1. The Divisional Court erred in law and denied the Appellant natural justice by refusing him permission to address the court after 11.50 am on the 4 day of October 2000.

2. The Divisional Court thereby cutting in half the Appellant’s submissions relating to the various actions that the Claimant had alleged were vexatious including those relating to the Co-Operative Insurance Society and denied him an opportunity of fully addressing the issues raised in his Skeleton Argument.

(See Witness Statement of Appellant and transcript of judgment of the Divisional Court at paragraphs 6-7)

3. In the premises the Appellant was not given a full and fair opportunity of being heard as required by the provisions of section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 with the result thereof that the said Civil Proceedings Order applicable to him is a nullity and made without and/or in excess of jurisdiction and should be set aside ex debito justitiae.

4. As a result thereof the hearing of the Claimant’s application against the Appellant was in held in breach of schedule 1 article 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 in that the Appellant was denied a “fair”-------“hearing”.

5. The hearing of the application for a “Civil Proceedings Order” before the Divisional Court against the Appellant was not before a “fair” and “independent and impartial tribunal” in breach of schedule 1 article 6(1) of the of the Human Rights Act 1998 because :-

6. The Appellant was denied “natural justice” by the Divisional Court declining to supply him as a result of his specific request with a copy of the “Bench Memo and/or summary” and/or “secret briefing” prepared for the court by the Crown Office lawyer and/or judicial assistants and/or by declining to inform him of its contents.

(See transcript of judgment of the Divisional Court at paragraph 10)

7. The Appellant was thereby denied the opportunity of being in a position to know adverse details of any comments made against him to his prejudice and of being able to make adequate or full representations in rebuttal thereby.

8. In the premises the Appellant was denied “natural justice” thereby as a result of the judges comprising the Divisional Court hearing the application against him having been secretly briefed by officials for and on behalf of the Lord Chancellor the head of the Judiciary.

9. As a result thereof the hearing of the Claimant’s application was neither “fair” nor heard by an “independent and impartial tribunal” in breach of schedule 1 article 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

10. The Divisional Court erred in law in although holding that the Appellant’s “civil proceedings” had been vexatious failing to further consider whether they had been habitual and persistent and without “any reasonable ground” as required by section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

(See transcript of judgment of the Divisional Court at paragraph 58)

11. The Divisional Court further erred in law in although holding that the test as defined in Attorney-General -v- Barker (2000) FLR 759 may not in all cases have been strictly satisfied the relevant test was not to be read literally and did not “set down an exhaustive definition to be read as if it were a statute”.

(See transcript of judgment of the Divisional Court at paragraphs 56-58)

12. The Divisional Court erred in taking into account whether the Appellant’s civil proceedings were vexatious the fact that there had been delays in instituting them when they had all been instituted within the respective time limits set out in the Limitation Act 1980.

(See transcript of judgment of the Divisional Court at paragraph 77)

13. The Divisional Court erred in law in making the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant for an indefinite period under section 42(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 without specifically inviting and/or giving the Appellant an opportunity of addressing the court in relation to the said issue.

(See transcript of judgment of the Divisional Court at paragraphs 93-95)

14. As a result thereof the hearing of the Claimant’s application against the Appellant was in held in breach of schedule 1 article 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 in that the Appellant was denied a “fair”-------“hearing”.

15. In the premises the Appellant was thereby denied “natural justice” by being denied “audi alteram partem” in respect of that specific issue and the making of the said Civil Proceedings Order against him is thereby rendered a nullity and should be set aside ex debito justitiae.

16. In particular the Divisional Court failed to apply its mind to the applicability of the correct tariff in respect of the Appellant seriatim relating to whether his alleged vexatious “civil proceedings” constituted :-

17. In respect of the Appellant this did not merit an indefinite order in any event under section 42(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 as it did not constitute the most serious and worst case scenario and the Divisional Court completely failed to apply its mind to this factor at all.

18. The Divisional Court further wrongly exercised its discretion in making the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant which was disproportionate in effect by barring the bringing of further actions in the future by him without the prior leave of the High Court which might be wholly unrelated to the actions taken into account by the Divisional Court and their subject matter.

(See transcript of judgment of the Divisional Court at paragraphs 93-97)

19. In the premises the making of indefinite the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant was rendered “Wednesbury” unreasonable and/or illegal and/or irrational and/or perverse and an unfair determination of his civil rights under schedule 1 article 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 when the Divisional Court ought to have utilised alternative remedies by way of Injunctions under section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court.

20. The making of the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant under section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 was and the making of such Orders generally are in breach of schedule 1 article 6(1) and 10(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 for the following reasons :-

21. As a result the Appellant should either :-