1. Whether Court of Appeal may entertain additional grounds apart from the grounds upon which limit leave to appeal was granted by Court of Appeal on 21 August 1997?

2. Whether Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to restrict grant of leave to appeal to Court of Appeal under Order 59 rule 14(2)(b) RSC 1965 in any event?

1. Whether sufficient proof before Divisional Court that then HM Attorney-General delegated authority to then HM Solicitor-General under section 1(1)(c) Law Officers Act 1944 to make application for "Civil Proceedings Order" against 2 Appellant?

2. Whether sufficient proof before Divisional Court that then HM Solicitor-General thereafter authorised making of application for "Civil Proceedings Order" against 2 Appellant?

3. Whether hearsay evidence contained in para 6 of 2 Affidavit of Charlotte Isobel Martin sworn on 10 July 1996, contravened article 6(1) Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms?

4. Whether Respondent should be permitted to file further evidence in Court of Appeal relating to issues No 1-2?

1. Whether also sufficient proof before Divisional Court that then HM Solicitor-General had personally considered papers in the case and whether such an application would be in public interest?

2. Whether decision of Government Law Officers to apply for "Civil Proceedings Order" can be challenged in a court as being oppressive and unconstitutional?

1. Whether application for "Civil Proceedings Order" against 2 Appellant was correctly brought in name of HM Attorney-General if he purported to delegate authority to bring the proceedings to then HM Solicitor-General under section 1(1)(c) Law Officers Act 1944?

2. Whether then HM Solicitor-General had authority to further delegate authority for bringing application against 2 Appellant to Treasury Solicitors’ Department?

1. Whether 2 Appellant denied "natural justice" by Divisional Court denying him opportunity to be heard in relation to all of legal issues raised in his skeleton argument relating to the Law Officers and related matters?

2. Whether as a result, Divisional Court breached mandatory provisions of section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 and whether this rendered "Civil Proceedings Order" against 2 Appellant void ab initio and a nullity?

1. Whether 2 Appellant denied "natural justice" by failure of Divisional Court to either inform him that they had been supplied with confidential "Bench Memos/Summaries" prepared by Crown Office lawyers and to provide 2 Appellant with copies?

2. Whether 2 Appellant entitled under rules of "natural justice" to be provided with copies of confidential "Bench Memos/Summaries" prepared by "judicial assistants" of Civil Appeals Office?

1. Whether there was lack of an "independent and impartial tribunal" before Divisional Court as required by Article 6(1) Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as result of application being brought on behalf of HM Attorney-General, due to his or his predecessors and also HM Solicitor General or his predecessors being consulted regarding appointment of High Court Judges?

2. Whether there was lack of an "independent and impartial tribunal" before Divisional Court as required by Article 6(1) Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as result of application being brought on behalf of HM Attorney-General, due to his or his predecessors and also HM Solicitor General or his predecessors being consulted regarding appointment of High Court Judges before being appointed as Lord Justices of Appeal?

3. Whether there was lack of an "independent and impartial tribunal" before Divisional Court as required by Article 6(1) Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as result of application being brought on behalf of HM Attorney-General, due to his or his predecessors and also HM Solicitor General or his predecessors being members of HM Government due to recommendations of Lord Chancellor as to appointment of High Court judges, and recommendation of Prime Minister on advice from Lord Chancellor regarding appointment of Lord Justices of Appeal?

4. Whether the hearing before the Court of Appeal is before an "independent and impartial tribunal" as required by Article 6(1) Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms for the reasons set out in paragraphs 1-3 herein?

1. Whether Divisional Court should have differentiated between 1 and 2 Appellants in making indeterminate Civil Proceedings Orders and should have made such Orders limited in time in respect of either or both of them under section 42(2) Supreme Court Act 1981?

2. Whether Divisional Court should have applied any tariff criteria applicable to seriousness of cases involving 2 Appellant before making indeterminate "Civil Proceedings Order" under section 42(2) Supreme Court Act 1981?

3. Whether Court of Appeal should set aside "Civil Proceedings Order" of 2 Appellant as being disproportionate in effect due to length of Order, or should reconsider issue itself de novo under Order 59 rule 10(3) RSC 1965?

1. Whether Divisional Court’s exercise of its discretion in making "Civil Proceedings Order" was disproportionate in effect in respect of 2 Appellant by restricting bringing of further actions in respect of subject matter wholly unrelated to actions taken into account by Divisional Court?

2. Whether Divisional Court should have considered utilisation of alternative remedies by Injunction under section 37(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 and/or under inherent jurisdiction of court as being more proportionate remedy in respect of actions involving 2 Appellant?

1. Court of Appeal granted leave to 2 Appellant simultaneously with Appellant, his brother on 31 August 1997, although 2 Appellant not present in court at time due to illness, court permitted him to be represented by 1 Appellant.

2. Although leave granted to 2 Appellant as indulgence in his absence, this was on basis that his case raised exactly same points relating to constitutional points of law of public importance as that of 1 Appellant, and would have been unfair in those circumstances to deny right of appeal to him.

3. Court of Appeal however, purported to limit leave to appeal to issue of whether proceedings properly brought by Attorney-General, and whether sufficient or any evidence of this before Divisional Court,

4. See 2 Appellant’s Core Bundle, Notice of Appeal dated 29 August 1997, grounds 1-8 at pages 2-5 and Court of Appeal's Order dated 21 August 1997 granting leave to appeal at pages 16-18, and in particular, para 1 of Order at pages 16-17.

5. See Order 59 rule 14(2)(b) RSC 1965, which provided at time of original granting of leave,

6. This wording not changed in new Court Rules, and in particular Order 59 rule 14(2)(b) RSC 1965, apart from replacement of "leave" with "permission".

7. In order to obtain such leave from Court of Appeal, prospective Appellant must therefore show prima facie case for appeal made out, and that issue or point of law raised which requires clarification in public interest by court.

8. Contended that test of prima facie case similar to that required to obtain leave to move for Judicial Review from High Court under Order 53 rule 3(1) RSC 1965, which similar filtering process to weed out unmeritorious applications which disclose no arguable case and have no reasonable prospects of success.

9. Tests for granting leave to appeal by Court of Appeal fully set out in Ex parte Gilchrist re Armstrong (1886) 17 QBD 521, per Esher MR at page 527-528,

10. See further in Buckle -v- Holmes (1926) 2 KB 125, per Banks LJ at page 127,

11. These principles now mirrored in Court of Appeal Practice Direction, see Practice Note (1999) 1 All ER 186.

12. Contended that remaining grounds are in any event clearly prima facie arguable and raise issues of public importance that should be considered by court, viz. denial of Natural Justice by Divisional Court in breach of mandatory provisions of section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 and length and proportionality of "Civil Proceedings Order" made against him.

13. See similar requirements for obtaining leave in Order 53 rule 3(1) RSC 1965, which provided at time,

14. Divisional Court held in R -v- Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Roberts and ors (1990) 3 All ER 487, that in cases where single judge has granted leave to move for Judicial Review on limited grounds, unnecessary to renew applications for leave regarding grounds on which leave not specifically granted.

15. If Applicant nevertheless wishes to argue additional grounds on which leave not granted at substantive hearing, procedure is to serve adequate notice on respondent that at hearing, Applicant will seek to rely on those additional grounds in support of application, even though previous leave not been granted by single judge.

16. See R -v- Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Roberts and ors (1990) 3 All ER 487, per Watkins LJ at page 489 paras C-E,

17. Contended that practice approved by Divisional Court in R -v- Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Roberts and ors (1990) 3 All ER 487, must ipso facto be applicable to appeals in Court of Appeal, where court has granted leave to appeal on limited grounds.

18. Procedure approved in R -v- Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Roberts and ors (1990) 3 All ER 487, therefore adopted by 2 Appellant in present case, as clearly indicated by his Notice of Appeal that would seek to rely on additional grounds of appeal in respect of which leave not granted on 21 August 1997.

19. See 2 Appellant’s Core Bundle, Notice of Appeal dated 29 August 1997, grounds 9-22 at pages 5-8, and in particular, notification heading that 2 Appellant would seek to rely on those additional grounds at page 5.

20. Therefore contended that 2 Appellant completely free to argue additional points in respect of which leave not granted, and would be wholly wrong of Court of Appeal to attempt to refuse him leave to do so, especially as was not present on 21 August 1997.

21. In any event, in present case although Court of Appeal merely purported to grant limited leave, did not specifically go on to refuse leave on remaining grounds, which would in any event leave 2 Appellant free to advance additional original grounds on which leave to appeal sought.

22. Court of Appeal has since adopted similar principles, see Greenhalls Management Ltd -v- Canavan Court of Appeal transcript 19 May 1997, per Mummery LJ, at page 4 paras B-C,

23. See further in Greenhalls Management Ltd -v- Canavan Court of Appeal transcript 19 May 1997, per Mummery LJ, at page 5 paras E-F,

24. See most importantly in Greenhalls Management Ltd -v- Canavan Court of Appeal transcript 19 May 1997, per Woolf MR, at page 6 paras F-H to page 7 paras A-G,

25. These principles again considered in Yorkshire Bank plc -v- Hall and ors (1998) Times Law Report January 14, judgement December 18.

26. See Yorkshire Bank plc -v- Hall and ors (1998) handed down judgment January 14, per Walker LJ at pages 10-11,

27. These principles now subject to Court of Appeal Practice Direction, see Practice Note (1999) 1 All ER 186, per Woolf MR at page 188 paras E-H,

28. For similar approach in Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) see R -v- Jackson (1999) 1 All ER 572, at page 574 para G,

29. Court of Appeal would not therefore be restricted by its previous Order dated 21 August 1997 from considering original grounds in their entirety and from granting subsequent leave to appeal on those if felt appropriate.

