1. The Claimant applied for a “Civil Proceedings Order” against the Applicant under section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 by Claim Form dated 14 April 2000.

2. (See Claim Form dated 14 April 2000 at pages 49-51 of the Applicant’s Bundle.)

3. The Applicant appeared in person below and the application was heard by the Divisional Court on 3, 4 and 6 October 2000 respectively.

4. After hearing submissions by both parties, the Divisional Court consisting of Buxton LJ and Penry-Davey J, made the Order sought by the Claimant under section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for an unlimited period of time and also refused the Applicant permission to appeal.

5. (See “Civil Proceedings Order” of Divisional Court under section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 dated 6 October 2000 at pages 19-23 and refusal of permission to appeal at page 18 of the Applicant’s Bundle respectively.)

6. The Applicant thereafter filed an Appellant’s Notice on 20 October 2000 in which he seeks permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal under Part 52 rule 52.3(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.

7. (See Applicant’s Appellant’s Notice sealed on 20 October 2000 at pages 1-14 of the Applicant’s Bundle.)

1. Whether Woolf LCJ is either “disqualified” from taking part in hearing Applicants application for permission to appeal or whether there would be “real danger” of bias if he took part in hearing application?

1. Whether Court of Appeal should grant leave to Applicant relating to issues which raise important and new points of law and principle which desirable for court to rule on to clarify legal areas of novelty?

1. Whether Applicant denied “natural justice” by Divisional Court denying him opportunity to be heard in relation to all of his various legal proceedings?

2. Whether as a result, Divisional Court breached mandatory provisions of section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 and whether this rendered “Civil Proceedings Order” against Applicant void ab initio and a nullity?

1. Whether there was lack of an “independent and impartial tribunal” before Divisional Court as required by Article 6(1) Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as result of application being brought on behalf of HM Attorney-General, due to his or his predecessors and also HM Solicitor General or his predecessors being consulted regarding appointment of High Court Judges?

2. Whether there was lack of an “independent and impartial tribunal” before Divisional Court as required by Article 6(1) Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as result of application being brought on behalf of HM Attorney-General, due to his or his predecessors and also HM Solicitor General or his predecessors being consulted regarding appointment of High Court Judges before being appointed as Lord Justices of Appeal?

3. Whether there was lack of an “independent and impartial tribunal” before Divisional Court as required by Article 6(1) Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as result of application being brought on behalf of HM Attorney-General, due to his or his predecessors and also HM Solicitor General or his predecessors being members of HM Government due to recommendations of Lord Chancellor as to appointment of High Court judges, and recommendation of Prime Minister on advice from Lord Chancellor regarding appointment of Lord Justices of Appeal?

4. Whether the hearing before the Court of Appeal is before an “independent and impartial tribunal” as required by Article 6(1) Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms for the reasons set out in paragraphs 1-3 herein?

1. Whether Applicant was denied “natural justice” by Divisional Court not supplying him with copies of “Bench Memos/Summaries” of Crown Office lawyer in respect of Applicant’s case?

2. Whether Applicant entitled under rules of “natural justice” to be provided with copies of confidential “Bench Memos/Summaries” prepared by “judicial assistants” of Civil Appeals Office?

1. Whether Divisional Court were correct to hold that Applicant had “habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground” “instituted vexatious civil proceedings” etc., under section 42(1)(a)(b) Supreme Court Act 1981?

1. Whether Divisional Court were correct and had jurisdiction to take into account Applicant’s subsequent alleged conduct of his legal proceedings once they had been instituted under section 42(1)(a)(b)(c) Supreme Court Act 1981?

1. Whether Divisional Court denied Applicant “natural justice” by not providing him with specific opportunity of addressing it in relation to length and duration of any Order it proposed to make under section 42(2) Supreme Court Act 1981?

2. Whether Divisional Court should have made such Order limited in time in any event, under section 42(2) Supreme Court Act 1981?

3. Whether Divisional Court should have applied any tariff criteria applicable to seriousness of cases involving Applicant before making indeterminate “Civil Proceedings Order” under section 42(2) Supreme Court Act 1981?

4. Whether Court of Appeal should set aside “Civil Proceedings Order” of Applicant as being disproportionate in effect due to length of Order, or should reconsider issue itself de novo under Part 52 rule 52.10(1) and (2)(a) Civil Procedure Rules 1998, or refer issue back to Divisional Court for further consideration under Part 52 rule 52.10(2)(b) Civil Procedure Rules 1998?

