"
... Mr Duff explained that the grievances for which he was seeking redress
were that he ought not to have been sequestrated in the first place since the
debts for which he was made bankrupt were not personal to him but debts of his
limited company and secondly that in the course of the sequestration a valuable
asset, land belonging to him, had been sold by the trustee to a company of
which one of the directors, if not the only director, was a commissioner in his
sequestration ..."
The
actions are as follows:
1. Duff v Forbes (the
trustee in sequestration): the Court of Session
"...The decision of Lord Kincraig dated
17 March 1983 should be treated as void, because a party with no legal
right to enter into a process cannot defend the cause. Lord Kincraig acted ultra
vires by allowing the [trustee] and his agents to defend the appeal which
was clearly an abuse of process. Reference is made to Skinner's Trustee
v Keith 4 March 1987. The [trustee's] discharge should be treated
as void due to the fact that it was obtained by deception. The [trustee] and
his agents deliberately withheld from the court that three court actions were
still pending when the [trustee] had lodged his application in October 1991.
Reference is made to Swanson v Wight 1836 SC 652."
Further adjustments
made by the respondent emphasise that the indebtedness was that of the limited
company, and not of the respondent. Two pleas-in-law have also been added by
adjustment, as follows:
"1. The decision of
Lord Kincraig being obtained by an abuse of process, the decision should
be treated as void.
2. The respondent's discharge being
obtained by deception, that decision should be treated as void."
At a hearing on
20 December 2012, Lord Glennie issued the following interlocutor:
"The Lord Ordinary having heard the
party and solicitor advocate...allows [certain productions and adjustments;
orders Notes of Argument]; and allows a procedure roll hearing on the petition
and answers as adjusted, and restricted to the competency and relevancy
issues..."
The procedure roll
debate on issues of competency and relevancy was fixed for 6 June 2013.
"Deletes as scandalous and irrelevant
the pursuer's averments in article 2 of the condescendence except for the
words 'These statements are untrue, false, calumnious', and all his averments
in article 3 of the condescendence. Deletes for the same reason his third
plea-in-law. Dismisses craves 1 and 3 of his initial writ. Quoad
ultra, and subject to the requirements of the pursuer to consign £2,000
with the sheriff clerk, allows the action to proceed."
The respondent's
appeal to the Court of Session was otherwise refused. The respondent was found
liable in expenses, restricted to 50 per cent. On 16 February 2012
the cause was remitted to Dumfries Sheriff Court to proceed as accords. On
22 November 2012 the case was dismissed at Dumfries Sheriff Court. No
appeal was marked.
11. Duff v
Dumfries and Galloway Council (November 2010: A312/10, XA71/12): Dumfries
Sheriff Court and the Court of Session
"Power of Court of Session to
prohibit institution of action without leave
It shall be lawful for the Lord
Advocate to apply to either Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session
for an order under this Act, and if he satisfies the Court that any person has
habitually and persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings without any
reasonable ground for instituting such proceedings, whether in the Court of
Session or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or
against different persons, the Court may order that no legal proceedings shall
be instituted by that person in the Court of Session or any other court unless
he obtains the leave of a judge sitting in the Outer House on the Bills in the
Court of Session, having satisfied the judge that such legal proceeding is not
vexatious, and that there is prima facie ground for such proceeding ..."
" ... the court has a discretion to make
an order under [section 1 of the 1898 Act], but is not obliged to do so.
Whether, where the conditions are met, the court will exercise its discretion
to make an order will depend on the court's assessment of whether it is
appropriate to do so in the interests of justice. In exercising its
discretion, the court is entitled to have regard to any matter which is
relevant to that assessment, including the conduct of the litigant in other
proceedings besides those which form the basis of the court's jurisdiction to
make the order. The prima facie right of all citizens to invoke the
jurisdiction of the civil courts, and the availability of other powers to deal
with abuses of process, will be relevant considerations. So too will be the
need to protect members of the public, and the resources of the court itself,
against further abuses of process. The extent to which vexatious litigation
drains the resources of the court, in particular, is a matter of considerable
concern. In that regard, the court in HM Advocate v Frost (paragraph
44) expressed its agreement with what had been said by Staughton J in Attorney
General v Jones (page 865), where he explained why there must come a
time when it is right for a court to exercise its power to make a civil
proceedings order against a vexatious litigant. He said that there were at
least two reasons:
'First, the opponents who are harassed
by the worry and expense of vexatious litigation are entitled to protection;
secondly the resources of the judicial system are barely sufficient to afford
justice without unreasonable delay to those who do have genuine grievances, and
should not be squandered on those who do not.'
As has been said in other cases, it is
necessary to look at the whole picture, having regard to the cumulative effect
of the litigant's activities, both on the other persons involved in the
proceedings and on the administration of justice generally. It also has to be
borne in mind that an order under the section operates not as a bar to the
bringing of further proceedings, but as a filter."
The respondent's
litigations
Habitually and
persistently
"[82] The result is, both in relation
to the damages claim and the crave for interdict, [Mr Duff] has not set out a
relevant case, or made sufficient averments, so as to be entitled [to] the
remedies which he craves against the defender. His claims for damages and
interdict, as laid, are in my view fundamentally misconceived and thus
fundamentally irrelevant ..."
"In my opinion, Mr Duff's
pleadings in this case were woefully inadequate. They did not support his
crave for interdict. His pleadings were diffuse and amounted to complaints
against a number of individuals and organisations, all completed, and some
considerable time ago. They failed to identify any legal wrong or reasonable
apprehension any such wrong was being, or would be, committed by the defender
..."