30. In addition, 2 Appellant not present in court due to illness on 21 August 1997, when Court of Appeal granted him leave simultaneously with 1 Appellant .

31. Therefore must follow that 2 Appellant has not been heard in relation to issue of grant of leave on remaining grounds at all, and only natural justice that now be fully heard.

32. However, in view of ruling of Divisional Court in R -v- Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Roberts and ors (1990) 3 All ER 487, contended that not therefore necessary for him to further apply for leave in respect of those additional grounds, but if required to do so by court, 2 Appellant seeks specific leave to appeal regarding them.

33. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R -v- Cox and Thomas (1999) Times Law Report February 4, judgment January 19 per Bingham CJ further held that was not necessary to have to renew grounds where single judge had granted leave on one ground under section 31 Criminal Appeal Act 1968 but not specifically refused leave on remaining ones, approving dicta in R -v- Jackson (1999) 1 All ER 572.

34. Contended that this is correct principle applicable to 2 Appellant’s current Notice of Appeal.

1. Contended that provisions of Order 59 rule 14(2)(b) RSC 1965 did not give Court of Appeal jurisdiction in any event to have granted restricted leave to appeal on limited grounds to 2 Appellant, as merely provided that "Court may grant or refuse the application".

2. No specific power in Order 59 rule 14(2)(b) RSC 1965 or section 54 Supreme Court Act 1981 to restrict grant of leave to appeal, and contended that if leave granted, this operates as a grant of leave as a whole and all points then open to Appellant as of right.

3. Divisional Court in R -v- Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Roberts and ors (1990) 3 All ER 487 did not make any ruling as to whether practice of granting leave to move for Judicial Review on limited grounds was lawful, therefore point still open to argument as with grant of leave in Court of Appeal.

4. 2 Appellant therefore contends that would need an amendment to Order 59 rule 14(2)(b) RSC 1965, to enable Court of Appeal to grant restricted leave to appeal.

5. Desirability of this power being incorporated into provisions of Order 53 rule 3(1) RSC 1965 relating to granting of leave for Judicial Review commented on in R -v- Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council and ors (1994) 1 All ER 577.

6. See R -v- Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council and ors (1994) 1 All ER 577, per Laws J at page 600 paras H-J,

7. Laws J clearly recognised that at present, court does not have specific power to split up grounds for granting leave to move for Judicial Review, and refusing leave on remaining ones.

8. If lacuna therefore exists in Order 53 rule 3(1) RSC 1965, then can only be remedied by Parliament on recommendation of Supreme Court Rule Committee and wrong for court to gloss over matter as indicated by Laws J.

9. For further statement of general principle applicable, see Re Sherman and Apps (1981) 72 Cr App R 266, per Donaldson LJ at page 269,

10. Contended that same principle must ipso facto apply to grant of leave by Court of Appeal under Order 59 rule 14(2)(b) RSC 1965.

1. Fact that issues relating to appointment of and status and locus standii of then Law Officers not able to have actually been argued in detail in 2 Appellant’s Skeleton Argument before Divisional Court wholly irrelevant, as they were attempted to have been raised, but Divisional Court wrongly refused to hear 2 Appellant in relation to them.

2. In any event, issues raised go to validity of "Civil Proceedings Order" made against 2 Appellant, and issue of proper authorisation for bringing of application for "Civil Proceedings Order" properly accepted as being raised in Court of Appeal in Attorney-General -v- Hayward (1995) 10 November 1995, to extent that additional affidavit allowed to be filed relating to alleged consents of Law Officers.

3. 2 Appellant completely free to argue points of law and jurisdiction not argued before High Court, see Norwich Corporation -v- Norwich Electric Tramways Co Ltd (1906) 2 KB 129, per Vaughan Williams LJ at page 121,

4. See further in Norwich Corporation -v- Norwich Electric Tramways Co Ltd (1906) 2 KB 129, per Stirling LJ at page 129,

5. Points of law regarding County Court appeals if not reliant on any new evidence or facts not found in court below, may now be argued in Court of Appeal although not taken below, see Pittalis -v- Grant (1989) 3 WLR 139, (1988) 2 All ER 622 where decision of House of Lords in Smith -v- Baker & Sons (1891) AC 325 held no longer binding due to change in statutory provisions relating to County Courts.

6. See Pittalis -v- Grant 3 WLR 139, per Nourse LJ at page 145 paras A-C,

7. Follows that 2 Appellant free to take all jurisdiction points and arguments relating to appointment of and locus standii of Law Officers in relation to application under section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 although not permitted to be argued before Divisional Court.

WEIGHT OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE

1. Not conceded by 2 Appellant that then HM Attorney-General actually authorised application for "Civil Proceedings Order" against him. Law Officer must personally authorise application to be made under section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981.

2. Otherwise application brought without jurisdiction, see R -v- Bates (1911) 1 KB 946, per Lord Alverstone CJ at page 946,

3. Not conceded by 2 Appellant that then HM Attorney-General delegated to then HM Solicitor-General authority to make application for "Civil Proceedings Order" against 2 Appellant either under section 1(1)(c) Law Officers’ Act 1944.

4. Objection was taken before Divisional Court, see 2 Appellant’s Skeleton Argument at paras 1 to 5, see pages 62-63 of 2 Appellant’s core bundle.

5. This also conceded by Amicus curiae, see Skeleton Argument of amicus at page 7 para 14(a).

6. See also R -v- Waller (1910)1 KB 364, per Lord Alverstone CJ at page 367,

7. Necessity for specific delegation emphasised in respect of local authority planning decision which held unlawful as result of failure to specifically delegate under section 101(1)(a) and (2) Local Government Act 1972 in R -v- St Edmundsbury Borough Council ex parte Walton (1999) Times Law Report May 5, judgment April 13, per Hooper J.

8. Also contended that no direct evidence before Divisional Court of either delegation by then HM Attorney-General to then HM Solicitor-General, or thereafter authorisation by him for application to be made.

9. Divisional Court wrong to hold that para 6 of Charlotte Isobel Martin’s 2 Affidavit sworn on 10 July 1996 sufficient evidence of consents of Law Officers, see Divisional Court transcript of judgment, Attorney-General -v- Foley, per Rose LJ at page 2 para G to page 3 paras A-F, and in particular page 3 paras C-F,

10. Contended that hearsay evidence contained in para 6 of Ms Martin’s 2 Affidavit sworn on 10 July 1996 insufficient evidence of delegation and consent of then Law Officers.

11. Conceded that provisions of Civil Evidence Act 1995 not applicable to present application, as proceedings issued prior to coming into force of that Act on 31 January 1997, see Bairstow -v- Queen’s Mote (1998) 1 All ER 343.

12. This also conceded by Amicus curiae, see Skeleton Argument of amicus at page 9 para 15(e).

13. In any event, no evidence before Divisional Court that Ms Martin had any personal knowledge of matters deposed to relating to involvement of then Law Officers as required by Order 41 rule 5(1) RSC 1965.

14. For consequences of affidavit were deponent swears to matters which he has no direct knowledge, see Barclays Bank plc -v- Piper (1995) Court of Appeal transcript 23 May, per LJ at page 11 paras C-G to page 12 Para A,

15. Application of then HM Attorney-General substantive application and proceedings in own right, therefore this not interlocutory in nature or reliefs sought, therefore Order 41 rule 5(2) RSC 1965 inapplicable.

16. As issues were not peripheral, was not appropriate for hearsay evidence, see Arab Monetary Fund -v- Hashim and ors (No 7) (1993) 4 All ER 114, per Neil LJ under heading "Discretion in relation to an order under RSC Ord 38, r 3" at page 123 paras C-F,

17. Direct evidence was available and no reasonable excuse available to Respondent why such evidence should not have been used.

18. See R -v- Secretary of State for Home Dept ex parte Rahman (1996) 4 All ER 945, per Collins J in Habeas Corpus application, where observed that Respondents who relied on hearsay evidence when direct evidence available ran risk that court might attach less weight to it in those circumstances.

19. Conceded that admissibility of hearsay evidence upheld by Court of Appeal in R -v- Secretary of State for Home Dept ex parte Rahman (1997) 1 All ER 796, but weight to be attached to it purely for court itself, applying burden of proof approved of in House of Lords in R -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Khawaja (1984) AC 74.

20. Dicta of Collins J in R -v- Secretary of State for Home Dept ex parte Rahman (1996) 4 All ER 945 relating to weight of evidence approved of by Court of Appeal in R -v- Secretary of State for Home Dept ex parte Rahman (1997) 1 All ER 796, per Hutchison LJ at page 803 paras D-G,

21. Also for further additional dicta see R -v- Secretary of State for Home Dept ex parte Rahman (1996) 4 All ER 945, per Collins J at page 952, paras E-G and in particular para H,

22. For further confirmation of weight to be attached to hearsay evidence, see further in R -v- Secretary of State for Home Dept ex parte Rahman (1997) 1 All ER 796, per Hobhouse LJ at page 817 para B,

23. Contended that hearsay evidence relating to then Law Officers in present case in Ms Martin’s 2 affidavit sworn on 10 July 1996 wholly inappropriate due to nature of Order sought against 2 Appellant, and that Divisional Court ought to have attached little or no weight to it at all.

24. No excuse whatsoever why relevant then Law Officers could not have personally sworn affidavits due to importance of Civil Proceedings Orders removing constitutional rights of Appellants from bringing proceedings before the courts.