1. Whether Divisional Court’s exercise of its discretion in making “Civil Proceedings Order” was disproportionate in effect in respect of Applicant by restricting bringing of further actions in respect of subject matter wholly unrelated to actions taken into account by Divisional Court?

2. Whether Divisional Court should have considered utilisation of alternative remedies by Injunction under section 37(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 and/or under inherent jurisdiction of court as being more proportionate remedy in respect of actions of Applicant?

1. Whether making of “Civil Proceedings Order” against the Appellant under section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 was and the making of such Orders generally are “established by law” and/or “prescribed by law” and in breach of schedule 1 article 6(1) and 10(1) Human Rights Act 1998?

2. Whether phrases “instituting vexatious civil proceedings” “habitually and persistently and without reasonable ground” under section 42(1)(1)(a)(b)(c) Supreme Court Act 1981 are too vague and undefined?

3. Whether consequences of making of “Civil Proceedings Order” are “established by law” and/or “prescribed by law” and in breach of schedule 1 article 6(1) and 10(1) Human Rights Act 1998?

4. Whether phrases “abuse of the process of the court” and “reasonable grounds” under section 42(3) Supreme Court Act 1981 are too vague and undefined?

5. Whether consequences of applications for subsequent leaves under section 42(3) Supreme Court Act 1981 are reasonably foreseeable?

6. Whether Court of Appeal should grant Applicant under section 4(2) Human Rights Act 1998 a Declaration of Incompatibility in respect of section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981 vis à vis schedule 1 article 6(1) and 10(1) Human Rights Act 1998?

7. Whether section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981 has been repealed by later enactment of Human Rights Act 1998.

8. Whether Declaration of Incompatibility relief under section 4(2) Human Rights Act 1998 is only applicable to statutes passed after enactment and/or implementation by Statutory Instrument of Human Rights Act 1998?

10. For “real danger” of bias test, also see judgment of House of Lords in R v Gough (1993) 2 All ER 724, (1993) AC 646, per Lord Goff at page 737 para J to page 738 paras A-B.

1. Contended that Court of Appeal should grant leave to Applicant in present case, as issues are of sufficient importance and novelty that clarification of law is required in public interest.

2. This especially so relating to issue of denial of “natural justice” by existence of “Bench Memos/summaries” before Divisional Court and whether Applicant denied opportunity of fully arguing his case before Divisional Court, and the validity of continuing this practice in view of the coming into force of Data Protection Act 1998 on 1 March 2000.

3. Also issues of compatibility of section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981 with Human Rights Act 1998, coupled with length and proportionality of “Civil Proceedings Order”.

4. Tests for granting leave to appeal by Court of Appeal fully set out in Ex parte Gilchrist re Armstrong (1886) 17 QBD 521, per Esher MR at page 527-528,

5. See further in Buckle -v- Holmes (1926) 2 KB 125, per Banks LJ at page 127,

6. See also Part 52 rule 52.3(6)(a)(b) Civil Procedure Rules 1998, and in particular sub-rule (b), which provides,

7. Therefore, issue of reasonable prospects of success not only criteria, as Court of Appeal may wish to have some points of law of general public importance which need clarification by Court of Appeal in general public interest, even if it was of view that substantive issue might be resolved against Applicant.

8. Therefore contended that tests set out in still very relevant to tests for granting leave to appeal under Part 52 rule 52.3.(6)(a)(b) Civil Procedure Rules 1998.

9. All of issues raised by Applicant relate to “Civil Proceedings Order” removing previously held constitutional right of access to court and right of “freedom of expression”, especially if not “not prescribed by law” for purposes of article 6(1) and 10(1) Convention for Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, now enacted in Schedule 1 Human Rights Act 1998.

10. These may be very serious issue indeed, in view of implementation of Human Rights Act 1998 on 2 October 2000.

11. This point recently emphasised in Johnson -v- Valks (2000) 1 All ER 450, per Walker LJ at page 453 para G,

1. Applicant not given full and fair hearing before Divisional Court as not permitted to address court in relation to all of his actions that were being taken into account by HM Attorney-General, see Applicant’s Witness Statement signed on 23 October 2001 at pages 24-29 of Applicant’s Bundle.

