(1) I was denied the opportunity of arguing my case as the court indicated that my submissions were to end at 3.30 pm, although my brother had been able to address the court for over an hour. In all I only had approximately 10 minutes at the most.

(2) No reasons were given for imposing an indefinite Civil Proceedings Order against me, apart from the court indicating that the order would be indefinite, and I was not invited to address the court on this issue in any event.

(3) The making of an indefinite order was disproportionate along with the making of the Order in any event.

(4) The constitution of the Divisional Court was not an fair and impartial tribunal as former Law Officers had been consulted about their appointment and the application was being brought by the Solicitor-General on behalf of the Attorney-General.

(5) The hearing before the Divisional Court was not before an fair and impartial tribunal as the court had secret bench memoranda prepared by Crown Office lawyers and the court never revealed the existence of these memoranda to me.

(6) The provisions of section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for the making of the Order were too vague and were not reasonably forseeable along with any consequences regarding obtaining permission to institute or continue with proceedings under section 42(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 once the order had been made.

(7) The making of such an Order is discriminatory regarding similar Orders in Northern Ireland and Scotland under article 14 as there are some advantages regarding the making of Orders in those jurisdictions as compared with an Order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 in England and Wales.

(8) I therefore do not consider that the making of the Civil Proceedings Order against me was established or prescribed by law under article 6(1) and 10(1) of the Convention.

(8) My appeal before the Court of Appeal was also an unfair determination of my civil rights under article 6(1) and 10(1) as my application for leave to appeal had only been permitted on limited grounds, although there was nothing in the then rules of court which provided as such. Also the judges were appointed in the same manner as before the Divisional Court.

(9) I did not have any effective remedies before either the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal, as the Human Rights Act 1998 had not been enacted in 1997 and had not been brought into force when my appeal was heard.

(10) My application to the House of Lords was dealt with on the papers without an oral hearing, and no reasons were given for the refusal of leave.