25. This very serious matter in democratic society in any event and circumstances very different from that of hearsay evidence of villagers accepted in R -v- Secretary of State for Home Dept ex parte Rahman (1997) 1 All ER 796.

26. European Court of Human Rights have considered wrongful admission of hearsay evidence to be in breach of article 6(1) Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, depending in importance of prohibited hearsay, see cases summarised in Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice 1997 at page 2790 Appendix E para E-62.

27. See in particular, Unterpertinger -v- Austria (1986) 13 EHRR 175 at para 29, Kostovski -v- Netherlands (1989) 12 EHRR 434 at para 39, Windisch -v- Austria (1990) 13 EHRR 281, Ludi -v- Switzerland (1992) 15 EHRR 173, Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo -v- Spain (1988) 11 EHRR 360, Bricmont -v- Belgium (1989) 12 EHRR 217, Delta -v- France (1990) 16 EHRR 574 and Saidi -v- France (1993) 17 EHRR 251.

28. Importance placed by democratic societies on right to a fair trial, observed by European Court of Human Rights in Delcourt -v- Belgium Series A No 11 at page 15 para 25,

1. Court must be satisfied that either then HM Attorney-General delegated authority to then HM Solicitor-General under section 1(1)(c) Law Officers Act 1944 to authorise substantive application for "Civil Proceedings Order" and that he subsequently gave his authority or then HM Attorney-General exercised this power himself before Order can be applied for with jurisdiction.

2. For example of affidavit setting out direct evidence of status and capacity of person making it in order to make application for winding up of company, see In Re Golden Chemical Products Ltd (1976) 1 Ch 300.

3. See In Re Golden Chemical Products Ltd (1976) 1 Ch 300, per Brightman J at page 311 paras D-E,

4. Ms Martin’s 2 affidavit failed to satisfy standard of proof applicable to such applications, see Attorney-General -v- Hayward (1995) 10 November 1995, Supreme Court Library transcript, per Henry LJ at page 13 para D to page 15 para F, and Pill LJ at page 25 para G to page 26 para D and Staughton LJ at page 26 para E to page 27 para A.

5. Divisional Court had to be satisfied on a high standard of balance of probabilities, see Attorney-General -v- Hayward (1995) 10 November 1995, Supreme Court Library transcript, per Henry LJ at pages 10 para G to page 12 para C, and in particular approving standard of proof approved of in R -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Khawaja (1984) AC 74, at page 11 paras A-B,

6. Divisional Court in its judgment conceded that this in fact standard of burden, although contended that this not applied to this particular issue, see Divisional Court transcript of judgment, Attorney-General -v- Foley, per Rose LJ at page 4 para G to page 5 para A,

1. Ms Martin’s 2 Affidavit on its face failed to satisfy criteria approved in Attorney-General -v- Hayward (1995) 10 November 1995, Supreme Court Library transcript, per Pill LJ at page 25 para G to page 26 paras A-D, and in particular paras C-D,

2. This principle relating to both jurisdiction of Court to make "Civil Proceedings Order" and evidence in support of it to show relevant involvement of Law Officers as required by section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981, again reinforced and applied in Attorney-General -v- Williams CO/905/95 April 22 1996 DC (1996) COD 386, Crown Office List transcript.

3. See Attorney-General -v- Williams CO/905/95 April 22 1996 DC Crown Office List transcript, per Pill LJ at page 2 paras D-F,

4. Principle of sufficient evidence of delegation of authority being before court, also emphasised relating to evidence of delegation by Chief Officer of Police under section 232 Road Traffic Act 1960 in Record Tower Cranes Ltd -v- Gisbey (1969) 1 All ER 418.

5. See Record Tower Cranes Ltd -v- Gisbey (1969) 1 All ER 418, per Parker CJ at page 420, paras C-G,

6. Should therefore have been evidence before Divisional Court with full affidavits from both then Law Officers who had direct personal knowledge of granting of relevant authorisation as signatures now admissible under section 1(1) Civil Evidence Act 1995.

7. For general desirability of authorization of Official Receiver in writing to bring proceedings, see Re Lord E Fitzgerald (1915) 112 LT 86, per Horridge J at page 86,

8. For possible form of further evidence if written signatures available, see R -v- Turner (1910) 1 KB 346, per Channel J at page 357,

9. Therefore contended that no jurisdiction at all for Divisional Court to have made "Civil Proceedings Order" against 2 Appellant without sufficient proof of proper authorisation and consideration of papers, and no evidence that application therefore "made" by then HM Solicitor-General for purposes of section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981.

10. Contended that "Civil Proceedings Order" made on present evidence rendered nullity ab initio as result, and must be set aside ex debito justitiae by Court of Appeal.

1. Contended that Treasury Solicitors not able to file additional evidence before Court of Appeal as to additional evidence relating to alleged consents and consideration of merits by then Law Officers for application against Appellant under section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981, or any other evidence relating to lawful appointments of Law Officers to their posts.

2. Evidence of these formal matters should have been proved in any event in Divisional Court and would constitute formal evidence relating to whether application brought with jurisdiction, and whether purported then Law Officers had locus standii to grant any consents to proceedings being brought and properly considered merits of case against 2 Appellant.

3. Such evidence available with reasonable diligence in Divisional Court by Treasury Solicitors, and such fresh evidence not now admissible in Court of Appeal, see Ladd -v- Marshall (1954) 1 WLR 1489, (1954) 3 All ER 745.

4. For Treasury Solicitors to be permitted to adduce fresh evidence before Court of Appeal, must satisfy 3 conditions :-

5. Conceded that Treasury Solicitors could satisfy conditions (b) and (c) but must fail completely regarding condition (a) of Ladd -v- Marshall principles, which held still to apply unless evidence has arisen since trial, see Hugh -v- Singh (1989) Times Law Report April 21.

1. Literal strict interpretation must be given to section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981. Statutes removing rights of citizen to be interpreted as though were penal statute.

2. See Maxwell on Statutes, 12 Edition pages 251-252, and Walsh -v- Secretary of State for India (1863) 10 HLC 367, per Lord Westbury LC and Hugh -v- Windust (1884) 12 QBD 224, per Bowen LJ.

3. See also Bennion on Statute Law 3rd Edition by Francis Bennion at pages 149-150, "Impairment of rights in relation to law and legal proceedings".

4. Removal of legal remedies to be strictly construed and this must apply to provisions of section 42(1A)(a)(b)(c) and (3) Supreme Court Act 1981, see Boulting -v- Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (1963) 2 QB 606.

5. Mischief rule of statutory construction inapplicable to penal statutes, see London & County Commercial Properties Investments Ltd -v- Attorney-General (1953) 1 WLR 312, per Upjohn J at page 319, and Tuck & Sons -v- Priester (1887) 19 QBD 629, at page 638 and Plowman J in Re HPC Productions Ltd (1962) Ch 466, at page 486, and Lord Tomlin in ICR -v- Duke of Westminster (1936) AC 1.

6. See David -v- Da Silva (1934) AC 106, Wonderland Cleathorpes (1965) AC 58, per Viscount Simmons at page 71, and D'Avigdor-Goldsmid -v- Inland Revenue Commissioners (1953) AC 347.

7. Further, if any ambiguity in statute, more lenient interpretation should be given in favour of subject, see David -v- Da Silva (1934) AC 106, and Wonderland Cleathorpes (1965) AC 58, per Viscount Simmons at page 71 and D'Avigdor-Goldsmid -v- Inland Revenue Commissioners (1953) AC 347.

8. Attorney -v- Jones (1990) 2 All ER 636 wrongly decided that mischief rule applied to interpretation of section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981, per Donaldson MR at page 638 para H.

9. This dictum not binding on any subsequent Court of Appeal, as decided per incuriam, see W A Sharratt Ltd -v- John Bromley Church Stratton Ltd (1985) QB 1038 regarding cannon of interpretation applicable, or in conflict with Re Boaler (1915) 1 KB 21 which equally binding on Court of Appeal.

10. Re Boaler (1915) 1 KB 21 authority on interpretation of meaning of "legal proceedings" which given restrictive meaning to excluding criminal proceedings in Vexatious Actions Act 1896 which statutory predecessor of section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981, and apart from some amendments is consolidating statute.

11. Same approach would apply to phrase "made by the Attorney General" in section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 to give most favourable meaning regarding their consents and consideration of application to Divisional Court in respect of 2 Appellant.

12. In construing consolidating Act, Parliament presumed not to alter existing law, see Gilbert -v- Gilbert (1928) P 1, per Scrutton LJ and R -v- Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte De Demko (1959) 1 QB 268, per Lord Evershed MR.

13. Also presumption that words in present statute bear same meanings as former, see Crook -v- Edmondson (1966) 2 QB 81, and therefore cannon of interpretation applied in Re Boaler (1915) 1 KB 21 still applicable to whole of section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981.

14. Authorities all fully discussed in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edition at pages 20-25.

15. Strict literal rule applicable to statutes relating to abrogation of rights of citizens applied in Re Boaler (1915) 1 KB 21, per Kennedy LJ at pages 34-35,

16. See principle further expounded in Re Boaler (1915) 1 KB 21, per Scrutton LJ pages 38-39,

17. Again in Re Boaler (1915) 1 KB 21, per Scrutton LJ at page 41 principle overwhelmingly applied to construction of Act,

18. If Attorney -v- Jones (1990) 2 All ER 636 in conflict with Re Boaler (1915) 1 KB 21, subsequent Court of Appeal may choose which one they follow, see Esselle AB and anor -v- Pearl Assurance plc (1997) 2 All ER 41 relating to conflicting decisions of Court of Appeal under Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, per Moritt LJ at page 54 in particular para B to page 55 in particular paras E-F.