2. Divisional Court therefore acted in arbitrary way in restricting time in respect of Applicant’s submissions.

3. Common Law principles of natural justice enacted in section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 which provides :-

4. Provisions for being heard in defence of application under section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 clearly therefore creates condition precedent to making of any valid “Civil Proceedings Order”.

5. Present “Civil Proceedings Order” made against Applicant must therefore be rendered a nullity ab initio for failure of Divisional Court to permit him to address court on remaining legal proceedings relied on by HM Attorney-General.

6. Applicant also denied natural justice at common law by being denied “audi alteram partem”, see University of Ceylon -v- Ferodo (1960) 1 All ER 631, per Lord Jenkins at page 637 paras H-I to page 638 paras A-F.

7. See also Kanda -v- Government of Malaya (1962) 2 WLR 1153, per Lord Denning at page 1162.

8. Applicant had right to appear in any proceedings in High Court in person under section 27(2)(d) and (6) Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.

9. See also Wiseman -v- Borneman (1971) AC 297, where held that right to natural justice and audience before court could only be removed by statute and Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, where complete hearing before Watch Committee denied to Chief Constable.

10. See Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, per Lord Reid at pages 66-73 for review of previous decided cases and approval of Hopkins -v- Smethwick Local Board of Health (1890) 24 QBD 712, per Wills J.

11. This analysis subsequently reviewed and fully approved by House of Lords in Chief Constable of North Wales Police -v- Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141, per Lord Brightman page 153 paras G-I to page 154 paras A-C para H.

12. Analogy with provisions of section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 can be made to observations of Lord Reid in Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, where clarified issue relating to rules of natural justice being applicable to provisions of section 191(4) Municipal Corporations Act 1882 relating to dismissal of Chief Constables as follows at page 80.

13. See further regarding principles of natural justice in Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, per Lord Morris at pages 113-114. See further in Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, per Lord Morris at pages 121.

14. See further for review of decided cases in Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, per Lord Morris at pages 122-125 and at page 122, per Lord Morris at page 124 and per Lord Hodgson at pages 132-133.

15. Approach adopted by House of Lords in Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, subsequently approved of and applied by House of Lords in Chief Constable of North Wales Police -v- Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141 regarding arbitrary request to resign of Probationary Constable by Chief Constable without giving any reasons or opportunity to comment on that issue.

16. See Chief Constable of North Wales Police -v- Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141, per Lord Hailsham at page 144 paras C-D.

17. Also recently held that principles of “natural justice” apply to Pensions Ombudsman in Seifert and anor -v- Pensions Ombudsman and anor (1997) 1 All ER 214, applying Duffield -v- Pensions Ombudsman (1996) Times Law Report 30 April.

18. Again, analogy with provisions of section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 can be gleaned from Seifert and anor -v- Pensions Ombudsman and anor (1997) 1 All ER 214, per Lightman J at page 222 paras G-H and page 223 para A.

19. If Applicant denied “natural justice” at Common law, then this too may render “Civil Proceedings Order” against him a nullity and Order liable to be set aside ex debito justitiae.

20. See also Al-Mehdawi -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (1990) 1 AC 876, per Lord Bridge at page 898,

21. Principle set out in Judicial Review by Michael Supperstone QC and James Goudie QC, Chapter 8 - Natural Justice - (The Audi Alteram Partem rule) and Fairness, page 206 “Result of breach”.

22. Contended that Applicant was not attempting to waste court time by addressing court in relation to each individual action, as was entitled to address them as to what cases were about and why they were brought and whether they were in fact misconceived etc.

23. Therefore, failure by Divisional Court to permit Applicant “natural justice” in present case infringed schedule 1 article 6(1) Human Rights Act 1998 by denying him “in the determination of his civil rights” a “fair” “hearing” under that article.

24. There were in this case a large number of actions and proceedings involved relied on by HM Attorney-General, and it was simply not possible for Applicant to be able to deal with all of them in the short time allotted, and he was unfairly cut short when he had not even reached half way.

1. In relation to this issue, Applicant relies on all of submissions already set out at great length in his Skeleton Argument before Divisional Court, see pages 32-42 numbered pages 152-162 of Applicant’s bundle.

