is not a matter relied on by the Attorney General it does seem to us that it would not be sensible to assume that the defendant will not commence all proceedings in the future. We are very conscious that he has been successful on two occasions. But when presenting his case on this application the defendant has demonstrated that he is as aggrieved as ever about the sale of the Bedworth property and those members of the judiciary who do not agree with him. He has made repeated allegations of criminal offences with suggestions that the judges are part of a group of organised crime.

50. I do not believe that his determination to seek redress for his grievances in court will finish in the immediate future. He has, after all, ignored repeated clear judicial warnings about his claims and I have no reason to believe that he will act differently in future. I take into account that he is now aged 62 and that he is a retired managing director who has been successful in two pieces of litigation, as I have explained. Taking all the factors into account, and subject to the views of my Lord, I consider that the appropriate period for an “all proceedings order” against this defendant is 12 years.

51. LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: I agree. In his courteous submissions Mr Barrett says that he has been persistent and tenacious, but not vexatious. He says he has acted extremely reasonably, other than where he might have acted in ignorance of the law. He points to his allegation that his marriage was destroyed by the fraud of a solicitor and that his property was sold to a purchaser who has no title deed. Anyone in that situation, he submits, would make every conceivable application to try and rectify these injustices.

52. I cannot accept these submissions for the reasons given by my Lord. The history, and particularly the recent history of attempts to start criminal proceedings against judges, speaks for itself.

53. There is one footnote which I should add to this judgment. My Lord has already referred to an outstanding application for judicial review. The Attorney General's application to us today did not rely on that further application which was made on 6^th November 2000 to quash the two Divisional Court decisions to which my Lord has referred, the first by the Lord Chief Justice and Collins J on 21st October 1998 and the second by Rose LJ and Alliott J on 23^rd February 2000. The application for judicial review repeats the allegations of sedition made against the judges concerned and alleges that in some way Article 6 of the European Convention On Human Rights revives his right to make those allegations and all the other applications which he has made in the past. It does not.

54. Harrison J dealt with the application on paper saying “This application is hopeless and vexatious”. The application was renewed and has been listed before us today. But the effect of the order which we have just made is that the application cannot be pursued unless, and I quote again from section 42(3) of the 1981 Act:

55. Neither of those conditions are met in this case, and this should be recorded as a footnote to the judgment which we have given.

56. There is, however, one outstanding point, Mr Hoskins, which I would like your help on. In the bundle we have supplied by your solicitors we do not have the claim form. Perhaps you should look at it in case there is some further or amended claim form which we have not seen. Now you will see that the claim form only asks for a civil proceedings order.