19. However Re Boaler (1915) 1 KB 21 approved by Court of Appeal in Ex parte Ewing (No 2) (1994) 1 WLR 1553, per Bingham MR at page 1558 para F-G.

20. Ex parte Ewing (No 2) (1994) 1 WLR 1553 may therefore have already decided that cannon of construction applicable to section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981 in Re Boaler (1915) 1 KB 21 is correct and this may be binding.

21. This so, even though Bingham MR in Ex parte Ewing (No 2) (1994) 1 WLR 1553 did not go so far as to state that cannon of statutory construction applied in Attorney -v- Jones (1990) 2 All ER 636 was actually wrong and was thereby overruled, although this may be effect of his judgment.

22. See Precedent in English Law Fourth Edition by Cross and Harris at pages 133-134 and 144-145, The Law Making Process 5 Edition by Michael Zander at pages 272-273, The English Legal Process Fourth Edition by Terence Ingman at page 256, and Smith and Bailey on the Modern English Legal System Second Edition by SH Bailey and MJ Gunn at page 384.

23. Casey -v- Casey (1940) P 420 conflicted with Ramsey Fairfax -v- Ramsey Fairfax (1956) P 115 and reconciled in Ross-Smith -v- Ross-Smith (1961) P 39 choosing to follow Ramsey Fairfax -v- Ramsey Fairfax (1956) P 115, regarding hearing of Petitions for nullities where marriages held to be voidable.

24. See also Tiverton Estates Ltd -v- Wearwell Ltd (1975) Ch 146. Court is completely free to reopen whole question where previous decision is irreconcilable.

25. See Hogan -v- Bentick Colleries 40 BCWCC 268 per Lord Greene MR at page 276, Fisher -v- Ruislip-Northwood UDC (1945) KB 584, R -v- Gosh (1982) QB 1053 and Turton -v- Turton (1988) Ch 542.

26. See also National Westminster Bank PLC -v- Powney (1990) 2 All ER 416, regarding whether application for leave to execute judgment was action that was statute barred, following WT Lamb & Sons -v- Rider (1948) 2 KB 331 rather than Lougher -v- Donovan (1948) 2 All ER 11.

27. See also cases of Catherineholm A/S -v- Norequipment Trading Ltd (1972) 2 QB 314, Ashburn Anstalt -v- Arnold (1989) Ch 1 and Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd -v- Hett, Stubbs & Kemp (1979) Ch 384.

28. Unclear whether Court of Appeal should follow earlier decision on basis that latter decision was really bound by it.

29. Fact that in Attorney -v- Jones (1990) 2 All ER 636, Re Boaler (1915) 1 KB 21 not cited nor principle of what correct statutory cannon of statutory construction applicable to section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981 not unusual.

30. See Bonalumi -v- Secretary of State for Home Department and anor ((1985) 2 WLR 723, per Stephenson LJ at page 728 para H,

31. Court of Appeal not bound by Attorney -v- Jones (1990) 2 All ER 636 regarding statutory interpretation of section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981 further because inconsistent with previous decision of House of Lords, regarding penal statute rule applicable in statutes removing rights of citizens, see Walsh -v- Secretary of State for India (1863) 10 HLC 367, per Lord Westbury LC.

32. If this principle applicable, then Attorney -v- Jones (1990) 2 All ER 636 also at variance with decisions of House of Lords holding that where any ambiguity, more lenient interpretation to be given.

33. See David -v- Da Silva (1934) AC 106, Wonderland Cleathorpes (1965) AC 58, per Viscount Simmons at page 71 and D'Avigdor-Goldsmid -v- Inland Revenue Commissioners (1953) AC 347, and that mischief rule inapplicable in any event to interpretation of penal statutes, see ICR -v- Duke of Westminster (1936) AC 1, per Lord Tomlin.

34. Court of Appeal clearly not bound by its own previous decisions where they cannot stand with inconsistent decisions of House of Lords whether they are directly in point or not.

35. See Young -v- Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd (1944) KB 718, (1944) 2 All ER 293, per Greene MR at page 298 paras D-G.

36. Court of Appeal refused to follow its own decisions as being inconsistent with decisions of House of Lords in Fitzsimons -v- Ford Motor Co Ltd (1946) 1 All ER 429, see for full discussion The Law-Making Process by M Zander at page 205.

37. See also Verrall -v- Gt Yarmouth Borough Council (1980) 1 All ER 839, where Court of Appeal refused to follow its own decision in Thompson -v- Park (1944) KB 408, on ground that it was inconsistent with decision of House of Lords in Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd -v- Millennium Products Ltd (1948) AC 173.

38. As House of Lords decisions in respect of interpretation of statutes and Re Boaler (1915) 1 KB 21 not cited in Attorney -v- Jones (1990) 2 All ER 636, decision may be per incuriam.

39. See Rakhit -v- Carty (1990) 2 All ER 202 where Court of Appeal did not follow Cheniston Investments Ltd -v- Waddock (1988) 2 EGLR 136 because it had been given in error on mistaken assumption that Court was bound by Kent Millmead Properties Ltd (1982) 44 P&CR 353, which itself had been given per incuriam in ignorance of a relevant statutory provision. For full discussion see The English Legal Process 5 Edition by Terence Ingman at page 273-274.

40. This follows Williams -v- Fawcett (1985) 1 All ER 787 and Rickards -v- Rickards (1989) 3 All ER 193, which held that cases should not be binding if there could be clearly detected an error and there was no possibility of a further appeal to House of Lords.

41. Court of Appeal in present case therefore free to re-interpret whole statutory provision de novo, although in any event, present case distinguishable from Attorney -v- Jones (1990) 2 All ER 636, as involves different part of section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981 and relates to prohibition in respect of appeal from decision by High Court under section 42(3) Supreme Court Act 1981.

42. See for analogy Carr and ors -v- Atkins (1987) 85 Cr App R 343, where held inter alia that Court of Appeal no longer bound by any constraints in interpretation of phrase "criminal cause or matter" in R -v- Southampton JJ ex parte Green (1976) QB 11.

43. This followed reluctantly by Court of Appeal in R -v- Lambeth Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte McCombe (1983) 76 Cr App R 246, (1983) QB 551, which likewise no longer binding.

44. Contended therefore that strict literal interpretation should be given to phrase "made by the Attorney General" in section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981, and that if ambiguous, least onerous and favourable meaning should be given in favour of 2 Appellant.

1. Contended that decision of either then HM Attorney-General or then HM Solicitor-General to make application for "Civil Proceedings Order" against 2 Appellant, arbitrary oppressive and abuse of process of court.

2. No prima facie evidence before Divisional Court that either relevant then Law Officer had acquainted himself personally with facts of 2 Appellant’s case, see 1 and 2 affidavits sworn by Treasury Solicitor Ms Martin on 16 February 1996 and 10 July 1996.

3. Ms Martin’s 2 affidavit specifically fails to mention anything at all regarding personal consideration of merits of proposed application to Divisional Court against 2 Appellant and only deals with issues relating to strict delegation and consent for application to be brought under section 1(1)(c) Law Officers’ Act 1944.

4. See also test approved by House of Lords in Gouriet and ors -v- Attorney-General and ors (1977) 3 All ER 70, per Viscount Dilhorne page 89 para J to page 90 para A,

5. See also Attorney-General -v- Williams CO/905/95 April 22 1996 DC (1996) COD 386, per Pill LJ, where held that it appropriate for evidence to be before court that Law Officer had considered papers in case and had given merits of application his personal consideration, as well as simply his consent for making of application, due to nature of Order regarding fundamental right to bring proceedings before courts.

6. Prejudicial and tarnishing effect of the making of "Civil Proceedings Order" was illustrated in HM Attorney-General -v- Cutler (1987) 5 November, Supreme Court Library transcript, per Woolf LJ at page 5 para H to page 6 paras A-B,

7. As result of effect of "Civil Proceedings Order" against 2 Appellant, must therefore have been essential that merits of proposed application was properly considered by relevant then Law Officer, and whether in public interest that application should be brought at all.

8. If "Civil Proceedings Order" obtained arbitrarily against 2 Appellant affecting his reputation, then breach of article 12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 which provides,

9. See also article 17 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 which provides,

10. 2 Appellant contends that not only no proper evidence before Divisional Court of consent of either of then relevant Law Officers, but also that either of them had personally considered papers in case and merits of application, then difficult to see how application for "Civil Proceedings Order" could be said to be "made by Attorney- General" under section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 by either then HM Attorney-General or then HM Solicitor-General if thereafter properly authorised.

11. 2 Appellants contends that even if proved that relevant then Law Officer authorised application, "Civil Proceedings Order" would still therefore be nullity ab initio, if personal consideration not given to papers and merits of application as not therefore application of then Law Officer, and brought without locus standii.

12. Therefore application for "Civil Proceedings Order" complete misuse of statutory powers for ulterior purpose that not original intention of section 42 Supreme Court Act 1981.

13. See Municipal Council of Sydney -v- Campbell and ors (1925) AC 338, per Duff J.

14. 2 Appellant contends that court in special circumstances of present application, should review actions of government Law Officers who should be accountable before courts for their actions regarding applications for Civil Proceedings Orders under section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 in any event as matter of principle.

15. Gouriet and ors -v- Attorney-General and ors (1977) 3 WLR 300 and R -v- Solicitor-General ex parte Taylor (1996) 8 Admin LR 206, (1996) COD 61, not therefore relevant to this kind of case due to nature of Order being obtained, apart from reference in Gouriet and ors -v- Attorney-General and ors (1977) 3 All ER 70, per Viscount Dilhorne page 89 para J to page 90 para A.