1. In relation to this issue, Applicant relies on all of submissions already set out at great length in his Skeleton Argument before Divisional Court, see pages 19-32 numbered pages 139-152 of Applicant’s bundle.

2. Applicant notes that Respondent has completely failed to address impact of Data Protection Act 1998 as securing access to litigants of Bench Memos.

3. For Applicant’s submissions relating to impact of Data Protection Act 1998, see pages 30-31 numbered pages 150-151 of Applicant’s bundle.

4. Applicant reiterates all of those submissions, but accepts that Court Service may in appropriate cases seek to presently rely on “transitional relief” ending on 23 October 2001, see schedule 8 Data Protection Act 1998.

5. However, after that date all manual documents if retained in structured file as defined definition of “relevant filing system” in section 1(1) Data Protection Act 1998 will become accessible, unless any of exceptions of Act apply, and Respondent has not sought to raise any.

6. However, once Freedom of Information Act 2000 comes into force, all manual documents will become accessible whether retained in structured file or not, as that definition is amended, although that amendment is not yet in force.

7. Applicant also notes that Respondent also does not comment on issue as to whether Parker -v- Law Society was decided per incuriam.

8. However, issue may now be irrelevant, as after October 2 2000, no previously decided cases binding if in conflict with Human Rights Act 1998 which overrides any previous doctrines of stare decisis if such conflict arises at common law.

9. If in statute, such statutes must be interpreted in way which conforms to European Convention, see section 3(1) Human Rights Act 1998 unless impossible to do so when declaration of incompatibility comes into play.

10. In any event, Parker -v- Law Society decided before bringing into force of either Data Protection Act 1998 or Human Rights Act 1998 and did not take into account the impact of either of those two statutes.

11. Respondent cites Feldbrugge -v- Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 425 which related to refusal to access case file and make comments regarding welfare benefits tribunal and that case cited in European Human Rights Law (1999) by Keir Starmer.

12. Contended that “Bench Memos” clearly may have influence on court and may comment on legal issues rather than being a merely impartial chronology of facts of case.

13. Even there, individual litigant may wish to comment to court and make representations if felt that writer of memo has misinterpreted important facts relating to his or her individual case.

14. Applicant contends that there is no difference between submissions and observations made by Crown Office Lawyers or in Court of Appeal judicial assistants, and evidence not revealed to parties, as by denying legitimate access, litigant is denied opportunity of correcting any false assertions.

15. Under section 12A(1)(a)(b) Data Protection Act 1998, person subject to “data” being held, now has statutory right to have corrected any false statements or assertions in such “data” and if necessary may take court action to ensure that this is done, see section 14(1) of Act.

16. Therefore clearly now intention of Parliament that documents such as “Bench Memos” will become accessible to litigants in High Court and Court of Appeal.

17. European Court has also held that persons are entitled to see any advices and legal submissions made by others that are put before tribunals, in order to participate in the proceedings and preserve “equality of arms”.

18. See Ruiz-Mateos -v- Spain (1993) 16 EHRR 505, Lombao-Machado -v- Portugal (1997) 23 EHRR 79, and Van Orshoven -v- Belguim (1998) 26 EHRR 55, all discussed in European Human Rights Law (1999) by Keir Starmer where commented on that this may have repercussions for amicus lawyers, intervening parties and clerks in Magistrates’ Courts etc.

19. Contended therefore that same must now apply to authors of “Bench Memos” to Administrative Court and Court of Appeal.

1. In relation to this issue, Applicant relies on all of submissions already set out at great length in his Skeleton Argument before Divisional Court, see pages 10-15 numbered pages 130-135 of Applicant’s bundle.

2. For recent instance where Divisional Court not satisfied that Respondent’s legal actions had been “habitual and persistent”, see Attorney-General -v- Flack DC transcript CO/3416/99 29 November 2000.

3. See Attorney-General -v- Flack, per Pill LJ, DC transcript at para 25,

4. Recent case of Attorney-General -v- Wheen Supreme Court Library transcript 7 December 2000, in Court of Appeal added nothing to interpretation of phrase “habitual and persistent” and contended is of no assistance to present case.

1. Applicant contends that Divisional Court did not have jurisdiction to consider manner in which legal proceedings had been conducted, once instituted.

2. Divisional Court only confined to initial view of whether original proceedings were “instituted” vexatiously and “without any reasonable ground”, see section 42(1)(a) Supreme Court Act 1981.

