1. The Right Honourable Lord Justice Latham was “disqualified” from being involved in hearing the application for a Civil Proceedings Order before the Divisional Court and/or there was occasioned a “real danger” of prejudice and bias by him being involved in hearing the said application.

2. The Right Honourable Lord Justice Latham was “disqualified” and/or there was occasioned a “real danger and possibility” of prejudice and bias thereby in the hearing of the said application because :-

3. The “disqualification” of the Right Honourable Lord Justice of Appeal aforesaid and/or the “real danger and possibility” of prejudice and/or bias arising out of his Lordship’s involvement in hearing the application before the Divisional Court resulted in the said court not being lawfully constituted as a Divisional Court to hear the said application under section 66(3) of the Supreme Court 1981 and/or Order 94 rule 15(1) RSC of Schedule 1 Part 50 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 and is liable to be struck down under the “Pinochet (No. 2)” and/or “Locabail” principle.

4. In the premises there was an unfair hearing before the Divisional Court in breach of the principles of “natural justice” and/or an unfair determination of the Appellant’s civil rights in breach of schedule 1 article 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

5. The Divisional Court erred in law in although holding that the Appellant’s “civil proceedings” had been vexatious and habitual and persistent and without “any reasonable ground” as required by section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 without supplying any adequate or proper reasons for reaching such conclusions.

6. The Divisional Court erred in law in taking into account civil proceedings which had resulted in adverse judgments being made against him in respect of which the Appellant was continuing to challenge and apply to have set aside by appeal or application to set aside.

7. The Divisional Court erred in law in taking into account civil proceedings which the Appellant had instituted in the Isle of Man as general background information to his civil proceedings within the jurisdiction of England and Wales which created improper prejudice to his case and were inadmissible as civil proceedings in any event that could be taken into account under section 42(1)(a)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

8. The Divisional Court erred in law in taking into account applications and appeals which the Appellant had made in the Bankruptcy proceedings brought against him and further by holding that Bankruptcy proceedings were civil proceedings within the meaning of section 42(1)(a)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

9. The Appellant was denied “natural justice” by the Divisional Court declining to supply him as a result of his specific request with a copy of the “Bench Memo and/or summary” and/or “secret briefing” prepared for the court by the Crown Office lawyer and/or judicial assistants and/or by misleading him that no such “Bench Memo and/or Summary” had been prepared in his particular case.

10. The Appellant was thereby denied the opportunity of being in a position to know adverse details of any comments made against him to his prejudice and of being able to make adequate or full representations in rebuttal thereby.

11. In the premises the Appellant believes that he was denied “natural justice” thereby as a result of the judges comprising the Divisional Court hearing the application against him having been secretly briefed by officials for and on behalf of the Lord Chancellor the head of the Judiciary and falsely he believes informing him that no such “Bench Memo and/or Summary” existed.

12. As a result thereof the hearing of the Claimant’s application was neither “fair” nor heard by an “independent and impartial tribunal” in breach of schedule 1 article 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

13. The Divisional Court erred in law in making the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant for an indefinite period under section 42(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 without specifically inviting and/or giving the Appellant an opportunity of addressing the court in relation to the said issue.

14. As a result thereof the hearing of the Claimant’s application against the Appellant was in held in breach of schedule 1 article 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 in that the Appellant was denied a “fair”-------“hearing”.

15. In the premises the Appellant was thereby denied “natural justice” by being denied “audi alteram partem” in respect of that specific issue and the making of the said Civil Proceedings Order against him is thereby rendered a nullity and should be set aside ex debito justitiae.

16. In particular the Divisional Court failed to apply its mind to the applicability of the correct tariff in respect of the Appellant seriatim relating to whether his alleged vexatious “civil proceedings” constituted :-

17. In respect of the Appellant this did not merit an indefinite order in any event under section 42(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 as it did not constitute the most serious and worst case scenario and the Divisional Court completely failed to apply its mind to this factor at all.

18. The Divisional Court erred in law in making the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant for an indefinite period under section 42(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 without giving full and adequate reasons as to why such an indefinite Order was necessary in the public interest.

19. The Divisional Court further wrongly exercised its discretion in making the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant which was disproportionate in effect by barring the bringing of further actions in the future by him without the prior leave of the High Court which might be wholly unrelated to the actions taken into account by the Divisional Court and their subject matter.

20. The Divisional Court further wrongly exercised its discretion in making the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant when he was already the subject of 2 Grepe -v- Loam Orders in relation to his Bankruptcy and further without discharging those Orders which continue to run indefinitely simultaneously with the current Civil Proceedings Order.

21. In the premises the making of indefinite the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant was rendered “Wednesbury” unreasonable and/or illegal and/or irrational and/or perverse and an unfair determination of his civil rights under schedule 1 article 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 when the Divisional Court ought to have utilised alternative remedies by way of Injunctions under section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court and should have discharged the Grepe -v- Loam Orders.

22. The making of the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant under section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 was and the making of such Orders generally are in breach of schedule 1 article 6(1) and 10(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 for the following reasons :-

23. The Court of Appeal is obliged to take into account all of the relevant Strasbourg decisions and judgments both of the former European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights under section 2(1)(a)-(d) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

24. The Court of Appeal is further obliged to interpret all domestic statutes and law in accordance with the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms under section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

25. Further it is unlawful for all public authorities including Her Majesty’s Attorney-General and the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal to act in any way which is incompatible with a Convention right under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 since the 2 October 2000.

26. The Divisional Court further erred in law by completely failing to address its mind to these issues and ruling on whether the making of such Civil Proceedings Orders were in breach of schedule 1 article 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 by denying complete access to the courts which was not the incompatibility issue raised before it by the Appellant.

27. As a result the Appellant should either :-