16. R -v- Solicitor-General ex parte Taylor (1996) 8 Admin LR 206, (1996) COD 61 only decision of Divisional Court and may in any event be overruled by Court of Appeal.

17. Contended that same principles for review of Law Officers regarding applications for Civil Proceedings Orders should apply as approved by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions -v- Ministry for the Civil Service (1985) AC 374, per Lord Diplock at page 410 para D,

18. This even more so in view of observations of Pill LJ in Attorney-General -v- Williams CO/905/95 April 22 1996 DC (1996) COD 386.

1. Divisional Court completely failed to deal with this issue in its judgement at all as 2 Appellant not permitted to argue point, and contended that this fundamental flaw as went to whole jurisdiction of court to entertain application at all.

2. If then HM Attorney-General lawfully authorised then HM Solicitor-General to act in this case under section 1(1)(c) Law Officers’ Act 1944, then he became founts officio in matter, and Notice of Motion could not be issued in his name.

3. Once this delegation had taken place, all "functions authorised or required, by any enactment"-----------------------------------------------------------"to be discharged by the Attorney-General" became sole preserve of Solicitor-General.

4. This even so although section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 authorises application to be made by Attorney-General, as section 1(1)(ii) Law Officers’ Act 1944 applies to that statute.

5. See section 1(1)(ii) Law Officers’ Act 1944, which provides :-

6. Must be case that Solicitor-General is correct party to have brought application in own name and capacity, as section 1(1) Law Officers’ Act 1944 provides that "functions authorised or required" of "Attorney General may be discharged by the Solicitor General" if "the Attorney General authorises the Solicitor General to act in any particular case" under section 1(1)(c) of that Act, which is alleged in present case.

7. No provision in Law Officers’ Act 1944 for Solicitor-General to bring proceedings on behalf of Attorney-General or in his name at all, once valid delegation been made under section 1(1)(c) of that Act.

8. If all functions of then HM Attorney-General delegated to then HM Solicitor-General, this must have included power to direct institution of application in Crown Office by him, as if no such delegation, proceedings must be brought in name of Attorney-General, see section 17(2) and (4) Crown Proceedings Act 1947 which requires proceedings to be instituted in name of Attorney-General.

9. If case that all proceedings brought by Attorney-General directed by statute to be specifically brought in his name, must follow ipso facto that where delegation of functions to institute proceedings, those must be brought in name of Solicitor-General.

10. See also provisions of section 12(2) Interpretation Act 1978, which provides,

11. Section 1(1)(a)(b) Law Officers’ Act 1944 also provides that Solicitor-General may discharge any of functions of Attorney-General if :-

12. Would be odd if no existing Attorney-General or Attorney-General dead, and Solicitor-General then brought proceedings in name of non-existent or dead person, and contended that this would render proceedings nullity.

13. Regarding proceedings not authorised by Attorney-General ab inito, which similar to not being brought by Solicitor-General if delegated to him under section 1(1)(c) Law Officers’ Act 1944, see R -v- Bates (1911) 1 KB 946.

14. See in particular R -v- Bates (1911) 1 KB 946, per Lord Alverstone CJ at page 946,

15. See judgement of House of Lords in Lazard Bros and Co -v- Midland Bank Ltd (1933) AC 289, per Lord Wright at page 296-297,

16. Passage of Lord Wright in Lazard Bros and Co -v- Midland Bank Ltd (1933) AC 289, considered and approved of in Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari (No 4) (1990) Times, 23 February, per Morrit J holding that where question raised as to whether plaintiff existed as a legal entity, this not cured by Order 2 rule 1 RSC 1965.

17. These authorities approved of and reviewed by Court of Appeal in Fielding -v- Rigby (1993) 4 All ER 294, per Bingham MR and subsequently in International Bulk Shipping and Services Ltd -v- Minerals and Metals Trading Corp of India and ors (1996) 1 All ER 1017, per Evans LJ at page 1023 para G and page 1024 para H,

18. Also see further in International Bulk Shipping and Services Ltd -v- Minerals and Metals Trading Corp of India and ors (1996) 1 All ER 1017, per Evans LJ at page 1024 para H,

19. See also for action against non-existent bank, Deutsche Bank und Disconto Gesellschaft -v- Banque des Marchands de Moscou (1938) 158 LT 364, per Scrutton LJ at page 367,

20. Similar principles applicable to action commenced without lawful authority, see Adams -v- London Improved Motor Coach Builders Ltd (1921) 1 KB 495, per Atkins LJ at page 503,

22. Finally, if any ambiguity in section 1(1) Law Officers’ Act 1944, then recourse may be had to debates of both Law Officers’ Bill 1944 and Law Officers' Bill 1997 in Hansard in both Houses, see Pepper -v- Hart (1993) AC 593.

22. See Pepper -v- Hart (1993) AC 593, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at page 634 paras D-E,

23. For statement of Parliament's intention regarding section 1(1) Law Officers’ Act 1944, see statement of then Attorney-General Sir Donald Somervell in House of Commons during speech of 2 reading of Law Officers’ Bill 1944.

24. See Hansard extract for 27 June 1944, per Sir Donald Somervell at column 639,

25. Issue therefore goes to constitution of court to deal with application under section 42(1) Supreme court Act 1981, and if not brought by authorised Law Officer or lawfully delegated in first place under section 1(1)(c) Law Officers’ Act 1944, then proceedings must be rendered nullity ab inito.

1. These contentions now supported by amending provisions of Law Officers’ Act 1997 which received Royal Assent on 31 July 1997 but came into force on 1 October 1997, but effects not retrospective, as no provision in that Act expressly providing for this.

2. Clear therefore that although Law Officers’ Act 1997 had received Royal Assent when present Notice of Motion lodged in Crown Office on 5 August 1997 and application thereby instituted, present proceedings not affected by its provisions.

3. General rule of statutory construction that legislation presumed not to be retrospective unless specifically authorised in statutory provisions.

4. See Law Officers’ Act 1997 which now provides that,

5. For statements of Parliament’s intention regarding Law Officers’ Act 1997, see statements of previous HM Solicitor-General Lord Falconer of Thoroton QC in House of Lords during speech of 2 reading of Law Officers’ Bill 1997.

6. See Hansard extract for 16 June 1997, per Lord Falconer of Thoroton QC at column 1075,

7. See further in Hansard extract for 16 June 1997, per Lord Falconer of Thoroton QC at column 1077,

8. See also statements made by previous Attorney-General John Morris QC in House of Commons during speech of 2 reading of Law Officers’ Bill 1997.

9. See Hansard extract for 24 July 1997, per John Morris QC at column 1103,

10. Contended therefore that these provisions validate submissions of 2 Appellant, as otherwise Parliament would not have thought it necessary to enact that acts of Solicitor-General have effect as though done by Attorney-General and are not invalidated by any vacancies in either office, and that proceedings brought by Solicitor-General do not have to be brought in his own name instead of Attorney-General.

11. If submissions of 2 Appellant rejected by Court of Appeal, this would render provisions of Law Officers’ Act 1997 otiose, and contrary to express wishes of Parliament who clearly felt these matters needed specific statutory clarification and amendment.

1. Clear that Attorney-General and Solicitor-General are two separate Law Officers of Crown with separate seals of office issued under Letters Patent Act 1571 under Gt. Seal, and separately sworn into office before Lord Chancellor under section 12(4) Promissory Oaths Act 1868.

2. This must be so, as Solicitor-General has always been deputy to Attorney-General and his subordinate, see Wilks -v- R (1770) Wilm 322 at pages 329-330 HL; 6 Haldsworth’s History of English Law at pages 462-463 and 469-470, see also Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 8(2) paras 529-536, pages 368-372.

3. This again affirmed by amending provisions of section 1(1) and (2) Law Officers Act 1997, as otherwise new statutory provisions rendered otiose.

4. Also, when distinct interests relating to Crown, Solicitor-General may separately represent those interests, see Attorney-General -v- Galway Corpn (1828) 1 Mol 95 at page 101n, Attorney-General -v- Dean and Cannons of Windsor (1860) 8 HL Cas 369 and other cases cited in Robertson Civil Proceedings by and against the Crown at page 15, Ellis -v- Duke of Bedford (1899) 1 Ch 494 at pages 504 and 518, and Attorney-General -v- Duke of Richmond (No 2) (1907) 2 KB 940.

5. Both posts purportedly created at different times in constitutional history of country, per first Attorney-General appointed in 1315 as King’s Advocate and first Solicitor-General appointed in 1461.

1. Making of "Civil Proceedings Order" very severe restriction on civil rights of citizen, restricting otherwise unrestricted access to justice and courts of law open to every citizen in land, see Attorney-General -v- Williams CO/905/95 April 22 1996 DC Crown Office List transcript, per Pill LJ at page 2 paras D-F.

2. Desirable therefore that decision to apply for "Civil Proceedings Order" therefore taken by appropriate Law Officer in personam and not merely delegated civil servant in either Attorney-General’s Chambers or Treasury Solicitors’ Dept.

3. Not appropriate therefore for "Carltona" principle to be applicable, see Carltona Ltd -v- Ministry of Works (1943) 2 All ER 560, per Greene MR. Principles fully set out in Wade on Administrative Law 7 Edition pages 356-358.

4. See also Liversidge -v- Anderson (1942) AC 206, per Lord Maughan at page 224 relating to wartime detention orders, and also deportation of aliens in R -v- Chiswick Police Station Superintendent ex parte Sacksteder (1918) 1 KB 578 at pages 585 and 591.