3. Canadian Federal Vexatious Statute does provide for subsequent conduct to be taken into account.

4. See section 40(1) Federal Courts Act, which provides,

5. If lacuna therefore exists in section 42(1)(a)(b)(c) Supreme Court Act 1981, then could only be remedied by Parliament.

6. For further statement of general principle applicable, see Re Sherman and Apps (1981) 72 Cr App R 266, per Donaldson LJ at page 269,

7. However contended that any issue of legal proceedings by Applicant within limitation period laid down by Limitation Act 1980 could not be criticised, as within ambits laid down by Parliament.

8. If thought that any limitation periods are too long, these may be amended by Parliament as in Defamation Act 1996 to one year for defamation actions unless further leave applied for on good ground.

1. In relation to this issue, Applicant relies on all of submissions already set out at great length in his Skeleton Argument before Divisional Court, see pages 42-53 numbered pages 162-173 of Applicant’s bundle.

2. Applicant further contends that making of indefinite “Civil Proceedings Order” disproportionate without any means to have it reviewed or rescinded at later date if change of circumstances.

3. Canadian Federal vexatious statute gives court specific power for “rescission” of order subsequently in addition to appeal.

4. See section 40(3) Federal Courts Act, which provides,

5. New South Wales State vexatious statute in Australia also gives court specific power to “vary or rescind” order subsequently in addition to appeal.

6. See section 84(3) Supreme Court Act 1970, which provides,

1. Contended that it is implicit that full reasons are given as to why either an indefinite order is made, or one limited in time and the reasons for applying any particular tariff and time limit.

2. This was done in Attorney-General -v- Ebert DC transcript CO/4506/98 7 July 2000, see per Laws LJ at para 54,

3. See also further for giving of detailed extended reasons in Attorney-General -v- Ebert DC transcript CO/4506/98 7 July 2000, see per Silber J at paras 55-64 and in particular para 64,

4. Supplying reasons for dismissal of appeals in the Crown Court, was established in R -v- Harrow Crown Court ex parte Dave (1994) 1 WLR 99.

5. See R -v- Harrow Crown Court ex parte Dave (1994) 1 WLR 99, per Pill J at page 107,

6. This principle again applied in R -v- Snaresbrook Crown Court ex parte Brooke (1997) COD 81, R -v- Snaresbrook Crown Court ex parte Impact Management Ltd 4 March 1999 Crown Office transcript CO/2593/98, and recently in Pullam -v- Crown Prosecution Service 17 April 2000 Crown Office transcript CO/3948/99.

7. For full review of law relating to lack of reasons, see Flannery and anor -v- Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd (2000) 1 All ER 373, where proper evaluation of conflicting evidence held essential and recitation of evidence not sufficient.

8. See in particular Flannery and anor -v- Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd (2000) 1 All ER 373 All ER 159, per Henry LJ at page 377 para C-J to page 378 para A-E,

9. Applicant contents that the Divisional Court patently failed the “Flannery” test and was therefore vitiated.

10. Similar issues have arisen in connection with giving reasons by Housing Benefit Review Boards as required under regulation 83(4)(b) Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987.

11. See R -v- Housing Benefit Review Board of South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Tooley (1996) COD 143, per Ognall J.

12. Held that reasons should cover proper evaluation of all of important aspects of evidence given and submissions made, and that anything less than this was unfair.

13. See also for giving of adequate reasons, R -v- Housing Benefit Review Board of City of Cardiff Borough Council ex parte Thomas (1991) 25 HLR 1, per Pill J at page 5.

14. See also R -v- Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Cunningham (1991) 23 HLR 534, per Hutchison J at page 543.

15. See further in R -v- Housing Benefit Review Board for East Devon District Council ex parte Gibson & Gibson (1993) 25 HLR 487, per Bingham MR at pages 494-495.

16. Principle and previous authorities on adequate reasons considered in R -v- Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council Housing Benefits Review Board ex parte Simpson (1994) 26 HLR 370, per Sedley J at page 377,

17. See further in R -v- Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council Housing Benefits Review Board ex parte Simpson (1994) 26 HLR 370, per Sedley J at pages 379-380.

18. Any failure to do give reasons or adequate ones may also contravene schedule 1 article 6(1) Human Rights Act 1998 which requires reasons for decisions for a “fair hearing”.