5. See also case on departmental officials illegally making orders for return of fugitive offenders in R -v- Brixton Prison Governor ex parte Enahoro (1963) 2 QB 455, without prior authority of Secretary of State in view of important ramifications of making of such Deportation Orders.

6. If strict penal interpretation should be given in any event to phrase "application made by Her Majesty’s Attorney-General" in section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981, this clearly must indicate that Law Officers must give decision to bring application in personam.

7. Difficult to see how Carltona Ltd -v- Ministry of Works (1943) 2 All ER 560 could apply in any event to granting of consent to bring proceedings on behalf of HM Attorney-General, as proceedings deemed to have been brought by him in his constitutional office holder capacity.

8. This even more so if decision to make application delegated to Solicitor-General under section 1(1)(c) Law Officers’ Act 1944, as he again separate office holder constitutionally and historically from Attorney-General.

9. If consent given by Civil Servant, although proceedings later brought in name of HM Attorney-General, as his consent not personally given or that of Solicitor-General, application could not be made by them.

10. "Carltona" principle wholly inappropriate to granting of consent of Government Law Officer or Minister of State to institute proceedings on his behalf, as applies only to policy decisions of government etc. and can have no place in context of authorising legal proceedings to be brought on behalf of Minister of Crown or Law Officers of Crown.

11. For personal involvement of Law Officers in applications for Civil Proceedings Orders, see again emphasis given in Attorney-General -v- Williams CO/905/95 April 22 1996 DC Crown Office List transcript, per Pill LJ at page 2 paras D-F.

1. If Notice of Motion wrongly issued in name of Attorney-General when had no locus standii to bring such proceedings, must follow that issue of Notice of Motion nullity ab initio as relates to service on 2 Appellant of originating process issued by party without locus standii.

2. Also follows that if Notice of Motion of then HM Attorney-General issued of without locus standii, cannot be rectified by either substitution of parties or amendment of Notice of Motion if Notice of Motion nullity ab initio for want of issue by party without locus standii under statute.

3. This not mere "irregularity", and curable under Order 2 rule 1(2) RSC 1965, as failure to comply with terms of delegated authority under actual provisions of section 1(1)(c) Law Officers’ Act 1944 per se, and not breach of RSC 1965 or procedural irregularity relating to application of those rules.

4. See notes to Supreme Court Practice Vol (1997) Vol 1 at page 9,

5. For example, see Re Fletcher Supreme Court Library transcript Court of Appeal 11 June 1984, where previous "Vexatious Litigant Order" under section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 as was case then declared nullity in Court of Appeal.

6. This because application had been wrongly heard before Divisional Court when should have been heard before single judge under section 19(3) Supreme Court Act 1981, as no rules of court authorising this in force at time under section 19(3)(a) of that Act.

7. See Re Fletcher Supreme Court Library transcript, per Lawton LJ at page 5 para G,

8. For recent application of same principle, see Re a Debtor (No 340 of 1992) the Debtor -v- First National Commercial Bank plc and another (1994) 3 All ER 269, subsequently affirmed by Court of Appeal, see Re a Debtor (No 340 of 1992) ex parte the Debtor -v- First National Commercial Bank plc and another (1996) 3 All ER 211.

9. Held that wrongful purported Sheriff’s return of Writ of Fi Fa when Writ not actually executed as Sheriff could not gain entry to premises, held not to be "formal defect or irregularity" as outside ambit of rule 7.55 Insolvency Rules 1986 as not proceedings within them, with result that failure of execution could not be used as ground for presentation of subsequent Bankruptcy Petition.

1. Also contended that then HM Solicitor-General did not have locus standii to further delegate making of application to Treasury Solicitors, as were not authorised proceedings under Crown Proceedings Act 1947.

2. Both then Law Officers separate organs of government from each other, and likewise Treasury Solicitors’ Department, and so power could not be further delegated to Treasury Solicitors’ Department as one organ of government cannot act for another.

3. See Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 8 para 1274, 1281 and 1286, Carltona -v- Commissioners of Works (1943) 2 All ER 560, Jackson -v- Butterworth (1948) 2 All ER 558, Lavender -v- Ministry of Housing (1970) 3 All ER 1, and R -v- Secretary of State for the Environment (1990) COD 195.

1. 2 Appellant not given full and fair hearing before Divisional Court as not permitted to argue all of points raised in his skeleton argument or relating to merits of actions with which he had been concerned with, see affidavit of 2 Appellant sworn on 6 March 1997, and Divisional Court transcript of judgment, Attorney-General -v- Foley, per remarks of 2 Appellant at page 21 paras B-C.

2. Divisional Court acted in arbitrary way in restricting time in respect of 2 Appellant's submissions when 1 Appellant had been given full opportunity to address court in relation to merits of the particular actions in which he had been involved in.

3. Common Law principles of natural justice enacted in section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 which provides :-

4. Provisions for being heard in defence of application under section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 clearly therefore creates condition precedent to making of any valid "Civil Proceedings Order".

5. Present "Civil Proceedings Order" made against 2 Appellant must therefore be rendered a nullity ab initio for failure of Divisional Court to permit him to address court on all of points raised in his skeleton argument and also in relation to merits of the 8 actions with which he had been involved with 1 Appellant.

6. 2 Appellant also denied natural justice at common law by being denied "audi alteram partem", see University of Ceylon -v- Ferodo (1960) 1 All ER 631, per Lord Jenkins at page 637 paras H-I to page 638 paras A-F,

7. See also Kanda -v- Government of Malaya (1962) 2 WLR 1153, per Lord Denning at page 1162,

8. 2 Appellant had right to appear in any proceedings in High Court in person under Order 5 rule 6(1) RSC 1965 which provides,

9. Such rights now enshrined in statute as specificially recognised and preserved by section 27(2)(d) and (6) Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.

10. See also Wiseman -v- Borneman (1971) AC 297, where held that right to natural justice and audience before court could only be removed by statute and Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, where complete hearing before Watch Committee denied to Chief Constable.

11. See Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, per Lord Reid at pages 66-73 for review of previous decided cases and approval of Hopkins -v- Smethwick Local Board of Health (1890) 24 QBD 712, per Wills J,

12. This analysis subsequently reviewed and fully approved by House of Lords in Chief Constable of North Wales Police -v- Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141, per Lord Brightman page 153 paras G-I to page 154 paras A-C para H,

13. Analogy with provisions of section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 can be made to observations of Lord Reid in Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, where clarified issue relating to rules of natural justice being applicable to provisions of section 191(4) Municipal Corporations Act 1882 relating to dismissal of Chief Constables as follows at page 80,

14. See further regarding principles of natural justice in Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, per Lord Morris at pages 113-114,

15. See further in Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, per Lord Morris at pages 121,

16. See further for review of decided cases in Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, per Lord Morris at pages 122-125 and at page 122,

17. See further in Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, per Lord Morris at page 124,

18. See also in Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, per Lord Hodgson at pages 132-133,

19. Approach adopted by House of Lords in Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, subsequently approved of and applied by House of Lords in Chief Constable of North Wales Police -v- Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141 regarding arbitrary request to resign of Probationary Constable by Chief Constable without giving any reasons or opportunity to comment on that issue.

20. See Chief Constable of North Wales Police -v- Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141, per Lord Hailsham at page 144 paras C-D,

21. Also recently held that principles of "natural justice" apply to Pensions Ombudsman in Seifert and anor -v- Pensions Ombudsman and anor (1997) 1 All ER 214, applying Duffield -v- Pensions Ombudsman (1996) Times Law Report 30 April.

22. Again, analogy with provisions of section 42(1) Supreme Court Act 1981 can be gleaned from Seifert and anor -v- Pensions Ombudsman and anor (1997) 1 All ER 214, per Lightman J at page 222 paras G-H and page 223 para A,

23. If 2 Appellant denied "natural justice" at Common law, then this too may render "Civil Proceedings Order" against him a nullity and Order liable to be set aside ex debito justitiae.

24. See also Al-Mehdawi -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (1990) 1 AC 876, per Lord Bridge at page 898,

25. Principle set out in Judicial Review by Michael Supperstone QC and James Goudie QC, Chapter 8 - Natural Justice - (The Audi Alteram Partem rule) and Fairness, page 206 "Result of breach".

1. High Court have held that "Bench memos" should not be disclosed, see R -v- Lord Chancellor’s Dept ex parte O’Toole (1998) COD 269, per Collins J.

2. Court of Appeal have also recently held that "Bench memos" should not be disclosed, see Parker -v- Law Society (1998) Times Law Report December 8 judgment December 4, Independent Law Report December 11, (1999) 96 p. 2 LSG 29, (1999) 143 SJ LB 45.

3. Woolf MR held that "Bench Memos" prepared by members of Court of Appeal staff would only be revealed to members of court hearing case and not to appellants or applicants for leave to appeal.

4. This was to enable judicial assistants to express views freely and without hindrance allegedly for assistance of court.

5. 2 Appellant accepts that Parker -v- Law Society probably binding on Court of Appeal, but wishes to argue and raise point so that may be taken further in House of Lords and before European Court of Human Rights.

6. Parker -v- Law Society may however be at variance with authorities on disclosure under rules of "natural justice" and decided per incuriam and not therefore binding, see Williams -v- Fawcett (1985) 1 All ER 787 and Rickards -v- Rickards (1989) 3 All ER 193 and Rakhit -v- Carty (1990) 2 All ER 202.

7. 2 Appellant denied "natural justice" by Divisional Court not supplying him with copies of "Bench Memos/Summaries" of Crown Office lawyer in respect of his case, and was not informed or knew at time that such documents had been prepared by Crown Office Lawyer by court.

8. 2 Appellant may also be denied "natural justice" if not also supplied with copies of "Bench Memos/Summaries" of Civil Appeals Office lawyer regarding his appeal.

9. Current practice of Crown Office List and Civil Appeals Office lawyers to prepare "Bench Memos/Summaries" on merits and law applicable to cases involving litigants appearing in person.

10. Common law rules of "natural justice" apply to cases before Divisional Court and also appeals before Court of Appeal unless removed by statutory provision, see Wiseman -v- Borneman (1971) AC 297.

11. Any tribunal or body dealing with a statutory appeal that deals with documents that the other party has not been served with or seen so that they may make adequate representations, acts outside of rules of "natural justice".

12. See R -v- Tribunal of Appeal under the Housing Act 1919 (1920) 3 KB 334, per Lord Reading and R -v- Secretary of State for Health ex parte Gandhi (1991) 1 WLR 1053, per Taylor LJ, observing that due to non disclosure of documents there had been no hearing of matter at all.

13. See R -v- Secretary of State for Health ex parte Gandhi (1991) 1 WLR 1053, per Taylor LJ at page 1063 paras F-G,

14. See further in R -v- Secretary of State for Health ex parte Gandhi (1991) 1 WLR 1053, per Taylor LJ at page 1067 para H to page 1068 paras A-B,

15. This supported by Kanda -v- Government of Malaya (1962) AC 322, Chief Constable of North Wales Police -v- Evans (1982) 1 WLR 1155, R -v- Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police ex parte Stevenson (1986), The Times 22 April, R -v- Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset ex parte Clarke (1986) The Independent 27 November, Shareef -v- Commissioner for Registration of Indian and Pakistani Residents (1966) AC 47, R -v- Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex parte Jones (1962) 2 QB 677.

16. Principle of applicant being supplied with full particulars of representations by third parties fully explored by leading judgment of House of Lords in R -v- Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Doody and ors (1993) 3 WLR 154, (1993) 3 All ER 92, per Lord Mustill pages 105 para J to page 112 para D.

17. Full principles of fairness set out in R -v- Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Doody and ors (1993) 3 WLR 154, (1993) 3 All ER 92, per Lord Mustill at page 106 para E to H, and see in particular principle No. 6 at para H,

18. Held that applicants serving life sentences should be given full particulars of any comments made by trial judge and Lord Chief Justice as to the question of length time spent in custody so that they could make adequate representations as to consideration and subsequent release on licence. Held that denial of "natural justice" for applicants not to be so informed.

19. See in particular R -v- Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Doody and ors (1993) 3 WLR 154, (1993) 3 All ER 92, per Lord Mustill at pages 109 para F,

20. Additionally, same point affirmed by Court of Appeal in R -v- Parole Board ex parte Wilson (1992) QB 740 and R -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Georgiades (1992) TLR 268.

21. This again followed relating to disclosure of police enquiries and reports regarding referrals to Court of Appeal under then section 17 Criminal Appeal Act 1968 in R -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Hickey (No 2) (1995) 2 All ER 490.

22. See R -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Hickey (No 2) (1995) 2 All ER 490, per Simon Brown LJ, at page 501 para G,

23. "Natural justice" required that "Bench Memos/Summaries" prepared by Crown Office lawyer in respect of law and merits of 2 Appellant’s case before Divisional Court, if seen and read by members of court should have been disclosed to him by court prior to hearing of HM Attorney-General’s application for "Civil Proceedings Order" in order to give him opportunity of commenting on them.

24. Same principle also applies to "Bench Memos/Summaries" from Civil Appeals Office lawyer in Court of Appeal regarding present application for leave to appeal.

25. See R -v- Huntington DC ex parte Cowan (1984) 1 WLR 501, R -v- Kent Police Authority ex parte Godden (1971) 2 QB 622, R -v- London County Council ex parte Commercial Gas Co (1895) 11 TLR 337, R -v- National Insurance Commissioner ex parte Viscusi (1974) 1 WLR 646, Freeland -v- Glasgow Licensing Board (1980) SLT 101 and R -v- Westminster Assessment Committee ex parte Grosvenor House (Park Lane ) Ltd (1941) 1 KB 53. See also Administrative Law Sixth Edition HWR Wade pages 538 - 543.

26. See also R -v- Hampshire County Council ex parte K (1990) 2 QB 71, (1990) 2 All ER 129 where Council refused to disclose medical evidence to parents, per Watkins LJ at page 131 para J,

27. R -v- Army Board of Defence Council ex parte Anderson (1992) 1 QB 169, (1991) 3 All ER 375, illustrates principle of need for full and adequate disclosure of documents before tribunal considering matter, see per Taylor LJ distinguishing R -v- Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Mughal (1974) QB 313, (1973) 3 All ER 769, R -v- MMC ex parte Matthew Brown PLC (1987) 1 WLR 1235 and R -v- Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Santillo (1981) QB 778, (1981) 2 All ER 897.

28. See R -v- Army Board of Defence Council ex parte Anderson (1992) 1 QB 169, (1991) 3 All ER 375, per Taylor LJ, at page 388 paras E-F,

29. 2 Appellant therefore was not able to make adequate representations on contents of "Bench Memos/Summaries" and their applicability to his case before Divisional Court and likewise same may apply to application in Court of Appeal.

30. If 2 Appellant had been permitted to see these documents, would have been able to have submitted where "Bench Memos/Summaries" incorrect or contained prejudicial statements to his case and likewise would be able to do same in present appeal before court.

31. No statutory provision for court officials to provide "Bench Memos/Summaries" at all, and not provided for either in either Order 53 or Order 59 RSC 1965, and practice appears to have grown from around 1990 of Crown Office list and Civil Appeals Office lawyers acting off their own bat on frolic of their own.

32. For full discussion see The English Legal Process 5 Edition by Terence Ingman at page 273-274.

1. Contended that current practice of supplying "Bench Memos/summaries" in Crown Office List and Court of Appeal in breach of Article 6(1) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

2. In recent judgment of European Commission of Human Rights in Rowe and Davis -v- UK Application No. 28901/95, Commission held that breach of Article 6(1) of Convention where material in possession of prosecution regarding prosecution witnesses not revealed to defence, either at trial or during appeal to Court of Appeal.

3. See judgment of European Commission of Human Rights in Rowe and Davis -v- UK Application No. 28901/95, under heading "safeguard the fairness of proceedings" at paras 68-83,

1. Applicant was discriminated against vis à vis appellants in Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), as current practice in that court for barrister to prepare summary for use of court, but copies supplied to parties before hearing of case.

2. See Practice Direction (Criminal Appeal Summaries) 1992 1 All ER, per Taylor CJ at page paras C-H,

3. Therefore, Applicant was at disadvantage in Divisional Court and may be at disadvantage in Court of Appeal as opposed to appellants in criminal cases before Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).

4. This may also infringe article 14 Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and also article 26(1) Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966.

1. Contended that current practice of Crown Office and Civil Appeals Office lawyers preparing "Bench Memos/Summaries" for court involving litigants in person may be tantamount to serious Contempt of Court, as contempt perpetrated by attempts to influence judges currently hearing cases with view to influencing outcome.

2. See Supreme Court Practice 1998, Vol 1 notes to Order 52 rule 1 "words written or spoken, scandalising the Court". Considered contempt of court to write letters to judge in attempt to influence decision, see Lechmere Charlton’s Case (1837) 2 My & Cr 316, Martin’s Case (1747) 2 Russ & M 674, and Re Dyce Sombre (1844) 1 Mac & G 116 at page 122.

1. Section 42(2) Supreme Court Act 1981 provides,

2. Provision for Civil Proceedings Orders for "specified period" only came into force with enactment of section 42(2) Supreme Court Act 1981, as this provision not previously included in section 1 Vexatious Actions Act 1896 or section 51 Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, so that Orders made under those provisions were automatically indeterminate in length.

3. 2 Appellant also understand that no limited Orders for specified periods have ever been made under section 42(2) Supreme Court Act 1981 in respect of the 73 Orders subsequently made since 1981 including those against 1 and 2 Appellants, apart from 15 year Order made in Attorney-General -v- Price (1997) CO/3390/96 19 March 1997, Crown Office List transcript.

4. Contended that provisions of section 42(2) Supreme Court Act 1981 make it mandatory for Divisional Court in all cases to specifically consider whether proposed "Civil Proceedings Order" should remain in force for "a specified period" or "indefinitely" under section 42(2) Supreme Court Act 1981.

5. This construction of statute apparently conceded by Divisional Court, see Divisional Court transcript of judgment, Attorney-General -v- Foley, per Rose LJ at page 4 para G.

6. Contended therefore that if Divisional Court fails to deal with or consider issue of length of "Civil Proceedings Order" therefore has no jurisdiction to make Order at all, and provisions of section 42(2) Supreme Court Act 1981 would be rendered otiose.

7. Divisional Court must therefore in all cases afford full opportunity to Respondents to applications for Civil Proceedings Orders to make submissions on length of proposed Order, as they are clearly entitled to be heard regarding this important issue in accordance with principles of "natural justice".

8. Well established principle of "natural justice" that tribunal or relevant court must give litigants adequate opportunity of dealing with specific issue which must specifically be put to them in order to facilitate this.

9. See Ridge -v- Baldwin (1964) AC 42, per Lord Hodgson at pages 132-133,

10. See also Chief Constable of North Wales Police -v- Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141, per Lord Hailsham at page 144 paras C-D,

11. Contended that this principle extremely important in relation to all applications for Civil Proceedings Orders, as Order remains in force "indefinitely" and cannot be set aside by subsequent court unless nullity ab initio.