19. See Hadjianastassiou -v- Greece (1993) 16 EHRR 299 at paras 34-37,

20. See also De Moor -v- Belgium (1994) 18 EHRR 372 at para 55,

21. See also Van de Hurk -v- Netherlands (1994) 18 EHRR 481 at para 61,

22. Finally, see Hiro Balini -v- Spain (1995) 19 EHRR 566 at para 27,

1. In relation to this issue, Applicant relies on all of submissions already set out at great length in his Skeleton Argument before Divisional Court, see pages 54-60 numbered pages 174-180 of Applicant’s bundle.

1. All Statutes must be construed in manner which is compatible with Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms if possible, see section 3(1) Human rights Act 1998.

2. “Declaration of incompatibility” under section 4(2) Human Rights Act 1998 only comes into play if this is not possible, which would appear to be present case.

3. Statutes to comply with Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, now incorporated by schedule 1 Human Rights Act 1998 into domestic law, must be sufficiently certain and reasonably foreseeable, in order to be “established by law” article 6(1), and “prescribed by law” article 10(1).

4. For application of this principle by the European Court of Human Rights, see Sunday Times -v- UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245, 271, para 49,

5. These principles were again applied recently in Steele -v- UK and Hashman and Harrup -v- UK relating to the terms of binding over order being too vague and uncertain.

6. This is also principle of domestic law, see Bennion on Statute Law 3 Edition at pages 153-154, and Black-Clawson International Ltd -v- Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenberg AG (1975) AC 591, p 638, Wright -v- British Railways Board (1983) 2 AC 773, at p 785.

7. US Supreme Court has also applied same principles in Conally -v- General Construction Co (1926) 269 US 385, 391, as otherwise, it fails “due process” test of the fifth and fourteenth amendments US Constitution.

8. See also Grayned -v- City of Rockford (1972) 408 US 104, 108, and Village of Hoffman Estates -v- The Flip Side, Hoffman Estates Inc (1982) 455 US 489, 503.

9. Same principles were applied in California decisions in Seabord Acc Corp -v- Shay (1931) 214 Cal 361 and Woton -v- Bush (1953) 41 Cal 2nd 460, 464.

1. Phrases in section 42(1)(a)(b)(c) Supreme Court Act 1981 too vague and meaningless and too wide in their ambit to be compatible with Convention.

2. Contended that phrases, “habitual and persistently and without any reasonable ground” too wide and “vexatious” covers so many instances that its meaning and application in section 42(1)(a)(b)(c) Supreme Court Act 1981 rendered totally meaningless.

3. Also contended that phrases “abuse of the process of the court” again too wide and undefined regarding specific instances, as likewise “reasonable grounds” in section 42(3) Supreme Court Act 1981.

4. Contended that failure to define accurately in statute exact criteria required fatal to compatibility of section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981 with schedule 1 articles 6(1) and 10(1) Human Rights Act 1998.

5. Also lack of reasonable forseeability in consequences of “Civil Proceedings Order” once made, as lottery regarding grants of leave under section 42(3) Supreme Court Act 1981.

6. This so, especially as facts cannot properly be gone into by judge hearing applications for leave, so cannot be properly established by what criteria any proposed proceedings have “reasonable grounds”.

7. Conceded however that each Statute or domestic law has to be considered on own particular facts and provisions and application.

1. If conflict arises between enactment of later Act with earlier Acts, which cannot together be read in conformity, later Act repeals earlier, see Argyll (Duke) -v- Inland Revenue Commissioners (1913) 109 LT 893, per Scrutton J at page 895, Kariapper -v- Wijesinha (1968) AC 716.

2. There may also be an implied repeal by later Act, see Herbert Berry Associates Ltd -v- Inland Revenue Commissioners (1977) 1 WLR 1437, per Lord Simon of Glaisdale at page 1443. However, this may only be done if two Acts totally repugnant to each other.

3. Later repeal may also be implied if contradiction exists between earlier and later Statute, see Garnett -v- Bradley (1978) 3 App Cas 944, per Lord Blackburn at page 966.

4. These submissions may have relevance if section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981 could not be reconciled with Human Rights Act 1998, rendering “Declaration of incompatibility” for earlier conflicting statutes under section 4(2) Human Rights Act 1998 otiose.