12. See Rohrberg -v- Charkin Times Law Report 30 January 1985, Supreme Court Library transcript 85/15, regarding to both Orders under section 51 Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 and section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, per Donaldson MR at page 1 para H to page 2 para A and para C-F,

1. Disqualification Orders in respect of company directors made for specified periods as provided by section 1(1) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, and relevant provisions of that Act under which the Disqualification Order is made.

2. Of particular relevance to indeterminate Civil Proceedings Orders made under section 42(2) Supreme Court Act 1981, is fact that when Disqualification Orders are made on conviction for an Indictable Offence by either Magistrates Court or Crown Court under section 2(1) and 2(2)(b)(c) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, maximum time limit orders should be reserved for only most serious of cases.

3. However, there are also provisions for both appeals and subsequent reviews of such Disqualification Orders under rules 7.47(1) and 7.49(1) Insolvency Rules 1986 which are applicable to Orders under section 21(2) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, as held in Re Tasbian Ltd (No. 2) (1992) BCC 322 and Re Probe Data Systems Ltd (No 3) (1992) BCC 110.

4. Contended therefore that should be matter of general principle that any "Civil Proceedings Order" should be "indeterminate" under section 42(2) Supreme Court Act 1981 in only most serious of cases, as case with Orders made by Crown Court under section 2(1) and 2(2)(b)(c) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, and also civil court Disqualification Orders as well under same Act.

5. See R -v- Millard (1993) 15 Cr App R (S) 445, per McCowan LJ at page 448 approving Re Seven Oaks Stationery (Retail) Ltd (1991) Ch 164, per Dillon LJ at page 174 paras E-G,

6. Would appear however, that Divisional Court so far has taken the view apart from Attorney-General -v- Price (1997) CO/3390/96, that indefinite orders are justified, as all constituted most serious and worse cases scenario.

7. See Attorney-General -v- Price (1997) CO/3390/96 Crown Office List transcript 19 March 1997, per Brooke LJ at page 27 para G and page 30 paras D-F to page 31 paras A-F ,

8. Contended that approach in Attorney-General -v- Price was itself flawed, as Divisional Court failed to apply any visible tariff criteria coupled with reasons for making "Civil Proceedings Order" for period of 15 years.

9. However, reality would appear to be that Divisional Court has previously, apart from judgment in Attorney-General -v- Price, completely failed to apply any criteria at all to this issue, and it would appear that this has been fully endorsed by Court of Appeal in few cases that have reached this court.

10. In present case, although Divisional Court specifically decided to make indeterminate Civil Proceedings Orders against each Appellant, it failed to differentiate between them in any way, and contended that was imperative that length of Order should have been considered separately in respect of each individual Appellant.

11. See Divisional Court transcript of judgment, Attorney-General -v- Foley, per Rose LJ at page 20 paras F-G.

12. This especially case with 2 Appellant, as he had only been on mere periphery of 1 Appellant’s actions, and had only been named as party to 8 actions of 26 actions of 1 Appellant that court considered.

13. In para 5 of Ms Martin’s 2 Affidavit sworn on 10 July 1996 at page 31 of 2 Appellant’s Core Bundle she swore that,

14. Whether this case in respect of Applicant/1 Appellant or not, no evidence that this could apply to 2 Appellant at all, as insufficient evidence placed before Divisional Court as to whether 2 Appellant was greater "driving force" than Applicant/1 Appellant.

15. Contended that this further example of failure of Divisional Court to adequately consider involvement of 2 Appellant in litigatin concerned, and to differentiate between him and Applicant/1 Appellant’s involvement which must even on face of documents be considerably greater if nothing more than being involved in nearly 3 times as many actions as 2 Appellant.

16. Also no evidence that 2 Appellant was force in litigation at all over and above other Plaintiffs in those actions, irrespective of involvement of Applicant/1 Appellant his brother.

17. In addition, Divisional Court failed to apply any criteria to both Appellants separately as to which category of seriousness their cases fell into, which must be relevant to issue of whether indefinite orders appropriate or whether such orders if made at all should have been limited and for what specified period.

18. If Court of Appeal finds therefore that "Civil Proceedings Order" rendered a nullity ab initio, it should be set aside ex debito justitiae and possibly rehearing ordered before differently constituted Divisional Court.

19. However, if Court of Appeal finds that "Civil Proceedings Order" merely voidable, then should reconsider de novo length of "Civil Proceedings Order" against 2 Appellant in any event, and exercise any relevant powers of correction or amendment under Order 59 rule 10(3) RSC 1965.

1. 2 Appellant draws to court’s attention fact that Disqualification Orders in respect of Driving Licences imposed by courts for road traffic offences under sections 34(1), 34A and 35(1)(a)(b) Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 in the United Kingdom usually made for definite periods of time.

2. Furthermore, such drivers may apply back to court that made original ban to remove disqualification under section 42(1) Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, in accordance with time limits set out in section 42(3)(a)(b)(c) of that Act, and even further subsequent applications permitted to be made not less than 3 months from date of refusal of previous application under section 42(4) of that Act.

3. These provisions in addition to offender being able to appeal against making of Disqualification Order imposed by Magistrates Court to Crown Court in simplicitor, irrespective of whether an appeal against remaining part of his sentence under section 38(1) Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.

4. In relation to conviction on Indictment, drivers can appeal against disqualification from Crown Court to Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) as part of their overall sentence under Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

5. Provisions relating to removal of Disqualification Orders under section 42(1) Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 applies even in rare cases where life Disqualification Orders have been imposed by Crown Court in bad cases involving death by dangerous driving.

6. In addition, same principles apply to Bankruptcy Orders, which can have severe repercussions for persons subject to them including redirection of mail, cutting off of gas and electricity supplies and most importantly, penal sanctions.

7. Such Orders are made for between 2 and 3 years under section 279(2)(a) and (b) Insolvency Act 1986 before automatic discharge, and there are similarly provisions for them to be subsequently annulled and even reviewed and rescinded under sections 282(1)(a) and (b) and 375(1) Insolvency Act 1986, in addition to normal appeal remedies under section 375(2) of that Act.

8. Similar principles also applicable to "Exclusion Orders" made against football hooligans under section 30(1) Public Order Act 1986, and persons who commit offences on licensed premises under section 1(1) Licensed Premises (Exclusion of Certain Persons) Act 1980.

9. In respect of persons convicted of offences during football matches satisfying criteria in section 31(2), (3)(a)(b)(c) and (4) Public Order Act 1986, the order is for the period specified in section 32(1) of that Act which must not be less than 3 months, but can of course be for life.

10. Again, the order can be appealed against as part of overall sentence of offender in the normal way, but there is specific provision for applications to terminate such orders after 1 year under section 33(1) Public Order Act 1986, and further applications may subsequently be entertained not less than 6 months from date of original refusal under section 33(2) of that Act.

11. In cases of persons convicted of violent offences on licensed premises, offender can be excluded from those "or any other premises" for period not less than 3 months but not more than 2 years under section 1(3) Licensed Premises (Exclusion of Certain Persons) Act 1980.

12. Provisions for "Exclusion Orders" relating to football hooligans and persons convicted of violent offences on licensed premises are therefore very similar in effect and application to driving Disqualification Orders.

13. Also, provisions for subsequent review relating to football hooligans under section 33(1) and (2) Public Order Act 1986, are almost identical to those contained in section 42(1) and (3)(a)(b)(c) and (4) Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.

14. Finally, 2 Appellant draws to court’s attention fact that prisoners’ discretionary life sentences for any offence, as well as those serving life sentences for murder, being mandatory under section 1(1) Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, may apply for Parole to Parole Board under section 34(3)(a) and (5) and section 35(2) Criminal Justice Act 1991.

15. Prisoners subject to such life sentences are entitled to full hearing for this purpose under section 32 of that Act with all of procedural guarantees implied by article 6(1) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

16. This has been implemented by UK Government largely as result of recent decisions of European Court of Human Rights in Weeks -v- UK Series A No 114, Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell -v- UK Series A No 190, and Wynne -v- UK Series A No 294-A, culminating in the recent case of Hussain -v- UK No 55/1994/502/584 regarding detention at Her Majesty's Pleasure.

17. Contended that indeterminate and un-reviewable nature of "Civil Proceedings Order" against 2 Appellant, wholly unwarranted in comparison to other determinate and subsequently reviewable Disqualification Orders and life sentences imposed by courts throughout United Kingdom.

1. In addition, 2 Appellant contends that current "Civil Proceedings Order" against him therefore offends against principle of "proportionality" as applied by European Court of Human Rights in recent cases.

2. See in particular Tolstoy -v- UK (1995) 20 EHRR 442, referred to in Attorney-General -v- Price (1997) CO/3390/96 19 March 1997 Crown Office List transcript, per Brooke LJ at page 23 paras B-E,

3. Test of reasonable proportionality applied in relation to reduction of libel damages under section 8(1) Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 by Court of Appeal in Rantzen -v- Mirror Group Newspapers (1993) 4 All ER 975.

4. Held that principles of article 10(1) Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms applicable to exercise of discretion in domestic law although not part of it, see Rantzen -v- Mirror Group Newspapers (1993) 4 All ER 975, per Neill LJ at pages 992 to 997, and in particular at page 993 paras B-C,

5. Principles of Rantzen -v- Mirror Group Newspapers (1993) 4 All ER 975 approved of and applied by Court of Appeal in John -v- MGN Ltd (1996) 2 All ER 35, per Bingham MR at page 58 para J, in light of subsequent judgment of European Court in Tolstoy -v- UK (1995) 20 EHRR 442.